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SUMMARY
As of 2006, the amount of private contributions to US based 501(c)(3) nonprofit
charities totaled around $295 billion, representing an almost 28% increase over the
same figure in the year 2000. Coupled with an almost 35% increase in the number
of charities between 1995 and 2005, from 572,660 to 876,164, a picture begins to
emerge of a rapidly growing sector, with both increased market size and increased
competition. While the increased funding is beneficial to the sector at large, whether
or not increased competition is beneficial remains an open question. One of the side
effects of the growth explosion, particularly from the donor perspective, is increasing
complexity in the decision process. Furthermore, when one considers that donors
often times contribute to charitable goods of which they do not directly benefit, the
question of how one ascertains the quality of such goods adds a layer of complexity to
the decision problem. At its core, this dissertation examines the role of information,
particularly as it relates to proxies for quality, and how it affects both the donor and
organization decision processes in the humanitarian space.
In Chapter 2 I consider the context of competition within the sub-sector of in-
ternational humanitarian relief organizations. It has been observed that large scale
humanitarian relief events tend to spawn highly competitive environments in which
organizations compete with one another for publicity and funding, often times to
the detriment of effective resource utilization. The question of why altruistic orga-
nizations behave in this manner arises. Positing that competition is a result of dual
organization objectives and the inability to credibly signal quality a model of signal-
ing is presented to explain this phenomenon, and conditions under which pooling and
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separating equilibrium can occur are shown. Results are shown to match closely with
observed behavior, and potential policy remedies are considered using the model as
a foundation.
Chapter 3 addresses a similar question but broadens the analysis to that of a
general market for charitable goods. Building on foundational results in search the-
ory, I propose a two-stage model of donor search behavior to explain the effects of
transparency and exposure on both donor and organization behavior as it regards
how donors select organizations. Using both analytical and simulated results I show
how donor behavior changes under various market constructions, with implications
on total market outcomes and organization behavior discussed.
Chapter 4 concludes with an empirical analysis to test the assumptions and results
from the models of Chapters 2 and 3. Using an observational data set provided by the
online charitable giving marketplace GlobalGiving, fixed effects panel regression and
logit models are used to investigate the effects of transparency on both the amount
of a donor’s gift, and on the likelihood of repeat giving. Results are complicated by
discussed validity issues, and in general show that within the context of GlobalGiving
proxied transparency does not appear to have a significant practical effect on either
the amount of the gift or organization selection by a given donor. While some signif-
icance is shown for various constructions, the results are not shown to be robust. A





As of 2006, the amount of private contributions to US based 501(c)(3) nonprofit char-
ities totaled around $295 billion, representing an almost 28% increase over the same
figure in the year 2000 [18]. Coupled with an almost 35% increase in the number of
charities between 1995 and 2005, from 572,660 to 876,164, a picture begins to emerge
of a rapidly growing sector, with both increased market size and increased compe-
tition. While the increased funding is beneficial to the sector at large, whether or
not increased competition is benefical remains an open question. Giving should be
a powerful and satisfying act, both for the donor and the recpient, and as Clinton
[23] discusses, if done correctly can be a powerful and impactful experience for both.
However, as Paul Light notes [40] one of the side effects of the growth expolosion, par-
ticularly from the donor perspective, is increasing complexity in the decision process,
making it harder to choose which organizations to fund so as to maximize the giv-
ing experience. When one considers that donors often times contribute to chartiable
goods of which they do not directly benefit, the question of how one ascertains the
quality of such goods adds an additional layer of complexity to the decision problem.
At its core this dissertation examines the role of information, particularly as it relates
to proxies for quality, and how it effects both the donor and organization decision
processes. Building on the foundational work that deals with the economics of altru-
ism and philanthropy I propose two models, one of signaling and one of search, to
illuminate the effects of information and increased competition within the voluntary
nonprofit sector.
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Chapter 2, of which this dissertation was originally motivated, begins by consid-
ering the context of competition within the sub-sector of international humanitarian
relief organizations. It has been observed, primarily anecdotally, that humanitarian
relief events tend to spawn highly competitive environments in which organizations
compete with one another for publicity and funding, often times to the detriment
of effective resource utilization. This result is partly a function of the highly de-
centralized environment in which these organizations operate, as outlined in Figure
(1), but the question persists as to why, if the ultimate goal is that of relief provision,
do these organizations compete in such a manner? I posit that the competition is
largely a function of the nonprofit’s dual objectives (fundraising and service provi-
sion), and their inability to credibly pass themselves off as being quality organizations
if they do not undertake this competitive ritual. In this respect, a signaling model is
put forth to examine the effects of this hypothesis, and how an organization’s desire
to signal quality can be used to explain both congestion, as it regards the number
of organizations that participate at a relief site, and as it regards how organizations
distribute resources within the site.
The model is a two sided framework that assumes that the amount donors con-
tribute to a given organization, in part, hinges on their perception of an organization’s
productivity level as it regards the use of donated funds. In response it is assumed
that organizations, of which their are high productivity types and low productivity
types, use their level of relief provision as a signal to donors of their productivity
level. Relief in this sense is used as a catch-all term, but can be considered to be ac-
tivities which are costly, but give the appearance, real or otherwise, of aid provision.
Under the assumption that high productivity types can provide relief at a cheaper
cost (more effectively), I am able to characterize both separating and pooling equi-
librium, and the conditions under which each might occur. In the case of separating
equilibrium, depending on the humanitarian context, it is shown that competition
2
Figure 1: Overview of the Humanitarian Relief System as defined by Borton [19]
and the need to signal will induce high productivity organizations to provide relief
beyond what is optimal, essentially wasting critical resources. It is also shown that
given that donors’ beliefs are high enough, as it regards the concentration of high
quality organizations within a particular relief site, a pooling equilibrium can be in-
duced whereby high types allow low types to pool on their optimal provision level
of relief. The significance of this result is found when one considers that this donor
belief level is likely to be high for those environments in which the media coverage is
high, in part offering an explanation for why these areas are often heavily congested
with both established and nascent organizations. Using the model as a guide, several
policy prescriptions for smoothing resource and organization distribution across the
humanitarian landscape are offered.
While Chapter 2 provides a foundation for how information is considered and
utilized within the framework of humanitarian relief, Chapter 3 expands this notion
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to the broader market for humanitarian causes as a whole, and offers a complementary
hypothesis for how information effects donor and organization behavior. This chapter
uses economic models of search theory as a foundation, and proposes a two-stage
donor search model to explain donor behavior as is regards organization selection.
Whereas Chapter 2 models the effect of information on the amount a donor chooses to
provide to an exogenously assigned organization, this chapter sets aside the question
of the amount of the donation, and considers how the endogenous selection process
might occur. Like chapter 2, the assumption is maintained that donor’s care about
information which allows them to make inferences about an organization’s quality.
However, while Chapter 2 assumes that quality is absolute, Chapter 3 assumes that
organization quality is relative to individual donor preferences, and that donor’s can
only fully realize the quality of the match after paying some first stage cost.
In this model, after being introduced to an organization, a donor can choose
whether or not to pay a cost to sample this organization through first stage engage-
ment. The cost in this model is assumed to be an organization’s monitoring cost,
or transparency level. The assumption is made that donor’s care about organization
transparency as it makes it easier for them to ascertain the quality of the organiza-
tion’s work and the impact of their contribution. Resting on the fact that charitable
markets consist of organizations of varying transparency and exposure levels, the as-
sumption is made that an organization is able to manipulate both its transparency
level and its exposure level (i.e. the probability of being discovered by a given donor)
via its activity set. The donor’s decision of whether or not to contribute to an or-
ganization in the first stage, and subsequently match with the organization in the
second, are shown analytically, to take the form of reservation values. The model is
subsequently used, via simulation, to explain not only the behavior of donors, but
also why organizations might choose to engage in certain activities, in particular those
which diverge from their core mission.
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The results of the model show that while exposure and transparency are both
critical to organizational success in attracting donors, the effects of exposure are ab-
solute, while the effects of transparency are relative. In particular it is shown that
effects of unilateral increases or decreases in the transparency level of an organization
are largely dependent on the overall transparency level of the market. The effects in
markets which are initially highly transparent are shown to be negligible, while the
effects for low transparency markets are rather large for the individual organization.
Additionally, it is shown that not only do individual efforts in transparency reduction
increase donor market share for an individual organization, but these individual ac-
tions also have the effect of increasing overall donor participation within the market.
The extent to which the results from this model are reasonable are investigated via
an empirical case study in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 concludes by conducting an empirical analysis to test the assumptions
and results of the previous two chapters. Using an observational data set provided
by the online charitable marketplace, GlobalGiving, I investigate the effects of trans-
parency on both the amount of the donor’s gift, and on their likelihood of repeat
giving. Because of GlobalGiving’s market structure, and requirements of its partici-
pating organizations, I am able to formalize the abstract notion of transparency by
using the number, and recency of project updates as proxies for organizational trans-
parency. Using project updates, along with other project related variables, a fixed
effects panel regression along with an ordered logit model are used to investigate the
effects of transparency on the amount of the donation. In a related test of Chapter
3’s donor search model the data is coded, and modeled using multinomial logit, and
conditional logit models to determine the effect of information on a donor’s propen-
sity for repeat giving. The results are complicated by discussed validity issues, and
in general show that within the context of GlobalGiving proxied transparency does
not appear to have a significant practical effect on either the amount of the gift or
5
organization selection by a given donor. While some significance is shown for various
constructions, the results are not shown to be robust. GlobalGiving as a marketplace
is considered to be highly transparent in general, and is in part developed on the
notion that transparency in giving can lead to increased engagement by the general
population. Consequently, as informed by the analysis of Chapter 3, it is not sur-
prising that within market transparency effects appear to be negligible in most of the
analysis.
Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of future work and extensions, as derived
from the signaling and search models. While analysis of the GlobalGiving data is
an important first step in verification, comparison of the results across more diverse
populations and organizations would yield more conclusive results. Additionally, both
models are amenable to experimental testing, the design and implementation of which
will be critical going forward if the results are to help shape institutions and policy
within the nonprofit sector.
6
CHAPTER II
SIGNALING IN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
2.1 Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the presence of International Non-Governmental
Organizations (INGOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) has increased
rapidly, with the former being around 400,000 in number at the beginning of 2001
[7]. These organizations exist for a variety of reasons, among which include general
purpose humanitarian relief and development in disaster and crisis situations. What
makes these organizations distinct from traditional firms is that their primary purpose
is altruistic in nature. Inevitably, however, these relief organizations must dedicate
some percentage of resources to securing funds for the continued pursuit of their
primary goal. As a result, these organizations operate within these two objectives,
with the latter being a direct consequence of the primary objective. Given the large
number of INGOs and NGOs operating in the relief sector, all with a continual need
for funding, a highly competitive environment manifests itself.
Competitive environments inevitably require firms to offer more innovative and
cheaper products and services than their competition in order to remain profitable.
The relief sector is no different, but instead of a physical product, these organizations
essentially sell their service and relief work to donors, who purchase these services
for the affected populations. As a consequence, these organizations compete to sell
the perception that they are the most effective and timely relief organization. While
competition in traditional markets can be good for the consumer, in that it usually
results in improved pricing and products, that has not been shown to be the case
in humanitarian relief work. Within this context, competition offers somewhat of a
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paradoxical result in that it can often lead to the degradation of the primary relief
objective [25][105]. Additionally, competition not only degrades primary objective
performance on the individual organizational level, but it also degrades overall relief
performance, in that it actively dissuades cooperation and coordination among the
various NGOs.
One peculiar, but perhaps not surprising, side-effect of the competitive environ-
ment is the frequent observation of congestion in high attention relief areas, in par-
ticular during the timeframe immediately following the disaster. To be sure, much of
this congestion is attributable to the desire of the relief organizations to simply pro-
vide relief, but it is the hypothesis of this chapter that a portion of the congestion can
be attributable to the desire of the relief organization to distinguish itself as a high
quality organization, in the hopes of attracting donor funding. In fact Simon [89],
Bennett and Kottasz [16], and Brown and Minty [21] allude to exactly this behavior.
The notion of signaling in humanitarian relief is not meant to claim that relief is
only provided as a means to attract donor funding. The motivation for this framing
is that relief organizations must continue to fundraise in order to remain viable in a
highly competitive humanitarian marketplace. In turn, fundraising can be thought
of as a function of exposure and credibility. The more credible an organization is
perceived to be, and the more exposure it receives, it usually follows that its ability
to raise funds increases. This chapter contends that one of the primary tools that an
organization can deploy to bolster both credibility and exposure is the provision of
highly publicized relief, which effectively acts as a signal to donors of the aforemen-
tioned variables. In this context, the premise of this research rests on the assumption
that the ability, and what some may term the necessity, of organizations to use relief
as a signal effectively causes organizations to over provide in high visibility relief ar-
eas. While not necessarily harmful in isolation, this chapter advances the notion that
many instances of the oft cited congestion, waste, and coordination difficulties found
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at relief “hot spots” can be attributable, at some level, to this signaling driver, which
itself is manifested out of competitive pressures.
With respect to the hypothesis, the first task is to define an appropriate model of
the system that can be used to either reject or accept the assumption presented above.
There is a large body of anecdotal evidence to bring forth in support of the aforemen-
tioned statements in relation to coordination, waste, and congestion. However, while
there are several theories as to the impetus behind the sub-optimal states, there has
yet, to the writer’s knowledge, to be a casting of the problem within the framework
of principal-agent modeling, with the notion of signaling as the driver behind these
undesirable outcomes. What follows is an attempt to construct a descriptive model
in this light.
While the outcomes of this model can be applied across the general charitable
landscape, there is some value in a specific consideration of the humanitarian relief
context. In particular, many other charities are able to manufacture media events that
can showcase their work, or the results of their work, in a highly visible manner (i.e.
breast cancer walk for survivors, Habitat for Humanity, homeless shelters with food
lines, etc...). Humanitarian relief organizations, especially those of the international
variety, have a harder time making tangible the work that they do, with their work
often times occurring thousands of miles away from those who they depend on to
fund it, effectively offering to the potential donor what can be considered a credence
good [30]. Consequently, signaling is that much more important within this realm if
one considers that these organizations can only provide seemingly verifiable signals
through carrying out their work in a highly visible manner. Otherwise, they must
rely on what they tell others about the work that they do to fuel confidence. Thus,
while other charitable organizations have several verifiable signals to employ, relief
organizations are left with a subset of those. It is this distinction, perhaps most clearly
understood as a difference in signaling capabilities, that makes relief organizations
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more dependent on signaling through their work than others.1 While all charities
face, to some extent, an information asymmetry problem, and the need to signal,
it is considered that the nature of humanitarian relief and development work may
warrant special attention. Moreover, this work lays the foundation for several testable
outcomes about both organization and donor behavior, specifically:
• Donor beliefs about the proportion of high quality organizations participating in
an area directly influences the existence of dominant pooling equilibrium. The
existence of which leads to a more attractive funding environment for lesser
quality organizations.
• The level of relief provided by an organization directly contributes to the amount
of funding received by that organization.
• Depending on the environment, organizations give more than they would at
optimality, leading to congestion in resources.
These issues, along with several policy recommendations are developed through-
out the chapter. Section 2.2 provides further background and framing of the problem
through a review of related literature. Sections 2.3 presents a general model of sig-
naling in humanitarian relief, defines related solution concepts, and characterizes
the relevant equilibrium. Section 2.4 interprets the results of section 2.3 within the
framework of the considered problem, and offers some potential policy implications.
Section 2.5 concludes with a summary of results and the discussion of several several
extensions.
1It should be noted that this is not just the case for humanitarian relief organizations, but for
any charitable organization that operates within an international framework, where it draws funds
from a base distinct from it conducts their work.
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2.2 Background and Literature
2.2.1 Evidence of Competition in the Humanitarian Relief Space
The problem of coordination and competition among NGOs, specifically those of the
humanitarian relief variety, has been fairly well documented over the past two decades.
What follows is an attempt to trace the origins of this coordination problem, discuss
relevant cases related to this problem, and identify theories which deal with both
the source and potential solution to the problem.2 Much of the work and analysis
has centered around qualitative observations and remedies rooted in organizational
theory, leaving open the space for treatment from a more quantitative perspective.
Coordination, or the lack thereof, has been a generally recognized problem among
NGOs, UN entities, practitioners, and academics alike [63]. Most view coordination,
as a necessity in achieving the most effective humanitarian response possible. Willitts-
King and Harvey [105] refer to coordination affects in helping to prevent corruption.
Lipson [54] and Stephenson [93] espouse coordination’s benefit to improved efficiency.
Macrae and Harmer [57] outline the necessity of coordination from the standpoint
of dependency, in that by the sheer size of the work, no one organization can effec-
tively complete the task by itself, thus necessitating some level of coordination. The
most commonly used working definition of coordination [73] [96], is that provided by
Minear:
“[Coordination is] the systematic utilization of policy instruments to deliver hu-
manitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include:
(1) strategic planning; (2) gathering data and managing information; (3) mobilizing
resources and assuring accountability; (4) orchestrating a functional division of labor
in the field; (5) negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host politi-
cal authorities; and (6) providing leadership. Sensibly and sensitively employed, such
2While in theory there is a distinction to be made between the terms, coordination, competi-
tion, and cooperation, they are used rather loosely in this initial context to describe organizations
willingness to work together along the lines outlined by Minear.
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instruments inject an element of discipline without unduly constraining action.” [64]
There are several thoughts on why this lack of coordination occurs, and where
some of the potential solutions might be found. Organizational insecurity, from the
standpoint of funding, as outlined by Cooley and Ron [25], is given as a contributor to
increased competition. In analyzing this increased competition and its effects on co-
ordination and efficiency outcomes Cooley and Ron draw from the theory surrounding
the New Economics of Organization. It is their contention that the increased com-
petition, and the constant search for the next funding source causes organizational
efficiency to decrease, coordination to decrease, and the number of publicity seeking
organizations to increase in high media attention areas. Natsios [68] reinforces this
through his contention that the cheapest way for relief organizations to fundraise is
to provide early relief in highly visible areas . Similarly, Smillie [90] supports the
notions of NGO insecurity as it concerns short-term funding, and the reliance on the
media via participation in high-visibility areas as a fundraising tool. Cooley and Ron,
highlight the competition problem through the following:
“The more contractors there are, the more contract uncertainty increases for indi-
vidual organizations. As a result, contractors will do their utmost to beat out competi-
tors and promote their own projects, regardless if cooperation would actually improve
project quality or help the recipient. The presence of multiple donors, moreover, in-
creases the ability of aid recipients to play contractors and donors off one another for
opportunistic gain.” [24]
In his chapter on coordination Minear [63] devotes a significant amount of space to
the congestion issue, in a sense, signaling a divide of the coordination problem into a
macro- and micro-context. The micro-perspective is a question of how organizations
coordinate once they have arrived at a designated disaster area. The macro-context
is concerned with the issue of how relief organizations choose which areas to partic-
ipate in, and as a consequence, how might organizations most effectively distribute
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themselves across the humanitarian landscape. Minear strongly suggests that the
landscape might be better served if congestion, or overcrowding, in these areas could
be avoided, thereby facilitating coordination at the micro-level.
While Cooley and Ron approach the problem through an organizational perspec-
tive, their primary analysis focuses on contracting incentives and opportunities that
arise in the market due to information asymmetries. Stephenson [93] however, fo-
cuses on the attribute of inter-organizational trust and its affect on organizational
willingness to coordinate. Stephenson eschews the principal-agent, or top-down, co-
ordinating solutions explored by others [11] and proposes viewing the humanitarian
enterprise in terms of a social network. He cites other organization scholars that rec-
ognize trust as an important factor in inter-organizational coordination, and subse-
quently asserts its importance in motivating coordination in the humanitarian sector.
He contends, under a social network view, trust-building lies at the core of a solution
to the problem of coordination in humanitarian emergencies. Difficulties in building
trust across organizations is derived in large part from the uncertain and ephemeral
nature of humanitarian work. Although certain organizations may be stalwarts in the
relief process the staff turnover is relatively frequent, making it difficult to establish
trust based via companionship and competence. Stephenson [94] reinforces this claim
through field interviews with those who support the proposition that trust building,
in the absence of top-down command, is essential in aiding coordinating efforts.
Staying within the realm of Organizational Theory, Lipson [54] explores concepts
from Institutional Theory and how they can be brought to bear on problems of co-
ordination among humanitarian organizations. Lipson contends that many of the
frameworks, specifically organizational field theory and organized hypocrisy, devel-
oped by organizational theorists to deal with coordination can be readily applied to
the issue of humanitarian relief coordination. Essentially conducting a preliminary
analysis of their appropriateness, Lipson urges further research into insights provided
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through the application of institutional frameworks.
While there exists a rather significant body of work on the NGO coordination
problem in general, there also exists a set of literature focused on case studies of
specific relief events. Much of this work provides a discussion of coordination, both
its successes and failures, within the context of an actual disaster or humanitarian
emergency. Cooley and Ron [25] provide three qualitative case studies to support
their organizational insecurity hypothesis presented earlier. Among these cases are
included: (1) a case of “technical assistance in Kyrgyzstan”, (2) a case of “competitive
bidding and Refugee Relief in Goma,” and (3) a case of “Multiple Principals and
Bosnia’s POW’s”. Additionally, Stockton [96] provides an analysis of coordination
within the context of Afghanistan.
In their case study of the Mozambique Floods, Moore et al. [66], use a measure of
centrality to quantify organizational coordination within the context of the disaster,
and subsequently conclude that those organizations with higher centrality scores, on
average, had higher relief and recovery period beneficiaries. Wood [107] describes an
event, the Bam earthquake disaster, in which over 200 international organizations
arrived within the first two weeks. There were some successes as it concerned the
willingness to coordinate as exemplified through shared use of supplies, along with an
attempt at a functional division of labor and zoning within the relief area. However,
while some initial attempts were there, the coordination ultimately fell short of its
goal, as some organizations were assigned areas which they could not handle, along
with a lack of information sharing which resulted in, among other things, wasted
efforts in repeating work.
In a more recent example, Bennett et al. [15] provide a case study of the aftermath
surrounding the tsunami of December 2004 in Maldives, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.
Key observations include: displeasure among INGOs at the UN’s role in sectoral
leadership, congestion at the relief sites due to a large number of INGOs participating
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in the relief theater, and the unwillingness of some INGOs to share information.
Among the various recommendations made, Bennett et al. recommend looking into
the feasibility of establishing a certification process to distinguish responsible NGOs.
Reindorp and Wiles [73], along with Donini and Niland [31] focus on evaluating
coordination from the perspective of the UN. Both reports, and in the case of Donini
and Niland, specifically within the context of Rwanda, outline the need for intra-
organizational coordination at the UN. Both call for, at some level, a restructuring or
clarifying of mandates and responsibilities among the UN’s relief response entities.
There is a rather large body of work concerning coordination of humanitarian
relief organizations. Much of the work has centered on evaluation of the problem
through both a case study approach, and methodology borrowed from organizational
theory. While there has been study of the problem under a principal-agent framework,
there has not been much in the way of game theoretical analysis of this framework.
Centrality scores notwithstanding, the literature fails to provide for a quantitative
approach to the problem of coordination. Consequently, the problem lacks a treat-
ment of policy that may be recommended by such an approach, or at the very least
a verification of aforementioned solutions such as trust and improved contracting.
2.2.2 Giving and Signaling
There has been much theoretical work done over the last few decades in the area
of philanthropy, from an economics perspective. Most of the work has focused on
the donor side of the market, but there has also been quite a bit of study of the
marketplace from the charitable organization perspective. This chapter attempts to
build on some of the work found in this area through the application of the well
developed work in economic signaling. A brief overview of the economics literature
that informs this work is considered below.
Spence’s [91] seminal 1973 paper on job market signaling seeks to formally define
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the notion of market signaling in economics. His work lays at the foundation for
much of what is considered in this paper, and has pathed the way for many useful
application derivatives. In what can be considered an extension of Spence’s work,
Crawford and Sobel [27] provide a model of strategic communication, specifically
bargaining situations in which each side has different information. They explore how
much information will be revealed as it relates to the agents’ similarity of interests.
For a more thorough treatment of the historical development of signaling literature
Riley [76] traces the origins of the literature through a comprehensive review of its
foundations and subsequent contributions. Riley cites four papers as having set the
foundation for the field, in addition to Spence’s work he lists, Vickery [101], Mirrlees
[65], and Akerlof [1].
The notion of signaling in philanthropy and charitable giving is not a novel con-
cept, and others have considered its role in altering actor behavior within the market.
Glazer and Konrad [38], Vesterlund [100], Romano and Yildirim [77], and Andreoni
[5], all put forth similar arguments that consider signaling as an impetus for giving.
Their arguments rest on the notion that donors use their charitable contributions to
signal something about themselves, usually income. The contention made in these
papers, specifically Glazer and Konrad, is that while wealth can be signaled to some
extent through private goods, public goods can at times offer more exposure and a
better opportunity to signal wealth. Additionally, the latter three papers consider the
notion that signaling, specifically in the form of leadership giving, can cause others
to increase their opinion of the quality of a particular charity or cause.
In perhaps the work most closely related to the presented model, Reinhardt [74]
advances the notion of signaling’s role in matching donors and nonprofits. Reinhardt
presents a binary decision game (signal or don’t signal) that focuses on the effective-
ness of signaling from an organizational perspective. Reinhardt considers a suite of
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signals, among which include: age, religious affiliation, professionalism, accountabil-
ity, legal registration, higher-degrees of donor accessibility, and third party audits.
She puts forth that “If the process of sending and reading signals is efficient, funding
decisions will tend toward optimal outcome in which only effective agencies survive.”
This is in line with the presumptions of this model, but this paper extends Reinhardt
via exploration of how the inefficiency occurs, how it changes dependent on the envi-
ronment in which the organization is operating, and the consideration of one signal
in particular. She concludes with the following, “Multivariate analysis shows that
donors channel their money to organizations exhibiting higher levels of reliability,
accessibility, credibility, and fundraising specialization.”
Much of the work in applied signaling, particularly as it concerns charitable giving,
can be considered in the same context as the work that seeks to link media, advertising
and donations. Bennett and Kottasz [16] through interviews of two hundred people
come to conclusions on how media representation of disasters induce people to give.
In particular, it was concluded that the way the media covers a particular disaster has
a strong effect on how the general public donates. Simon [89] tells us that aggregate
donations increase in response to “big news” events, but does not offer much in the
way of individual organization fundraising in response to these same events. Tisdell
and Wilson [97] present research on willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the conservation
of wildlife species, which offers a direct parallel to what would be WTP for certain
relief instances. Their results showed that poorly known species may obtain less
conservation than they deserve due to a lack of public exposure, emphasizing the
importance of the media in influencing charitable decisions.
From a theoretical perspective Milgrom and Roberts [62] extend Nelson’s seminal
work [70] on advertising as information. Where Nelson considers the value of adver-
tising on informing consumer opinion of a particular product, Milgrom and Roberts
consider both advertising and price as dual signals of quality. Of particular value
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is the framework they put forth for understanding solution methods for multi-signal
games.
Particularly important to the motivation of the presented model, is the work on
philanthropy, altruism, and giving from an economic perspective. This work primarily
informs the donor side of the philanthropy market, and is concerned with the impe-
tus behind charitable giving. Wolpert and Reiner [106], Rose-Ackerman [80], and
Andreoni [4] offer attempts to characterize what is meant by the philanthropic mar-
ket in the context of economics through literature reviews and commentary. Bekkers
and Wiepking [13] survey over 500 publications related to philanthropy with a focus
on the questions of; who gives, how much do they give, and why do they give. Specif-
ically as it relates to why people give, they identify eight factors as important forces
that drive giving: (1) awareness of need; (2) solicitation; (3) costs and benefits; (4)
altruism; (5) reputation; (6) psychological benefits; (7) values; (8) efficacy.
The question of why people give, in an economic setting, inevitably leads to the
question of what does a giver’s utility function look like. Several theories have been
put forth along this line. Traditional public goods literature says that people will give
because they benefit in some way from the aggregation of all contributions to that
good, which in this setting would be relief. Cornes and Sandler [26] offer a thorough
treatment of public goods theory. In addition to theories of prestige and wealth
signaling mentioned above, Andrenoi, Duncan, and Harabaugh offer contributions to
the discussion of motivations in giving. Andreoni’s [3] work, which informs the donor
side of the presented model, puts forth the notion of warm-glow or impure altruism,
suggesting that in addition to the benefit the donor receives from the public good
there are also private benefits that the donor experiences from the act of giving itself.
The inclusion of the private benefits to donors from their own contributions altered
the assumptions from traditional public good theory in a dramatic way. In particular,
Andreoni concludes with, “By assuming that individuals are not indifferent between
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gifts made by themselves and gifts made by other individuals or the government,
we conclude that redistributions to more altruistic people from less altruistic people
will increase total provision, that crowding out will be incomplete, and that subsidies
can have the desired effect”. Crumpler and Grossman [29] confirm Andreoni’s theory
through experimental testing. In part based on Andreoni’s consideration of private
benefits, Duncan [32] and Harbaugh [43] are able propose models of donor giving
that rest on private motivations. Duncan asserts that people give, in part, based on
the perceived impact of their donation. This work suggests that the same donation
to different organizations may effect the donor differently depending on the level of
impact the donation can provide. Harbaugh, similar to the signaling models presented
above, puts forth a model of prestige that is based on the consideration of warm-glow.
While the presented literature spans several different disciplines it all actively
informs and influences the presented model. The literature from the organizational
behavior perspective helps to motivate the considered problems of waste, inefficiency
in relief provision, and difficulties in coordination. The economics literature provides
a basis from which to begin development of a comprehensive model. The work on the
donor side of the equation is critical in understanding what drives giving and altruistic
behavior, which without, there would be no humanitarian marketplace of which to
speak. The signaling literature provides an established methodological perspective
allowing for both the closure of the model, and the subsequent analysis of behavior
and outcomes.
2.3 The Signaling Model
The initial model assumes a world in which there are disastrous events, people that
care about the effects of them, and organizations which work to reverse the effects of
these events. As such, two classes of agents are considered, donors and relief organi-
zations, and a set of relief areas or causes which are served by these agents. Donors
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effectively act through relief organizations to help ameliorate a particular cause or set
of causes. The purchase of relief by donors via donations to relief organizations can
be thought of as a type of public good. Let i define an individual donor in the set
Donors, such that i ∈ Donors where the set has cardinality of N . Similarly, let j
denote individual relief organizations in the set RO, with cardinality of M , and k for
individual relief areas in the set RA with cardinality P , when needed. The model is a
one period signaling model in which the amount of relief provided by an organization
acts as a signaling mechanism to donors, allowing them to ascertain the productivity
of an organization, which can be of high type (θ̄) or low type (θ).3 What follows is a
high-level overview of the game dynamics, accompanied by further discussion of the
individual actors and their strategies.
2.3.1 Order of Events
Nature takes two turns at the beginning, first assigning each relief organization a type
θ ∈ {θ̄, θ}, observable only to the individual organizations, where Prob{θ̄} = λ and
Prob{θ} = 1−λ. Second, nature assigns an organization to each donor in accordance
with the donor selection rule. Given types, each organization makes a decision about
how much relief to allocate toward a selected cause or area. Viewing these allocation
decisions, each donor makes a determination as to the type of each organization and
makes a donation accordingly. All actions occur in a “one-shot” framework. Figure
(2) provides an extensive form representation of the game.
2.3.2 Donors and Relief Organizations
Donors
3The term relief is rather generic, and will remain so throughout in order to ease computation
and analysis of the model. In more nuanced terms relief could be considered to be labor, food
supplies, financial aid, logistical support, etc. The assumption is made that some monetary value
can be associated with each of these items, and can be aggregated on a macro-level and thought of
as the generic relief mentioned here.
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Figure 2: Extensive Form Representation of Signaling in Humanitarian Relief
Donors in the model are considered to be heterogeneous in their preferences over
causes, but homogeneous in preferences over productivity.4 As has been discussed,
there is quite a large body of quantitative work on the donor behavior, and the
formulation of their preferences in giving to charitable organizations. This model does
not attempt to add to this body of work, but rather uses this work as a justification of
the assumption that giving philanthropically does enter an individual’s utility function
in some fashion. In this sense, an individual donor i is assumed to have the following
utility function,
4What is meant by this will become more clear later on. For our purposes now it essentially
means that a given donor may prefer one set of organizations over another for the type of work that
they do, but within that set of organizations that do similar work all donors will always give at least
as much to the organization that it views to be the most productive as it will to all others.
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Ui(xi, Y1, . . . , YM , yi1, . . . , yiM ; θ1, . . . , θM) (1)
where Ui(·) is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave, xi represents private consump-
tion, and θj represents the productivity of the relief organization j. Additionally,
Yj =
∑
i∈Donors yij is defined as the total amount of donations provided by all donors
to relief organization j, where yij ∈ <+ represents the donation of donor i to organi-
zation j. Given the utility function defined by (1), his budget constraint, defined by
a vector of prices p ∈ <M+ associated with giving to an organization and his budget
wi ∈ <+, donor i sets out to solve (2).
max
xi,y
Ui(xi, Y1, . . . , YM , yi1, . . . , yiM ; θ1, . . . , θM) (2)
s.t. xi + p1yi1 + . . . pMyiM ≤ wi
The initial presentation we considers a world in which the donor selects one relief
organization, ĵ, for which to provide a donation, via the donor decision rule defined
below. As such, the maximization problem (2) can be rewritten as,
max
xi,yiĵ
Ui(xi, Yĵ, yiĵ; θĵ) (3)
s.t. xi + pĵyiĵ ≤ wi
Furthermore, the public effects on utility, Yĵ, are initially excluded from the model,
such that the donor only receives a warm-glow from his contribution to the organi-
zation. While slightly limiting, this assumption does not detract from the primary
analysis, and can in some instances, particularly those associated with relief giving,
represent donor giving behavior.5
5Alternative utility formulations, such as those put forth by Andreoni, Vesterlund, and Harabaugh
may alter donor giving behavior. The extent to which characterization of the utility function alters




Ui(xi, yiĵ; θĵ) (4)
s.t. xi + pĵyiĵ ≤ wi
Donor Decision Rule: Before observing signaling levels the donor chooses a
relief organization at random. After observing the organization’s signal the donor
must then donate funds based on that signal.
An explicit function is not defined for Ui(·) as it does not advance the development
of the model, beyond what is outlined above. What is necessary is that there be levels
of giving, not necessarily unique, on behalf of each donor when confronted with the
belief that a relief organization is of a particular type. More specifically, for this
model, given beliefs about the type of a relief organization, θ̄ or θ, a donor i will
contribute either ȳ or y to the respective organizations, as defined by equations (5)
and (6). While not defining exact values for either level, the condition that ȳ > y is
added. Formally, the donor’s strategy can be defined as a function gi : <+ → yi ∈ <+.
ȳ = arg max
yij
Ui(wi − pĵyiĵ, yiĵ; θ̄ĵ) (5)
y = arg max
yij
Ui(wi − pĵyiĵ, yiĵ; θĵ) (6)
Relief Organizations
In addition to the donors, relief organizations are also considered, of which there
are two types, a high productivity organization (θ̄) and a low productivity organi-
zation (θ), where θ̄ > θ, and ex ante probability defined as Prob{θj = θ̄} = λ and
Prob{θj = θ} = 1−λ.6 Dependent upon both its type, and the expected donations to
6Differences in θ can be explained, in practice, through organizational capacity, expertise, and
relationships. This chapter does not attempt to explicitly define values for θ, nor how they might
be derived, but builds on the knowledge that much as in the private sector, differences do exist.
An organization’s ability to leverage its past expertise and network in a time of crisis will almost
certainly guarantee more efficient use of resources than other newly formed entities.
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be received from donors, a relief organization j makes a decision about which of the
P relief areas to commit resources to, and at what level. This decision is represented
through the relief organization’s strategy fj : {θ̄, θ} × <P+ → rj ∈ <P+. The initial
analysis considers only one relief area such that, fj : {θ̄, θ} × <+ → rj ∈ <+.7 In
this one area setting an initial objective function,πj(y, r, θ), is posited for the relief
organization j.8
πj(y, r, θ) = (y + r)− g(r, θ) (7)
Where (y + r) represents the benefits accrued to the relief organization via do-
nations (y), and relief provided (r). g(r, θ) is the disutility to the organization for
providing relief, and is defined such that; gr(r, θ) ≥ 0 and grθ(r, θ) ≤ 0 for all r ≥ 0,
and grr(r, θ) > 0 and gθ(r, θ) < 0 for all r.
9 g(r, θ) = µr
2
θ
is defined, where µ ∈ <+
represents the utility a relief organization receives from actually providing the relief,
thus abating some of the disutility that results from relief provision.10 Equation (7)
now becomes (8).




7The one area setting is justified via the initial context and problem considered. At issue is the use
of signaling in a particular relief area, and its impact on over-provision of relief and waste, as a result
of organizational aversion to cooperation. The same results would hold for a multi-area analysis,
but the outcomes would be dependent upon the parameters associated with a particular area. The
behavioral analysis is focused not on the organization’s decision over which area to participate in,
but how to participate in a given area. This micro-level consideration does, however, offer some
insight into the macro-level question of how might organization’s choose areas.
8While distinct in form, the organization objective function can be considered to be related to
the empirically verified revealed nonprofit objective function proposed by Steinberg [92]. He offers
that organizations have dual motivators akin to those considered in the introduction. As such,
depending on which objective an organization places emphasis on it can be considered either a
“service maximizer” or a “budget maximizer.”
9Thus, the first derivative implies that the relief organization’s disutility increases in relief. Ad-
ditionally, grr(r, θ) > 0 implies that this aversion is larger given the current level of relief r. Higher
values of θ are more desirable, as θ increases it becomes cheaper for the relief organization to provide
the same level of relief, and as implied by grθ < 0, the marginal disutility of providing relief also
decreases in θ.
10gr(r, θ) = 2µrθ−1; grr(r, θ) = 2µθ−1; gθ(r, θ) = −µθ−2r2; gr,θ(r, θ) = −2µθ−2r.
24
The function takes into account the dual motivators of the relief organization,
which were posited in the introduction, namely expected donations and relief pro-
vided. The function is linearly increasing in donations, but is quadratic in relief
provided. What is unique about this objective function as opposed to that of a tra-
ditional firm is that, depending on the cost function and reservation profit level, the
relief organization may still like to provide its “product” at some level, even in the
absence of demand from donors.11 A traditional firm, facing zero demand would not
find it economically beneficial to produce anything at all. The disconnect occurs
because the relief organization is essentially serving two audiences, the donors and
the affected populations in the relief areas. As discussed in the introduction, relief
organizations have altruistic motivations to serve, so even when the donor audience
disappears there is still a desire to serve the affected population to the extent that it
is able to in the absence of increased donor funding.
While equation (8) is a basic representation of an organization’s objectives, it is
lacking a dependence on the number of donors, N , and organizations, M , in the sys-
tem. In adding the impact of the system to the objective function, the organization’s
function must be recast as an expectation. Specifically, the presence of additional
relief organizations is felt in terms of an individual organization’s probability of re-
ceiving funding. Assuming the decision rule outlined above, q is the probability of an
organization being selected as a donor recipient where, given M relief organizations
let q = 1
M
, such that each organization has a fair chance of being selected a priori. For
a relief organization, expectation is calculated via M Bernoulli trials. In a situation
with N donors and M relief organizations an organization conducts these Bernoulli
trials, one with each donor, as a determinant on whether or not it will receive the
contribution of the donor. A success vector, ro = (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5), ro ∈ {0, 1}N ,
is created for each organization where each of the N elements is a binary random
11πj(θj)res is the reservation profit level afforded to relief organization j of type θj
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variable, where 1 denotes selection, and 0 denotes rejection. Defining the chances of
success by q leads to E[b1] = q, E[b2] = q, . . ., E[bN ] = q. As such, the expecta-
tion of the total number of donors picking an organization is Nq. Consequently, the
expected payoff to an organization participating in a system with N donors and M
relief organizations can be represented as in equation (9), or equivalently (10).









The hypothesis proposes that r ∈ R+ is an observable signal of an organization’s
productivity, θ, to the donor. As such, the question that immediately arises is how
does the equilibrium outcome of this game change when r is taken as a signal of
the productivity level and when it is not. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
solution concept is used to answer this question and characterize equilibrium resulting
from the game. Define R = <+ as the set of possible messages, with rj ∈ R being a
specific message. Define Θ as the set of possible types, with θ ∈ Θ being a specific
type. The following requirements must be satisfied to establish a PBE.
Signaling Requirement 1 After observing any message rj from R, the Donor must
have a belief about which types could have sent rj. Denote this belief by the probability
distribution λ(θ|rj), where λ(θ|rj) ≥ 0 for each θ in Θ, and
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ|rj) = 1 (11)
Signaling Requirement 2R For each rj in R, the Donor’s action y
∗(rj) must
maximize the Donor’s expected utility, given the belief λ(θ|rj) about which types could








Signaling Requirement 2S For each θ in Θ, the Relief Organization’s message r∗(θ)
must maximize the Relief Organization’s utility, given the Donor’s strategy y∗(rj).





Signaling Requirement 3 For each rj in R, if there exists θ in Θ such that r
∗(θ) =
rj, the Donor’s belief at the information set corresponding to rj must follow from






Θrj is the set of types that would send rj in optimality.
Definition: A pure-strategy PBE in a signaling game is a pair of strategies r∗j (θ)
and y∗(rj) and a belief about types λ(θ|rj) satisfying the above requirements.
2.3.4 Equilibrium
As a baseline, consider the instance in which r is not taken as a signal, and so
any message sent by the relief organization has no effect on the ex ante beliefs of
the donor. Assuming the donor, under complete information, would offer ȳ∗ to a
θ̄ type organization and y∗ to a θ type organization, then a donor will offer ŷ∗i =
λȳ∗ + (1−λ)y∗ in equilibrium when no signaling is allowed.12 The relief organization
will only pursue this donation if there exists some relief level r such that πj(θj)
res ≤
((N/M)ŷ∗ + r) − µr2
θ
. While the prospect of one donation may not be enough, an
aggregate of the donations to this relief organization may be enough to induce them
12The assumption is made about Ui(·; θ) such that this is true (i.e. max Ui(·;E[θ]) =
E[maxUi(·; θ)] )
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to participate. As more donors are introduced, specifically N , the condition becomes
accept if πj(θj)





∗, for some r. Assuming identical utility
functions across the N donors, the expression yields the following condition on the






≤ N∗. In other words, N∗ donors must be present within a given
market for an organization to be willing to participate.
Proposition 1: From equation (10) the organization, of type θ, will provide r∗ = θ
2µ
in an optimal market.
Proposition 2: If relief levels, r, are observable, then there exists a separating
equilibrium in productivity levels such that ȳ = y′(r(θ̄)) and y = y′(r(θ)), where
r(θ̄) = r̄′ and r(θ) = r′.
Proof. Satisfaction of the single-crossing or sorting condition on the objective func-
tions of types θ̄ and θ are necessary for the existence of a separating equilibrium.









) < 0. When applied to π(y, r, θ) = y + r − µr2
θ
,











Thus, establishing the single-crossing result in the positive quadrant.
If signals r̄′ and r′ are to separate, then the following conditions must be satisfied




πres(θ̄) ≤ (N/M)ȳ∗ + r̄′ − g(r̄′, θ̄) (15)
πres(θ) ≤ (N/M)y∗ + r′ − g(r′, θ) (16)
(N/M)ȳ∗ + r̄′ − g(r̄′, θ̄) ≥ (N/M)y∗ + r′ − g(r′, θ̄) (17)
(N/M)y∗ + r′ − g(r′, θ) ≥ (N/M)ȳ∗ + r̄′ − g(r̄′, θ) (18)
Constraints (15) and (16) are the participation constraints from relief organizations
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of type θ̄ and θ respectively. Constraints (17) and (18) are the incentive compatibility
constraints for the two types.
Proposition 3: In any separating equilibrium the low productivity type, θ, will
choose r′ = r∗ = θ
2µ
.
Proof. Suppose not, and that r∗ does not belong to the set of contributions that reveal
θ types. Then, it must be the case that it reveals θ̄ types. π(r, ȳ, θ) > π(r, y, θ). Con-
sequently, by equations (5) and (6), a θ type would maximize his payoff by choosing
r∗ instead of r′ 6= r∗. But, because r∗ signals a θ̄ type it contradicts the assumption
of a separating equilibrium.
Letting r̄′ = r̄∗ and r′ = r∗, and combining equations (17) and (18) yields the following
condition (19), which if violated requires that the signal, if it is to separate, be sub-
optimal from the standpoint of the relief organization.
(r∗− r̄∗) + g(r̄∗, θ̄)− g(r∗, θ̄) ≤ (N/M)(ȳ∗− y∗) ≤ (r∗− r̄∗) + g(r̄∗, θ)− g(r∗, θ) (19)
Proposition 4: If r̄∗ and r∗ satisfy equation (19) then there exists a separating
equilibrium in efficient strategies.
Proof. Let r̄′ = r̄∗ and r′ = r∗, and rearrange (17) and (18) to look like (20) and (21).
By definition, satisfaction of (17) and (18) yield a separation between θ and θ̄ types.
(N/M)(ȳ∗ − y∗) ≥ (r∗ − r̄∗) + (g(r̄∗, θ̄)− g(r∗, θ̄)) (20)
(r∗ − r̄∗) + (g(r̄∗, θ)− g(r∗, θ)) ≥ (N/M)(ȳ∗ − y∗) (21)
Consequently, combining both conditions, yields, (19), which if satisfied by r̄∗ and
r∗ , producing a separation in optimal strategies, from an organizational standpoint.
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Of critical concern to the analysis of the separating equilibrium are the range
of r values which are sustainable in a separating equilibrium. It was established
in proposition 2 that any θ-type will provide r∗ = θ
2µ
in a separating equilibrium.
The question of what levels of relief are sustainable for θ̄-type organizations can be
answered via an analysis of the situations in which a θ̄-type relief organization would
not find it beneficial to provide the required signal for its type. The premise of
the separating equilibrium is such that each relief organization finds it beneficial to
signal their true productivity level via some action, where in this case the action is
the provision of relief. As such, the lower bound, rLBsepNM , on the set of separating
signals must be the signal for which the θ-type relief organization is indifferent between
pretending to be a θ̄-type or revealing itself to be a θ-type. The lower bound on the
separating relief value is derived through satisfaction of the equality (22).
(N/M)y∗ + r∗ − µr
∗2
θ




Equation (22) characterizes the point at which the expected payoff, for a θ organi-
zation, from providing the relief level consistent with its type is equal to the expected
payoff consistent with pretending to be a higher type. rLBsepNM is the point which
solves this equality, and is the lowest point beyond which a θ-type will always act as
itself. This equality, EMN [π(y
∗, r∗, θ)] = EMN [π(ȳ
∗, rLBsepMN , θ)], is a quadratic, and
can be solved as such. The solution to (22) consists of two roots, of which the positive
root is taken, as relief is bounded in the positive quadrant. The separating relief level
is dependent upon both the number of relief organizations and donors present, M
and N respectively. Allowing that, r∗ = θ
2µ










As a θ̄-type organization in a signaling game two options present themselves; 1)
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provide the necessary signaling level of relief and receive the expected payoff for an
organization of θ̄-type, or 2) provide the optimal relief and risk being perceived as a
θ-type and receiving the expected payoff level afforded those organizations. rUBsepMN
represents the highest relief level that a θ̄ organization is willing to supply before it
will choose not to comply and provide it’s internal optimal level. As a consequence
this upper bound rUBsepMN on the signaling equilibrium is found via satisfaction of
equation (24), EMN [π(ȳ
∗, rUBsepMN , θ̄)] = EMN [π(y
∗, r̄∗, θ̄)], as show in equation (25).
(N/M)ȳ∗ + rUBsep −
µr2UBsep
θ̄












Although all levels of relief between rLBsepMN and rUBsepMN are considered sus-
tainable, the appendix on refinements justifies the choice of rUBsepMN as the signaling
point of focus.






if θ = θ




y if rj ≤ rLBsepMN
ȳ if rj > rLBsepMN
(III)
1− λ(θ|rj) = Prob{θ = θ|rj}
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λ(θ|rj) = Prob{θ = θ̄|rj} =

1 if rj > rLBsepMN
0 if rj ≤ rLBsepMN
Proof. This result follows from proposition 2, equations (22),(5),(6), and signaling
requirements 1 - 3.
Proposition 5: There always exists a separating equilibrium in relief levels, such
that θ̄-type organizations can distinguish themselves from θ-type organizations.
Proof. For a signaling equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that rUBsepMN >
rLBsepMN . In order to eliminate the possibility of a separating equilibrium we must
show that rUBsepMN < rLBsepMN cannot hold. Below, we show by contradiction,
that under the given parameter assumptions rUBsepMN < rLBsepMN is ruled out, and
consequently the possibility that there exists N such that no separating equilibrium
exists, is also ruled out. Assume that rUBsepMN < rLBsepMN . Then, (rUBsepMN −
rLBsepMN) < 0.
rUBsepMN − rLBsepMN =











However, the expression (26) is negative, only if θ̄ < θ, which is a contradiction
of our original assumption.
Figures (3) and (4) represent two scenarios in which separating equilibrium are
present. Figure (3) outlines the instance in which r̄∗ < rLBsepMN , making the sep-
arating relief point higher than the optimal level desired by the relief organization.
Discussed in the refinements later on, the relief organization will provide rLBsepMN
in this instance to separate. Figure (4) offers an alternative separating scenario, par-
ticularly one in which r̄∗ > rLBsepMN . This instance allows the θ̄-type to provide it’s
optimal level r̄∗ while simultaneously separating itself from θ-type relief organizations.
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Figure 3: Separating Equilibrium: r̄∗ < rLBsepMN
In addition to separating equilibrium, there also exist pooling equilibrium, the
notion of which implies that the same relief level is provided by both high productivity
and low productivity organizations, in equilibrium, at a particular relief site. Assume
that r∗(θ̄) = r∗(θ) = rp where rp is the pooling equilibrium level of relief provided,
then the donor’s beliefs about types remain unchanged. Consequently, in a pooling
equilibrium, it must be that the donor provides y∗(rp) = ŷ∗ = λȳ∗ + (1− λ)y∗. With
ŷ∗ as given, the last piece is the characterization of sustainable pooling levels of relief,
rp.
At the upper end of the possible pooling relief equilibrium levels is the relief
level, rUBpMN , that makes the the θ-type indifferent between providing its optimal
relief level r∗ at an expected payoff of (N/M)y∗ and providing rUBpMN and receiving
the expected pooling payoff of (N/M)ŷ∗. This indifference can be represented via
equation (27), and when solved yields, (28), of which the positive root is taken.
33
Figure 4: Separating Equilibrium: r̄∗ > rLBsepMN
(N/M)y∗ + r∗ − µr
∗2
θ







θ2 − 4(r∗ + ( N
M
)(−ŷ∗ + y∗))θµ+ 4r∗2µ2
2µ
(28)









The lower bound of the possible pooling relief equilibrium level is found via the
relief level, rLBpMN , which makes θ̄-type indifferent between providing its optimal
relief level r̄∗ at an expected payoff of (N/M)y∗ and providing rLBpMN and receiving
the expected pooling payoff of (N/M)ŷ∗. This indifference is represented by equation
(30). Solving the quadratic for rLBpMN yields equation (31), of which the lower root
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is taken if positive, otherwise rLBpMN = 0.
(N/M)y∗ + r̄∗ − µr̄
∗2
θ̄







θ̄2 − 4(r̄∗ + ( N
M
)(−ŷ∗ + y∗))θ̄µ+ 4r̄∗2µ2
2µ
(31)









Proposition 5a: If there exists a pooling PBE equilibrium, it satisfies the fol-
lowing:
(I) Both types send the same message
rp ∈ [rLBpMN , rUBpMN ]
(II) Donor offers a donation based on a priori beliefs, such that,
y∗(rj) = ŷ
∗ = λȳ∗ + (1− λ)y∗
for all rj ∈ [rLBpMN , rUBpMN ].
(III) Beliefs about types remain unchanged, such that
Prob{θ = θ̄} = λ, andProb{θ = θ} = 1− λ
Proof. (I), (II), and (III) follow from the definition of pooling PBE. (I) is established
via equations (29) and (31), (II) is a result of the assumed form of the donor’s utility,
and (III) follows.
Figures (5) and (6) outline two pooling scenarios.
There are no sustainable levels of pooling equilibrium when rLBpMN > rUBpMN .
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Figure 5: Sustainable Pooling Equilibrium Bounded at rLBpMN = 0
2.3.5 Analysis
Taking the partial of equation (23) with respect to several variables of interest yields
insight into how the lower bound on the separating condition responds to increases in
the number of donors, the number of relief organizations, and the difference between




























Equations (33), (34), and (35) speak to the dynamics of the lower bound of the
signaling equilibrium. In particular, insight into the effect of increased participation
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Figure 6: Sustainable Pooling Equilibrium Bounded rLBpMN > 0
from the donor and relief organization perspectives. Equation (33) is positive for all
N > 0, and shows that the lower bound on the separating level of relief is increasing in
the number of donors interested in contributing to a relief area. However, the number
of relief organizations has the opposite effect, as equation (34) is negative for all
M > 0. As a consequence, the separating level, when greater than the organization’s
optimal level, is determined in part by the ratio N
M
of donors to relief organizations
interested in an area. Equation (35) shows that as the spread, c, between the donation
amount offered to high quality organizations (ȳ∗) and the amount to low quality
organization (y∗) increases, so does the relief level necessary to signal high quality.
2.3.5.1 Payoff Dominant Pooling Equilibrium
Given the initial inquisition into the impetus for congestion and competition, along
with the characterization of the bounds on the separating equilibria and pooling
equilibria a question of dominance arises. Specifically, whether or not there is a
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Figure 7: Unsustainable Pooling Equilibrium when rUBpMN < rLBpMN
combination of donors and relief organizations participating in a relief site that would
yield an expected pooling equilibrium payoff that would dominate the expected payoff
from separating for a θ̄ organization. Equation (36) represents the condition for
dominance of the pooling equilibrium over the separating equilibrium, via indifference
between the payoffs associated with the two. For a given separating level rParSepMN













Proposition 6: A payoff dominant pooling equilibrium exists if 1) rLBsepMN ≥ r̄∗,
and if 2) rLBsepMN ≥ rParSepMN .
Proof. Condition (36) will not hold when r̄∗ ≥ rLBsepMN , with the reasoning fol-
lowing from the definition of r̄∗. r̄∗ is defined as the internal optimal level of relief
that an organization wishes to provide to a specific area in a humanitarian crisis. If
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Figure 8: Donor (N) Dynamics: The response of the lower bound on the separating
equilibrium in response to increases in donors.
r̄∗ ≥ rLBsepMN , then both r̄∗ and rLBsepMN allow the organization to signal it’s type.
From the definition of r̄∗ it follows that EMN [π(ȳ
∗, r̄∗, θ̄)] ≥ EMN [π(ȳ∗, rLBsepMN , θ̄)].
Consequently, if an organization is to signal it will be at the r̄∗ level. Alternatively,
we consider the option that the θ̄ type organization chooses to pool in this instance. If
the organization pools on rp it will receive a payoff EMN [π(ŷ, rp, θ̄)]. However, the fol-
lowing relation holds, for r̄∗ 6= rp such that: EMN [π(ȳ∗, r̄∗, θ̄)] > EMN [π(ȳ∗, rp, θ̄)] >
EMN [π(ŷ, rp, θ̄)]. The relation shows that, when r̄
∗ ≥ rLBsepMN the organization will
always prefer to signal at r̄∗, affirming that there does not exist a dominant pooling
equilibrium when r̄∗ ≥ rLBsepMN .
Substituting for r̄∗ = θ̄
2µ
and solving (39) at equality for rParSepMN , yields the
two roots (37) and (38), for which (38) is always positive. rParSepMN = rParSepMNpos
defines the point at which, given rp = r̄
∗, Pareto dominance in a pooling equilib-
rium is asserted (i.e. assuming otherwise constant parameters, for any given (M,N)
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Figure 9: Relief Organization (M) Dynamics: The response of the lower bound on
the separating equilibrium in response to increases in organizations.
















Given the construction of (39), and concavity of the profit function, it must be
the case that for rLBsepMN > rParSepMN and rLBsepMN ≥ r̄∗, there exists a payoff
dominant pooling equilibrium for θ̄ type organizations.
13rLBsepMN ≤ rParSepMNneg is also a condition under which a Pareto dominant pooling equi-
librium may exist. However, this may occur in a very small instance of cases given the additional
condition on the r̄∗. Additionally, given the concavity of the objective function, an increase in
donors will eventually violate this condition, whereas increases in donors beyond the positive root
rParSepMNpos will continue to satisfy the outlined condition.
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Figure 10: cDynamics: The response of the lower bound on the separating equilibrium
in response to increases in the spread between donation amounts for high and low
type organizations.
Consider the range of pooling levels for which the condition (36) might hold.
Equations (31) and (28) provide the range of feasible pooling levels, such that rp ∈
[rLBpMN , rUBpMN ]. Considering the question of whether or not condition (36) can be
satisfied, rp = r̄
∗ is taken to be the most likely candidate for θ̄-type organizations, as













Given rLBsepMN and rParSepMN consider whether rLBsepMN ≥ rParSepMN can in-
deed hold in conjunction with r̄∗ ≤ rLBsepMN . If both conditions hold simultaneously
then (40) and (41) should be positive simultaneously:
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rLBsepMN − r̄∗ =
θ +
√





rLBsepMN − rParSepMN =
θ +
√











rLBsepMN − r̄∗ =






rLBsepMN − rParSepMN =
−2
√











1 represent the donor levels which satisfy rLBsepMN−r̄∗ = 0
and rLBsepMN − rParSepMN = 0, respectively, allows solutions for each indifference






−M(θ̄ − θ)2(ŷ∗θ̄ + y∗θ − ȳ∗(θ̄ + θ))µ+
√
−M2(ŷ∗ − ȳ∗)(ȳ∗ − y∗)θ̄(θ̄ − θ)4θµ2
4(ŷ∗θ̄ − y∗θ + ȳ∗(θ − θ̄))2µ2
(45)
N In2 =
−(M(θ̄ − θ)2(ŷ∗θ̄ + y∗θ − ȳ∗(θ̄ + θ))µ+
√
−M2(ŷ∗ − ȳ∗)(ȳ∗ − y∗)θ̄(θ̄ − θ)4θµ2)
4(ŷ∗θ̄ − y∗θ + ȳ∗(θ − θ̄))2µ2
(46)
Figure (11) outlines a scenario where for given M , there exists a dominant pooling
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Figure 11: Payoff Dominant Pooling Equilibrium at Pooling Level rp = r̄
∗
equilibrium beyond N Ip2 . Beyond N
I
1 , the condition rLBsepMN ≥ r̄∗ is satisfied, and
beyond N Ip2 the condition rLBsepMN ≥ rParSepMN is satisfied.
The paper begins with an initial assumption that it is always optimal for θ̄ relief
organizations to signal their type, and not allow pooling by lesser organizations. How-
ever, the results presented here suggest that there may be instances in which it is not
always optimal for θ̄ organizations to actively signal their type. Such environments
present an opportunity for lesser quality organizations to pool with higher productiv-
ity organizations. The discussion considers whether there are real world analogs to
the pooling environment suggested here, and what they mean. Of particular interest,
is whether or not there is always a point at which the pooling equilibrium becomes
Pareto dominant. Proposition (7) says that λ must be of a certain value if a dominant
pooling equilibrium is to exist.
Proposition 7: It is not the case that there exists a payoff dominant pooling
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equilibrium when λ ≤ θ̄−θ
θ̄
.
Proof. Take the denominator of (45), 4(ŷ∗θ̄ − y∗θ + ȳ∗(θ − θ̄))2µ2. If
4(ŷ∗θ̄ − y∗θ + ȳ∗(θ − θ̄))2µ2 ≤ 0, (47)
then N Ip2 < 0, which means that there does not exist a positive N that satisfies
rLBsepMN − rParSepMN = 0. Solving for λ yields the condition,
λ ≤ θ̄ − θ
θ̄
(48)
Where, for any λ satisfying (48), there does not exist a payoff dominant pooling
equilibrium.
How this, and the preceding analysis relates to the problems considered in section
(2.2) is considered more formally below.
2.4 Interpreting Relief Response Through the Lens of “Sig-
naling in Relief”
In the previous sections we were able to define a simple game of the dynamics between
relief organizations and donors, along with both pooling and separating equilibrium
to describe the behavior of organizations in response to the assumed behavior of
donors. Here, we consider how this analysis might inform the competitive behavioral
phenomena among relief organizations associated with the waste, congestion, and
aversion to coordination discussed at the outset. In particular there are two behaviors
of interest; 1). the behavior of the separating equilibrium in response to environment
conditions, and 2). when can a pooling equilibrium be expected to occur, and what
does it mean.
Returning to the dynamics defined in equations (33), (34), and (35), we consider
how these might be used to analyze organization behavior. (33) and (34) show N and
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M to have opposite effects on the required separating level of relief. As a consequence
the ratio N
M
is informative, as the smaller the ratio, the smaller the separating level
required, and vice versa. As N increases the opportunity for expected donations
increases, while if M increases so does the competition level within an area . In
relation to areas of humanitarian relief, in particular those of high attention, N and
M are both likely to increase. How they increase, and the point at which they
stabilize will help define the composition of a particular area as it regards organization
behavior. The model assumes a static state of donors and organizations in an area, but
in practice both should be expected to evolve at varying rates. In particular, because
of the high number of organizations found in high attention relief areas, one might
infer that individual organizations internalize the effects of an anticipated increase
in donors, before the effects of competition are internalized. Once competition is
internalized one would expect to see a reduction in the number of organizations
associated with an area, or at the very least a lessening in the publicity seeking
behavior as defined by excessive signaling. This can in part be used to explain why
development work, post-emergency phase, is often carried out by a much smaller
subset of organizations.
The dynamic implied by (35) of the spread between donations to θ̄ and θ is rather
intuitive, as it implies that the greater the reward for being seeing as high quality
organization, the more desirable it would be for each organization to be seen as such.
This dynamic is not very illuminating in the context of high publicity relief areas,
but once considered across the landscape of potential humanitarian causes it can be
more informative. In particular, if one considers that there are some areas in which
the difference in quality of the organization is not perceived to matter as much then
there is not as large an incentive for organizations to signal their type beyond what
they would normally provide to an area.
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Proposition 5a establishes the conditions for the existence of a pooling equilib-
rium, whereas proposition 7 defines instances in which one might be dominate the
separating payoff for a θ̄ organization. What proposition 7 says, is that given the rela-
tive productivity levels of θ̄ and θ type organizations, there exists a threshold level for
λ beyond which the pooling equilibrium becomes dominant. Thus, for areas in which
the belief about the quality of the organizations that participate there is high enough,
θ̄ type organizations would not find it beneficial to try to distinguish themselves from
θ organizations. This however, would allow lesser quality organizations to signal at
the high quality level, and effectively capture a larger portion of potential donations.
This result can in part be used to explain why high attention relief areas are more
prone to congestion and competition, both at the level of resource allocation, and at
the participation level.
At the resource level, while θ̄ organizations are not compelled to provide beyond
their optimal level, lesser organizations are, with the expectation of higher future
donations. While the analysis has occurred through the consideration of relief as
being monetary, it is important to note that in practice the way that increased relief
occurs can be through other avenues, such an increase in the labor supply, or increased
visibility via strategic positioning. In this sense, while not necessarily beneficial to
the relief effort, lesser type organizations have a distinct motivation to participate in
this behavior within areas for which λ is high. Given this, it is important to consider
when λ might be high. If one considers, as in the beginning that λ is a measure of
the donor’s beliefs about the quality of the organizations participating in an area,
then it is not a stretch to infer that high attention relief areas might be precisely the
kind of area for which donors have higher beliefs about the quality of the organization
participating there.
Furthermore, while the dynamics of organization decision making as it regards
selection into particular areas is not modeled, it is not hard to imagine that lower
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quality organizations would find high λ areas more desirable, causing an influx of
organizations to areas with this characteristic, further explaining issues of congestion
within a given site. Further analysis is considered below, in which a production
function for the relief site is assumed, so that organization behavior can be considered
in a more holistic context.
2.4.1 Welfare Analysis
While the utility of affected populations in the relief space has yet to be modeled, it
is undoubtly the end goal of both the donor and the relief organization to improve
the conditions of the affected populations. The question of welfare, and welfare
improvement can be considered via the aggregation of three perspectives, namely the
donors, relief organizations, and the affected populations.
Framing the original problem as a signaling game between the donors and relief
organizations obscures, to some extent, the original focus on congestion, waste and
coordination in relief efforts, as has the selection of the objective function. What has
been shown to this point has specifically focused on the signaling equilibria between
the donor and humanitarian relief organizations. This is an important step in under-
standing the behaviors of relief organizations, specifically in the context of donors.
While there has yet to be an explicit connection between organizational behavior and
the realities of the relief needed on the ground, this initial analysis paves the way for
such a connection to be made, and allows for understanding of the tradeoffs between
the dual motives.
Also left to be shown is how the organization’s optimal relief level can be related
in any meaningful way to the needs of the relief area, and not just from the isolated
perspective of an organization. The impetus for this chapter was motivated out of
an analysis of congestion and waste in these relief areas, as a result of competition
for donations. It has been shown that a consideration of dual motives in a signaling
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context may cause the relief organization to provide more resources than they would
in optimality. While an interesting result, optimality is not particularly meaningful
at this point, as it does not have an overt connection to the relief being provided by
other organizations, nor to the relief requirements on the ground.
In the introduction of the relief organization payoff function a scalar parameter
µ, on the cost function, was introduced as a representation of the utility a relief
organization receives from actually providing the relief. The use of this parameter
can be extended by allowing that µ is dependent on the relief site k, and is not only
reflective of a particular organization’s affinity for that type of work, but also reflective
of the level of response needed. As such, by allowing µ to be a representation of the
necessary relief at a particular site one can forge a connection between the relief
required on the ground, and the importance that it takes on within the objective
function of the relief organization.
Assuming homogeneous organizations, µ can be indexed for each relief site, such
that µk is reflective of the necessary relief at a disaster area k. As noted previously
µk ∈ (0,∞) appears in the cost function gk(r, θ) = µkr
2
θ
. Consequently, there is an
inverse relationship between µk and the importance afforded a particular relief site,
with gk(r, θ) increasing in µk, and r
∗ = θ
2µk
decreasing in µk (i.e. the smaller µk
the greater the need for relief at a site). As such, it might be said that a densely
populated area recently hit by a hurricane may have a much smaller µ value than
a rural area hit by a tornado. While both scenarios are of importance, the former
would clearly merit a more sustained relief effort both in terms of time and resources
committed.
The last piece to this puzzle is a production function for the relief site that de-
scribes how the assistance provided by the various organizations actually impacts
conditions on the ground. This allows aggregation of the total relief across all organi-
zations, providing a better understanding of how signaling can impact the total relief
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level at a site. Take a simple function V : <M → {0, 1}, as an indicator function de-
noting whether or not enough relief has been provided in the current period. Taking
rtotalk =
∑M
j=1 rjk as the total amount of assistance provided by all relief organizations
to area k, and set rthres as the relief threshold, one can define V as follows:
V (rtotal) =

1 if rtotal ≥ rthres
0 if rtotal < rthres
(49)
Using V as an indicator of whether or not the necessary relief has been provided
in a particular area allows for a rough quantification of the effects of signaling on the
amount of aid received by an area in need. Based on the results developed from the
signaling model, the effects presented here are intuitive. However, the presentation
of the indicator function allows the previous results to be placed in a more accessible
context.
Not explicitly noted earlier, but an important difference between the presented
signaling model and the canonical signaling model of the labor market is that as more
firms enter the labor market, it has no effect on the expected wage of the laborer. In
fact, more firms in the labor market actually help to drive the wage to the competitive
wage rate, equal to the expected output of the worker. Consequently the presence of
additional firms, above two, does not effect the signaling equilibrium that is found
in that model. However, in the presented model, the presence of additional donors,
which takes the place of the firm in the labor market example, alters the signaling
equilibrium in a significant way. Most notably, the presence of a large number of
donors forces high productivity organizations to provide more relief to signal their
quality than when there is a lesser amount of donors. Dependent on the situation
this may or may not be desirable. With respect to the relief organizations there are
three states in which they can find themselves as it defines their giving to a particular
relief area, all of which are relative to their internally defined optimal relief levels.
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These conditions include, under provision, provision at optimum, and over provision.
Removing these states from the context of the relief organization interests, and placing
them in a larger framework one may find that depending on the humanitarian context
each of these states could possibly be desirable.14
Given Vk(r
total) for a relief area k and Vk(r
total) 6= 1, it may in fact be desirable
that organizations be induced to over provide in a separating equilibrium. As has
been shown in the preceding analysis, depending on the mix of donors and relief
organizations in a particular area, the organizations may be forced to provide more
than they might like, but when compared with what is needed on the ground, it in
fact might not be enough. Meanwhile, signaling moves these organizations to provide
more than they would in a non-signaling environment, and goes toward alleviating
the need at the relief site.
Take the scenario where no signaling is allowed and Vk(r
total) = 0, but where
rtotalk =
∑M
j=1 rjk = r
thres
k − ε. This suggests, given the appropriate humanitarian
context, and the ability to signal there may exist a signaling equilibrium, in which the
participating θ̄-type organizations are all induced to give rjk+
ε
Mθ̄
, thereby allowing for
rtotalk = r
thres
k , which now turns the indicator Vk(r
total) to 1.15 In this situation the over
provision induced by signaling becomes a good thing from the standpoint of the relief
area. However, one can just as easily imagine a situation in which the over provision
is unnecessary and only leads to wasted resources at the site of interest. Having
established Vk(r
total) as the production function at the site level, it is now possible to
define the overall welfare in a generic manner via aggregation of donor utility, relief
organization payoff, and population relief, as in equation (50). α1, α2, and α3 are
weights on the donor, relief organization, and population utilities, respectively. This,
14Taking welfare, utility, and payoff functions as static, the humanitarian context consists, in a
loose sense, of a pair that defines the number of donors and relief organizations participating in a
relief site. Define the humanitarian context of a relief area k, via {N,M}k.
15Mθ̄ is defined as the number of θ̄-type relief organizations in the system, and Mθ as the number
of θ-types
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characterization is slightly deceiving, in that it fails to account for the negative effects
of waste in a particular area. Waste can be quantified as in equation (51). A positive
value of the waste variable denotes overprovision, and negative values denote a deficit
in relief for a given area.













rjk − rthresk (51)
Below,RTOTNS and R
TOT
S are defined such that they represent the total amount of
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NS − rthresk (54)
WasteTOTS = R
TOT
S − rthresk (55)
Proposition 8: Given a {M,N} context, the presence of signaling will never
cause there to be less resources available in an area when contrasted with the outcome
in the non-signaling environment.
Proof. GivenM , letMθ andMθ̄ denote the number of θ type and θ̄ type organizations,
respectively, such that M = Mθ +Mθ̄. In a no signaling situation, the total amount
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of relief provided to an area can be defined by RTOTNS , where each type provides their
optimal relief level, r∗ and θ̄∗. RTOTS is the total amount of relief provided in an
environment in which signaling is allowed. If RTOTS ≥ RTOTNS , then it must be the case
that Mθ̄rLBsepMN ≥Mθ̄r̄∗.
To show that Mθ̄rLBsepMN ≥ Mθ̄r̄∗ consider that the lower bound on signaling,
rLBsepMN will fall into one of three categories, (1) rLBsepMN > r̄
∗, (2) rLBsepMN < r̄
∗,
or (3) rLBsepMN = r̄
∗. Working from the assumption that through refinements the
donor chooses the utility maximizing level of relief, then in case (1) the donor will
signal at rLBsepMN makingMθ̄rLBsepMN > Mθ̄r̄
∗. In case (2) the donor can separate by
signaling at his utility maximizing level, and will do so, causing Mθ̄rLBsepMN = Mθ̄r̄
∗.
Similarly case (3) leads to Mθ̄rLBsepMN = Mθ̄r̄
∗.
Conversely, consider the possibility of a pooling equilibrium. It was established in
proposition 6, that a payoff dominant pooling equilibrium can occur, under certain
conditions, at a pooling level of r̄∗. In this instance, the total relief provided in an




Because θ̄ > θ and r̄∗ > r∗, then Mθr̄
∗ > Mθr




The model has several policy implications as it regards facilitating better coordination
and resource distribution in the humanitarian relief sector. Specifically, we have shown
that signaling can lead to two types of congestion effects. Congestion in resources as
shown through the separating equilibrium, and congestion in organizations as implied
through the Pareto dominant pooling equilibrium. The need to signal is manifested
out of the informational asymmetries that exist within the humanitarian marketplace.
As a consequence of the results following from the signaling structure, it is clear that
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an environment in which types are observable allows for more discretion as it regards
placement of resources, and the level of resources provided, from an organization
standpoint. This leads to consideration of the central question, of how one might
put structures or policies in place to drive the current environment toward one where
signals are not necessary, or at the very least are not as palpable. Ways in which the
power of signals can either be reduced or eliminated are considered below.
One of the prevailing policy remedies for signaling markets, in which inefficiency is
created from actors’ desire to distinguish themselves in some fashion, is that of cross-
subsidization. In effect, cross-subsidization is exercised through a central authority
with the power to determine behavior via incentive alignment as controlled through
resource distribution. In this instance, given the lack of a centralized authority within
the humanitarian domain, specifically one with carte blanche over funds, it is impor-
tant to consider how such an organization might operate as it regards subsidization
and behavior. In part, the authority’s incentive structure will vary dependent upon
the type of equilibrium situation they are dealing with, and thus it helps to have
previously characterized the parameters which could lead to either a signaling or a
pooling equilibrium, and what type of investment the authority could expect to see
in both situations. However, in both situations the underlying problem is how does
one control access to what is essentially a public good.
In the separating occurrence, beyond a certain point, there are presumably high
productivity organizations which over provide, and low productivity organizations
that provide at their optimum. When viewed with respect to the amount of relief
necessary for a particular situation the aggregate provision may indeed by necessary.
However, if the provision level is not necessary, a central authority with discretion over
funds could implement a scheme in which those organizations who signal their type
at the appropriate level receive their expected funds, and those organizations which
cannot provide at the separating level are given a subsidy, or grant, to invest their
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resources in another area. Such a grant, would have to be comprised of an amount
that would make the low productivity organization indifferent between investment in
either area. As a result, not only is investment in other causes or areas fostered, but
the effects of congestion and overprovision are mitigated at the initial site of interest,
making coordination an easier prospect.16
In the pooling occurrence the scheme gets a bit more complicated. In the sepa-
rating case, high productivity organizations had a natural inclination to separate via
provision at a certain level. In the instance of pooling, these organizations are content
with providing at their optimal level and allowing lower productivity organizations to
pool on this level. Although we do not model the dynamics of the equilibrium over
time, it would presumably not be a stretch to infer that pooling environments would
encourage increased participation from low type organizations as time advanced. Ac-
cepting this premise, the increased participation of these organizations would cause
wasted resources and coordination difficulties as their numbers increased. Conse-
quently, the problem of how one limits access persists, but in a slightly different
context. One solution to this problem, in the spirit of subsidization, would be to en-
courage highly productive organizations to signal at the separating level, and provide
a grant to make up for their payoff loss from not pooling. While this accomplishes
the goal of distinguishing between organizations, the authority is then forced into the
separating contingency, in which the authority would once again have to incentivize
low type organizations to stay away, if that is what is necessary. Behavior can be al-
tered through grants and lump-sum payments, but the pool of funds may not support
realignments through this process, and forcing organizations to over provide for the
sake of separation may be counter-productive. A potential remedy to this problem,
would be forcing the organizations to provide another costly signal of capability and
16Issues of timing may need to be considered, in that these funds may need to be allocated up
front, but recouped on the back end. In this sense such an organization would act as revolving fund.
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preparedness beforehand, such that organizations could be classified based on readi-
ness. Through this tiered system, although organizations could still pool on resource
provision, the pooling could be broken through the capability requirements, which
would then allow a central authority to make better decisions about who is needed
where and how best to allocate funds to accomplish that, in a less costly manner.
In a more straight forward fashion, if there were a central authority that did not
have funds to incentivize organizations, but simply had control over where organi-
zations could and could not go and what they could do when they got there as it
concerns division of labor, there would still be effects on the strength of the relief
signal. In this sense, this structure shifts the power in signaling from how much relief
was provided, and where, to how well did an organization fulfill its requested assign-
ment. If donors are aware of this structure, relief as a signal no longer has much
meaning, as the provision requests were made from outside the organization. While
bringing a centralized command structure to what is a highly de-centralized system
is a preferred solution, the practicality of implementation is inhibited by logistical
considerations, and to a large extent incentives. There are individual foundations
and governments which are large enough to leverage a certain amount of control over
the organizations to which they contribute. However, these foundations and govern-
ments are themselves spread out, and have varying agendas. The only way in which
a centralized structure could become feasible is through the concentration of funding
sources. If donors trust one foundation above all others as being good stewards of
their funds, and come to recognize that this foundation has the sufficient skill and
knowledge to best utilize these funds, then organizations, and particularly smaller
ones, will become reliant on this foundation for funding. Chapter 4 consides a varia-
tion of this and shows to one extent how the power of signals may lose some of their
effect when considered in the context of a trustworthy governing institution.
Beyond consideration of a central authority, it is also worthwhile to consider the
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power of outside organizations to influence behavior. In this instance how these
entities might help to reduce the power of relief as a signal via diversification of the
available signals is considered. Mentioned in the introduction is the notion that relief
organizations were unique with respect to other charitable organizations in the sense
that the number of types of credible signals which they have available for use is smaller
than that of other charitable organizations. If there are independent organizations
which can be created, and there are some which currently exist, to document and
ascertain effectiveness beyond use of funds via Form 990 analysis, then ways in which
organizations can credibly tell others that they are high quality organizations can
be increased. However, even beyond the transformational policy recommendations,
it is important that funding organizations stress the importance of cooperation and
coordination via existing grants.
2.5 Conclusions and Extensions
As outlined in the introduction, this work seeks to build a foundational model from
which the effect of information on the behavior of donors and relief organizations
within the humanitarian relief marketplace can begin to be quantified and better
understood. The model provides some curious insights into these dynamics via the
characterization of separating and pooling equilibrium, under an assumed dynamic
structure, and additionally provides some context for when one might expect to see
either occur. What can be definitively said, is that information and the need to con-
vey it as manifested through signaling, alters organizational behavior in the provision
increasing direction, such that each organization will at minimum contribute what
they would in the perfect information setting, but in fact may contribute more than
they would to the public good with full information in hand. While it can be specu-
lated that these behavior alterations obstruct the completion of the primary mission,
it will require empirical analysis to make definitive conjectures along these lines. The
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presented model builds upon the traditional models of signaling, and offers several
extensions to satisfy the distinct nature of the considered problem.
The primary extension of the model deals with the altruistic foundations on which
relief organizations are derived. The most easily relatable signaling model is that of
Spence’s model of the job market in which education is used as a signal to employers of
a worker’s true type. In a perfect information environment, workers of both types will
choose not to obtain any education at all. Only when there is uncertainty about types
will a high productivity worker choose to obtain education. However, in the instance
of relief organizations, regardless of type and the information environment, these
organizations will always choose to provide some level of relief. The organization, in
this sense akin to workers, will always find fulfillment in providing some level of relief
as it allows for progress toward completion of their core mission, even if the relief does
not lead to any future donations. This provision leads to a slightly more complicated
equilibrium structure, particularly as it concerns refinements, and the focus on which
equilibrium will occur in practice.
Another deviation occurs in the consideration of how wages, or donations, are
derived within this model. Donors, which are considered to be a direct parallel of
the firms in the labor market model, are looking to provide a donation to relief
organizations much as firms provide a wage to workers. However, in the instance
of firms, the wage that is provided to workers can be explained through satisfaction
of a competitive market equilibrium, in that no firm would provide a wage greater
than the expected productivity, but neither would any firm provide a wage below this
level, lest it price itself out of the market for any workers. In the presented model,
the donation levels of donors are not derived from a competitive market, but from
altruistic inclinations, in the sense that each individual has some willingness or desire
to give part of their wealth to a public cause or good. This model leverages the
previous work on altruistic giving to define standard levels of giving outside of the
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competitive environment.
Lastly, the model was developed with the notion of competition as a driver of
relief organization behavior. Consequently, some may find it curious that the model
does not directly consider competition within the organization objective function,
as one might expect, via a congestion term. However, competition is inherently
present within the model in two senses; 1). competition between low productivity
and high productivity types, which was the impetus for the model, and 2). com-
petition between individual organizations as proxied through the use of expectation
in determining potential payoffs to each organization. Both dynamics enter directly
into the characterization of the equilibrium, with consideration of the expected pay-
off causing the equilibrium set to change dependent on the ratio of organizations to
donors present within a particular site. In the future a more explicit consideration
of competition effects within the organization objective function may be beneficial in
advancing the model.
As it regards what the separating and pooling equilibrium explicitly say about the
potential behavior observations, we can say that a separating equilibrium will always
exist, and may help to explain why incidents in which areas receive more supplies
and attention than are necessary, resulting in waste, occur. Beyond that, we are also
able to characterize pooling equilibria and instances in which pooling can or cannot
exist. Scenarios in which the pooling equilibrium exist and dominates the payoff
from separating for both high productivity and low productivity organizations are
outlined, and are shown to be dependent on donor beliefs about organization quality
in a particular area. The Pareto dominant pooling structure shows that if the donor
pool is large enough, and beliefs high enough, then organizations of lesser quality
will find it beneficial to act as high quality organizations, through relief provision in
a given area, while high quality organizations will not be incentivized to distinguish
themselves. This result is substantiated by anecdotal observations of relief cases in
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which many newly formed and lesser known organizations crowd into high publicity
relief theaters, but would require further empirical verification.
As a final caveat on the implications of the model, one should caution against over
reading the results of the model, particularly with respect to the observed level of
coordination within high publicity relief sites. While the signaling results can be con-
sidered to explain some of the resistance to coordination, they should not be read as
accounting for the entirety of the reason for why coordination often times falls short
of desired levels. While the model can perhaps explain much of the competitive dy-
namic, it does not rule out other possible explanations for coordination related issues.
In particular it does not rule out that in general coordination is difficult in a highly
de-centralized system and that resistance to coordination may be a result, in part, of
the difficulties inherent in carrying it out within such a high stakes environment.
In the current model, the assumption is made that signaling via relief is the only
way in which organizations can alter their expected contributions. In practice, how-
ever, organizations will often engage in direct fundraising campaigns to attract donor
funds. An extension of the model in which direct fundraising is considered, along with
signaling effects would be useful in making further characterizations about behavior in
the face of informational asymmetries. Additionally, the decision about which areas
organizations participated in was exogenously made. An extension whereby organi-
zations can make this decision endogenously across a set of relief theaters would also
be beneficial.
From an empirical perspective this paper highlights several areas which could
benefit from empirical analysis. In particular, the existence of a Pareto dominant
pooling equilibrium is dependent upon λ, which is the donor belief about the propor-
tion of high quality organizations participating in an area. Behavioral studies of how
donors form perceptions about the quality of organizations participating in various
relief theaters would further ground the results of the presented model. Beyond the
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donor analysis, an assumption about signaling was made, in that it was assumed that
higher levels of relief provision brought higher levels of exposure, and beyond a point
increased expectation of donor funds. This exposure assumption is something that is
testable via comparisons of organizational exposure around particular humanitarian
events to levels of subsequent funding received by the organization of note. Lastly,
the parameters θ̄ and θ were used to represent high productivity and low productivity
organizations, respectively. However, in practice, we know that there are differences
in the quality of organizations, but an appropriate estimate of the values of these
parameters is not readily accessible. Work to derive appropriate characterizations of
productivity in the humanitarian environment is necessary going forward.
The presented model can be considered a first step toward the quantification of
the market for humanitarian relief, which itself can be considered a subset of the
philanthropic marketplace. There have been several papers which have grappled with
how the market for philanthropy can be defined, with most falling into the category
of conceptual frameworks. While a specific niche of this marketplace was considered,
it is the author’s belief that this model can be extended to include a more holistic
analysis of charitable giving. Future work into model refinement and development
from a quantitative perspective is crucial in advancing best practices as it concerns
actual relief provision, and the maximization of its effectiveness. As motives and
behavior are better understood, through both qualitative and quantitative research,
the better institutions and policy can be designed with the aim of aligning incentives
such that enhanced service for those in need is the ultimate outcome.
Chapter 3 considers similar issues as it relates to the influence of information on
donor and organization behavior. It builds off the assumptions and results presented
in this chapter, but is complementary in that it takes the perspective of search, in
considering how donor’s and organization’s interact around information and giving.
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2.6 Appendix: Equilibrium Refinement 17
The previous section establishes a range over which various types of equilibrium
can exist. However, even within this range, there are an infinite number of feasible
equilibrium, and so the question of which equilibrium to focus on persists. Several
reasonable-belief refinements have been proposed to help provide focus on a smaller
subset of the abundant perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) usually resulting from
signaling games. Below, we apply several of these refinements in a progressive manner.
Each of these refinements is introduced with the thought that one can establish a set
of PBEs for which beliefs at the equilibrium are reasonable with respect to the agreed
upon construct.
Strict Dominance
Strict dominance, as a refinement, asserts the following proposition with respect
to the presented signaling game.
A relief level r ∈ R is a strictly dominated choice for type θ if there is a relief level




′, y(r′), θ)] > max
y∈Y
EMN [π(r, y(r), θ)] (57)
For each action r ∈ R define the set Θ(r) = {θ : there is no r′ ∈ R satisfying (57)}
A PBE has a reasonable belief if, ∀r ∈ R with Θ(r) 6= , then λ(θ|r) > 0 only if
θ ∈ Θ(r), and a PBE is a sensible prediction only if it has reasonable beliefs.
In this instance, because there is no upperbound on y ∈ Y = <+, we find that
there is no strictly dominated r for either θ̄ or θ, thus Θ(r) = {θ̄, θ}, ∀r ∈ R. As a
consequence this refinement does not rule out any of the proposed PBEs.
Strict Dominance in Equilibrium Responses
Another refinement, which extends the rationale developed in the strict dominance
17Refinement discussion adapted from Mas-Colell [59]
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example, is that of strict dominance in equilibrium responses. This refinement is
built out of the same fundamental idea of strict dominance, but limits the space of
acceptable y values to those which can be found in equilibrium responses. In this
sense, the range of equilibrium responses y, over the set of relief levels, r, creates
some reasonable bounds over the set of donations Y = <+. More formally, for
any nonempty set Θ̂ ⊂ Θ, let Y ∗(Θ̂, r) ⊂ Y1 × . . . × YN denote the set of possible
equilibrium responses that can arise after relief level r is observed for some beliefs
satisfying the property that λ(θ|r) > 0 only if θ ∈ Θ̂. In the sense of strict dominance
in equilibrium responses we can now say that relief level r ∈ R is strictly dominated




′, y′, θ)] > max
y∈Y ∗(Θ,r)
EMN [π(r, y, θ)] (58)
Using this notion of dominance we can define the set,
Θ∗(r) = {θ : there is no r′ ∈ R satisfying (58)}
In this sense a PBE has reasonable beliefs if for all r ∈ R with Θ∗(r) 6= , then
λ(θ|r) > 0 only if θ ∈ Θ∗(r).
Application of this refinement has the ability to reduce the set of PBEs by a
reduction of the Y -space to Y ∗(Θ, r′) = [y∗, ȳ∗] for all relief levels r. This reduction
occurs because, for any belief λ ∈ [0, 1], the resulting Nash Equilibrium wage must
lie between y∗ and ȳ∗.
By restricting the space to those responses found in equilibrium, it follows that for







is dominated by r∗. Consequently
it is not reasonable to hold the belief that λ(θ|r) > 0 ∀ r > r̃. This condition requires
that for r > r̃ that beliefs about the high types must be λ(θ̄|r) = 1. This restriction
on beliefs requires, provided that r̄∗ > r̃, that a type θ̄ signal r̄∗. However, if r̄∗ < r̃,
and a separating equilibrium is desired it must be the case that θ̄ will maximize its
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payoff by signaling at r = r̃ + ε slightly above r̃, where ε > 0.
Additionally, strict dominance in equilibrium responses helps to rule out certain
pooling equilibrium, and in some cases all pooling equilibrium. The refinement re-
quires that for r > r̃, λ(θ̄|r) = 1, and as a consequence, we can rule out any pooling
equilibrium such that the expected payoff from pooling, EMN [π(ŷ
∗, rp, θ̄)] is less than
EMN [π(ȳ
∗, r̃+ε, θ̄)] the payoff from a deviation to the smallest separating level. In fact,
if one considers the set of all potential pooling equilibrium levels [rLBpMN , rUBpMN ],
then all pooling equilibrium can be ruled out if for all rp ∈ [rLBpMN , rUBpMN ],
EMN [π(ŷ
∗, rp, θ̄)] ≤ EMN [π(ȳ∗, r̃+ ε, θ̄)]. In this scenario, a θ̄ organization will always
find it beneficial to deviate from the pooling level to its most profitable separating
level.
Equilibrium Dominance
Equilibrium dominance further strengthens the refinement proposed via strict
dominance in equilibrium responses.18 This refinement begins with an equilibrium
payoff EMN [π
∗(θ)] for type θ and asks the question, what relief levels, r, does this
payoff dominate for a type θ? More formally, relief level r is equilibrium dominated




EMN [π(r, y, θ)] (59)
Subsequently, define for each r ∈ R the set,
Θ∗∗(r) = {θ : condition (59) does not hold}.
18Equilibrium dominance finds its base in the distinction between the notions of “no chance at
all”, and the notion of “some chance,” no matter how small that chance may be. In other words,
there are some situations in which, even if it were to be presumed that the organization is a high
type with probability one, the payoff that accompanies the necessary signal would still not be enough
to improve the organization’s current PBE payoff. However, there may be some organizations for
which the payoff could be better than the PBE payoff if the donor assumes with certainty that the
organization is a high type. As a consequence types for which there is no chance are ruled out, and
the probabilities of the remaining types are updated accordingly.
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In this instance a PBE has reasonable beliefs if for all actions r with Θ∗∗(r) 6= ,
λ(θ|r) > 0 only if θ ∈ Θ∗∗(r).
This refinement condition not only rules out all the equilibrium that are ruled out
under dominance in equilibrium responses, but also rules out all pooling equilibrium.19
Given satisfaction of the single crossing property, and adherence to equilibrium dom-
ination, pooling equilibrium can be ruled out via the following argument:
The pooling level rp has to be less than r̃, the lower bound on separating equilib-
rium. By the definition of single-crossing property the θ̄-type objective curve crosses
under the θ-type curve. As such, any deviation by a θ-type to a relief level r > r′
decreases the profit of the low productivity type, even if the new signaling level
caused the donor to believe with certainty that the organization was of a high type.20
Consequently, a deviation to r ∈ [r′, r′′] must imply that the organization is of a high
type with certainty. This breaks the stability of any pooling PBE, as the high type
organization will always have incentive to deviate to some r ∈ [r′, r′′]. Thus, only the
best separating equilibrium remains as a PBE of the game.
19This is with the caveat that all pooling equilibrium are ruled out, only when a high type does
not prefer one to separation. As was presented in the paper, there are instances in which a high
type organization may find a pooling equilibrium to be optimal.
20r′ and r′′ are defined as the relief levels that make θ and θ̄ types indifferent between the pooling
payoff and the high productivity payoff, respectively.
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CHAPTER III
A TWO-STAGE DONOR SEARCH MODEL OF THE
MARKET FOR HUMANITARIAN CAUSES
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter builds a model of donor and relief organization interaction on
the assumption that donors have difficulties in distinguishing between the quality
of relief organizations, and consequently look for signals to help them come to a
determination about the quality of a given organization. In turn, this chapter builds
on the concept of the relationship between the donor and organization by considering
the dynamic from a slightly different perspective. Underlying the dynamics of the
relationship is still the notion that organization behavior reveals information to the
donor about its quality. However, in this chapter, the dynamic is developed through
a two-stage donor search model, in which the information sought by the donor is less
about whether or not the organization is a high or low productivity organization, but
more about the quality of the match between an organization and a donor. In this
sense a match is considered to be a donor’s intrinsic value for the work of a particular
organization, and the extent to which a donor can find and internalize the benefits of
such an organization is the basis of the presented model. Taking a step back from the
context of humanitarian relief defined in the previous chapter, this chapter abstracts
the discussion to a more generally defined charitable marketplace, and considers an
environment in which their are multiple sectors (e.g. health, education, human rights,
etc.), each being comprised of various organizations. In this way, the donor’s decision
about which organization to donate toward, is no longer exogenously made.
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At its most basic level an organization is the sum of the individuals and activi-
ties of which it is comprised. In this respect there may often be a contrast between
what an organization thinks it is, and what it actually is. In this vein, activities and
individuals effect various output metrics of the organization. Two metrics of par-
ticular concern to this work are the exposure level (i.e. an organization’s likelihood
of discovery by a donor) and the transparency level of an organization.1 Through-
out, these metrics will, in tandem, be used as proxy representations of particular
organization types. These two organizational levers are isolated to formulate testing
scenarios,which allow for analysis, through simulation, of donor behavior in response
to changes in the system relative to some baseline, via the derived model. As such,
this approach provides a handle on potential behavioral implications of these vari-
ables, with subsequent policy insights. Furthermore, it is assumed that, in an almost
cyclical way, a donor’s behavioral responses to these metrics are significant determi-
nants in guiding the decision making of charitable organizations. The extent to which
this may or may not be true is a driving consideration of model development and is
discussed within the chapter. The model and its subsequent analysis will also provide
the basis for empirical analysis of the theory, in particular; match sustainment, longi-
tudinal studies of organizational activities, congestion analysis, and the provision for
a taxonomy of charitable causes.
The presented model is a modification of the Jovanovic’s [49] model of job search
in the labor market, and was chosen because of its ability to capture aspects of a
sustained relationship between donors and charities. This is in contrast to product
search models in which the consumer searches for the lowest price of a given product,
1The terms transparency level and monitoring cost will be used interchangeably throughout the
chapter. When one speaks of an organization having a high level of transparency, it is akin to
saying that the organization has a low monitoring cost. In both senses, it is easier for an individual
to acquire information about such an organization when compared to an organization of a low
transparency level and high monitoring cost.
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given some search costs. Most models of job search presuppose a continuing relation-
ship past the initial match point (given all parties involved are so inclined), and thus
continuous benefits are realized in each period after the initial match. Additionally,
and perhaps an even more important distinction is that the nature of this good re-
quires a certain level of discovery and exploration to determine the true utility to a
donor.
This donor search model attempts to help fill a gap in the body of research sur-
rounding donor and organization behavior. In particular, there has been much work
from a theoretical perspective on understanding why people give. Notions of pres-
tige in giving, impact giving, intrinsic altruism, impure altruism, etc., are all closely
aligned with this branch of donor research. However, in addition to this branch, there
has also been research into understanding how organizations can best tap into the
sometimes latent desires of individuals to give. From this standpoint, research into
how different fundraising appeals effect giving came about (e.g. leadership giving,
matching, direct mail appeals[41], etc.). In this respect the model seeks to better
define the area in the middle of these two research areas via a specific modeling of
the process through which the two entities are engaged. Furthermore, in addition to
the descriptive antecedents, the model also lays the groundwork for the development
of charitable markets in which stable matches between donors and organizations can
be more readily developed.
Section 3.2 provides more background on the considered problem, and places the
research within the framework of previous literature as regards donor search behavior,
organization behavior, and the use of search models in general. Section 3.3 builds
the case for the presented model, and subsequently defines its construction. Section
3.4 outlines a simulation of donor search behavior within a charitable marketplace,
and provides analysis on observed results. Section 3.5 attempts to place the results
in a wider context as it regards how organizations weigh tradeoffs in the allocation of
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resources, and implications of the model for the charitable marketplace as a whole.
Section 3.6 highlights some of the significant results of the model, and outlines direc-
tions for future work and extensions.
3.2 Background and Literature
While the previous chapter introduced a subset of the literature on the economics of
charitable giving and signaling, in this chapter we turn our attention to the literature
on search, non-profit motives, and notions of what non-profit or philanthropic mar-
ketplaces look like in practice. In arriving at an understanding of what is meant by
the market for charitable causes one must not only have a baseline understanding of
the role of charities and non-profits within the public space, but also understand to
some extent what their objectives are, and how their activities evolve. While this was
touched on in the preceding chapter, particularly within the context of humanitarian
relief organizations we consider these questions again within a larger framework.
Hansmann [42], in “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise” attempts to develop a
perspective on the role that private nonprofits play in the economy, distinct from that
of government enterprises and for-profit organizations. In particular he develops the
notion of the “non-distribution” constraint, which is the distinguishing characteristic
between non-profit and for-profit entities.2 In similarly considering the characteristics
and motivations of non-profits, James [48] posits a model of nonprofit growth. In
particular she considers the notion of cross-subsidization within nonprofits, and finds
that organizations will often times have to undertake activities from which they derive
little to no satisfaction, such that they can afford to provide “high-value” services. In
particular, this notion will become important when considered within the context of
results from the donor search model. Weisbrod [102] and Holtman [46] offer further
2“non-distribution” implies that any profits accrued by the organization may not redistributed
to individuals who exercise control over their organization, but instead must be reinvested within
the organization to further the production of services and goods.
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explanations for the existence and role of nonprofits, with an emphasis on their ability
to efficiently provide public good, for which the for-profit or government sectors are
not able to suitably provide.
The extent to which one is able to model a market for charitable goods in part
rests on the assumption that competition exists within such a market. It was shown
anecdotally in the previous chapter that competition among non-profits exists within
the market for humanitarian relief. To this extent, quite a bit of work has been done
in characterizing competition among a larger set of nonprofit entities. Bilodeau and
Slivinski [17] consider why rival charities exist, with the primary motivation being that
individuals can exert control of the mixture of public goods provided by operating such
organizations. In particular, Rose-Ackerman [79], Feigenbaum [33], Tuckman [98],
and Pepall et al. [71], all consider how competition within the nonprofit sector effects
organization behavior as it regards resource allocation and efficiency. Rose-Ackerman
shows how competition for donations can force organizations to spend an “excessive”
amount of resources on fundraising. Feigenbaum develops a model of competition in
the nonprofit sector using US medical research charities as a case study. She uses a
four-firm concentration ratio as a measure of intramarket competition, and finds that
increases in concentration lead to a negative impact on the amount of funds allocated
to research. Along these same lines Castaneda et al. [22] use measures of market
concentration to consider the effects of competition across a larger set of nonprofit
sectors, and find similar results to Feigenbaum. Pepall et al. examine competition in
the context of the religious marketplace and find that churches compete via expenses
on charitable services.
Along the lines of the notion of transparency in the presented model, Frumkin and
Kim [34] consider whether increased organization efficiency is rewarded via increased
donor contributions within the charitable marketplace. In particular they consider
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whether it is economically beneficial to position one’s organization as being adminis-
tratively efficient relative to other organizations. Using panel data, and expense ratios
as measures of efficiency they find that there are no significant gains in contributions
for those organizations which are more efficient.
In the context of this chapter understanding why nonprofits exist, and how their
behavior is influenced by competitive pressures is useful in contextualizing the results
of the simulated search model, and in developing a functioning market of humanitarian
causes. However, to develop a model of the marketplace, how the donor interacts with
the aforementioned organizations most be modeled appropriately. Expanding on the
factors introduced at the outset, namely exposure and transparency, Sargeant [84]
develops a conceptual model of donor behavior. This model, along with other factors
are considered within the context of economic search theory.
Much of the development of the donor search model builds on the results that lay
at the foundation of research on economic search theory. Search theory, at its core,
recognizes, the individuals make decisions based on the information they have at given
point in time, and that in general better decisions are made when more information
is available. As such, how much information an individual gathers during the course
of the decision making process depends, in large part, on the costs associated with
information gathering. These costs, in an economic sense are considered to be search,
or transaction costs, as outlined by Williamson [104], and can be inhibitors to effective
search, in the sense that one may be forced to make a less than optimal decision
because it becomes too costly to obtain more information. Stigler’s [95] seminal essay
on the economics of information acknowledges as much, and considers the role of
information within economics. Rothschild [83] offers a survey of the literature that
can be considered derivatives of Sitgler’s initial outline. While the concepts around
search models can be applied in a multitude of settings, each model retains the same
basic structure at its core.
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Many of the foundational results in search theory have been derived from models
placed in the setting of job search as defined by Stigler’s [95] initial work on informa-
tion in the labor market, and extended by McCall [60] in classifying optimal stopping
conditions for laborers seeking employment. Yashiv [108] offers a recent survey of
literature with respect to search within the labor market and its role in facilitating
macroeconomic analysis. Becker [12], however, defines a theory of marriage via search
and considers how matches within a frictionless “marriage market” occur, finding that
individuals tend to match in a positively assortive manner along physical character-
istics, and negatively in wage rates and other household substitutes. Atakan [9], and
Shimer and Smith [88] extend Becker’s work by considering how output changes when
cost is associated with search in this market.
Jovanovic’s model of job search provides the basis upon which the presented donor
search model rests. Similarly, Wilde’s [103] model can be considered in the same vein,
with both offering a level of discovery as it concerns the quality of the information
received before agreeing to accept a job. As such, both models consist of multiple
stages with a new decision at each stage, and can be used to explain why job quits may
or may not occur within the labor market. The remainder of the section considers
why the canonical model of job search is not sufficient to model the donor market,
with a discussion of how Jovanovic’s model is applied occurring in Section 3.3.2.
The research on economic search is vast, with many variations and applications
of the the economic search problem. These variations, of which the presented model
is also one, all emanate in some respect from a basic model of search. As discussed
in Lippman and McCall [53] the foundational economic search model provided in the
context of the labor market is one in which there is some worker seeking a job that
will provide him with an acceptable wage. The worker, at each stage, must pay a
cost c to find out how much he will be offered for a particular job.3 Conditional on a
3c can be equivalently thought of as the opportunity cost of search in a given period.
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job offer the worker then either accepts the offer permanently, or rejects the offer and
repeats the same process next period for a new wage offer. This process continues
indefinitely, with no discounting for future wages, and without recall.4 Underlying
this simple model are several assumptions that shape the nature of the solution to
the problem of when a worker should accept an offer.
It is initially assumed that the worker is risk neutral, so that he is indifferent
between a current wage offer and an equivalent expectation of future wage offers.
Furthermore, there is a known distribution of wages, such that the worker is able to
formulate a mathematical expectation of future wages. The cumulative distribution
of wages, F (·), provides the source of uncertainty in the model for which search
becomes necessary. Given this setup, and the underlying assumptions, the solution
takes the form of a cutoff value, where for wages offered above the cutoff value the
worker accepts, and for wages below the cutoff value the worker rejects and continues
searching.
The foundational model is presented to both provide a basis for the extended
model presented in this paper, but also as an expository tool to understand why the
model must be extended in order to capture some of the desired attributes of the
market for humanitarian causes. In particular, given the issues under consideration
in this chapter, an appropriate model must capture the following:
• Unique valuations across different causes and organizations from a donor per-
spective.
• Organizational discovery 5.
• A range of transparency levels across organizations, and monitoring costs asso-
ciated with them.
4“With Recall” would allow the worker to continue searching and recall any previous offer that
he has seen during his search process, and accept it, at anytime he wishes. In this simple model
there is no difference between search with recall and without recall.
5This is akin to gradual learning about an organization’s quality.
72
• Alternative uses for money (i.e. If a donor does not find a suitable donation
opportunity then they can place their money elsewhere for the time being).
All of the items, with the exception of organizational discovery, can be packaged
in a one-stage framework, and could conceivably be handled by the foundational
model. However, discovery requires, at minimum, a two-stage framework and cannot
be handled by the foundational model. The desire for discovery in the model is
drawn from the use of Andreoni’s impure altruism model [3] as the basis for donor
utility construction. This point, along with the remainder of the presented model is
explained more throughly in the following section.
3.3 A Two-Stage Donor Search Model
3.3.1 Assumptions
To facilitate model development, a few basic assumptions about the dynamic under
construction are outlined:
• There are altruistic donors who want to give money to charitable causes.
• Individual donors have preferences over which of these causes are most impor-
tant to them.
• Within these causes, the donor has preferences over which organizations he
would like to contribute toward.
• The donor knows his preferences, but must take time to find the organization
which best matches them (i.e. information about best matches is not readily
available, and may require a commitment of the donor’s resources to obtain it.)
• The humanitarian organizations have preferences over certain causes as dictated
by mission. However, they would still like to provide assistance to as many areas
a possible, but are constrained by resources.
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• Humanitarian organizations have preferences over the areas they participate in.
• Humanitarian organizations need, and want donor funds.
• Humanitarian organizations will act strategically to obtain donor funds.
3.3.2 Model Development
The Jovanovic model, a two-sided search model of the job market, can be modified to
allow for a one-sided agent-based model of donor interaction with the humanitarian
marketplace. Specifically, the proposed model acts as a descriptive model of donor
search. Below, the initial set of parameters, and the progression of the model are
defined, along with a discussion of several assumptions and conditions used within
the model. Philip Nelson, in his seminal work ([69]), proposed a dichotomous classi-
fication of goods as either search goods, or experience goods. Search goods are goods
which have characteristics that can easily be evaluated before they are purchased.
In contrast, experience goods must be purchased in order to discern quality. In this
paper the provision of humanitarian aid is considered a public good that the donor
wishes to contribute toward via donation to a humanitarian organization. It is not
clear whether the purchase of aid for others through a humanitarian organization is a
search or experience good from the donor’s vantage point, in that the donor may never
be entirely sure about the quality of the good he has purchased. However, for the
purposes of this paper and the presented model, it is assumed that the characteristics
of this public good fall closer to that of an experience good.6
The donor search process is modeled around the following story, adapted from
Jovanovic’s model of job search. The hypothesis that both sides of the job match (i.e.
workers and employers) behave optimally and only gradually learn about the quality
of the match between the two, on which Jovanovic built his model, is transferred to
6As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Darby and Karni [30] discuss the notion of a credence
good, or a good for which the true value is never known to the purchaser. The purchase of aid, via
donations to humanitarian based organizations could be considered to be such a good.
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the presented model. In this model a risk neutral donor samples an organization to
ascertain the quality of its work, and his experience as a donor to that organization.
This initial sample phase dictates to the donor the nature of his relationship with
the organization going forward. In this initial model the organization’s action set
is restricted to {Accept, Reject}. The organization either accepts donated funds,
or rejects the funds. Working under the assumption that the funds are “no strings
attached,” the optimal behavior for an organization is to always accept, which allows
the market to be modeled as a one-sided matching.7 In this scenario, as alluded
to in the previously defined assumptions, there exists a set of donors, all of whom
are interested in giving this period provided that giving exceeds the opportunity
cost of not giving. Furthermore, they have preferences over the type of work the
organization does, and coupled with their perceived productivity of the organization,
they experience varying benefit depending on the organization they ultimately end up
donating to. As a consequence, given a heterogeneous donor pool, the match (or fit),
that each donor experiences with a given organization will vary.8 With this in mind,
a process in which a donor, via some mechanism, encounters a potential recipient
organization is considered.
The donor, having some exogenous level of information available to him about
a given organization formulates an initial belief about the benefit he would receive
from making a donation to this organization. This initial view of the benefit from the
organization match will be called sij, and can be viewed as the warm-glow experienced
by a donor i upon an initial donation to organization j, similar to what Andreoni
describes. Accordingly, the donor makes a decision about whether or not to donate to
7“No strings attached” is defined such that the organization is not restricted in how it uses
any donations it may receive. If “with strings attached” is allowed, it may be the case that the
organization will reject the funds because the requirements associated with a donation may not be
in line with its core activities or goals.[10]
8See Roth and Sotomayor [82] for a more in-depth discussion of game-theoretic matching in
markets.
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this organization in the current period, or to hold off and search for a better match for
his humanitarian interests. Also under consideration is that a donor must pay some
cost, cj, to invest in the organization and to subsequently monitor the behavior of the
organization. Monitoring is necessary, in that the donor needs to acquire information,
ex post, in order to come to a better understanding of how well he matches with the
organization and its outcomes. In this sense, the donor’s benefit from donating in
this initial period is the experience of the warm-glow, as defined by sij, less the
cost of monitoring (i.e sij − cj). If the donor chooses not to commit to the current
organization he goes back to the initial phase and encounters another organization
via the same introduction mechanism. However, if the donor chooses to pay cj and
donate, in the next period they are shown the true value of the match, xij, and then
presented with the option of either continuing with this match and leaving the search
process or discarding their current match and continuing the search process.9
3.3.2.1 Definitions
Several parameters, which will be used going forward, are defined.
Time:
T ≡ The set of time periods, indexed, t = 1 . . . |T |.
Agents:
N ≡ The set of donors, indexed, i = 1 . . . |N |.
M ≡ The set of relief organizations, indexed, j = 0 . . . |M |, where j = 0 is
an index included to represent the donor (i.e. A donation to organization
j = 0 is equivalent to a donor deciding to keep his money).
9It may be a bit presumptuous to assume that the donor can ascertain the true value of the match
after one period, but this construction is nonetheless presented as a baseline example. Extensions,
whereby the donor gradually learns of the true value can also be considered.
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Donor Parameters:
xij ≡ The benefit, or value of the match, to donor i from making a contribution
to organization j.10 Values of x are i.i.d with distribution N(µx, σ
2
x).
ε ≡ Random noise within the system that obscures the true value of xij. ε is
i.i.d. with distribution N(µε, σ
2
ε ).
sij ≡ The initial warm-glow perception to donor i of a donation to organization
j. More explicitly, sij = xij + ε, which makes sij i.i.d. with distribution





ptij ≡ The probability that donor i encounters organization j in period t. When
pij is used the probabilities are stationary.
∑|M |
j=1 pij = 1 for all i.
β ∈ (0, 1) ≡ Donor sensitivity to delay, or discount value on future rewards.
Values close to 0 signify an impatient market, in which donors severely
discount rewards accrued pass the current period. Values close to 1 is
indicative of a market in which donors make little distinction between
current period rewards and future rewards.
Organization Parameters:
cij ≡ The cost to donor i of monitoring organization j. The distribution of c
within a particular marketplace is context dependent, but can be consid-
ered to be bounded on the interval [c, c̄].
3.3.2.2 Progression
The progression of the model is outlined below.
Step 0 (Initialization):
10At this point, no suggestions as to what the actual dollar amount of the donation is, are made.
The assumption is made that the donor wants to donate some money, and that they donate such
that, under perfect information xij would be realized.
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0a. Define Values for M , N , and T .
0b. Define the |N | × |M | Introduction matrix, P, where pij ∈ P.
0c. Define parameters for N(µx, σx) and N(µε, σε).
0d. Define the Cost vector c ∈ <|M |, where cj ∈ c denotes the cost of exploring
organization j for all donors i. 11
Step 1 (Pairing and Viewing):
1a. If donor i does not have a 1st stage match, then he randomly encounters orga-
nization j with probability ptij in the current period. Go to step 1b, otherwise
step 1c.
1b. sij is generated according to N(µx + µε, σ2x + σ
2
ε ) and revealed to donor i. Go to
step 2.
1c. If the donor i has a 1st stage match, then go to step 4.
Step 2 (Decision Evaluation):
2a. Donor i makes a decision, based on his action set and guided by his decision rule,
whether or not to pay cj this period and match with j.12 Go to step 2b.
2b. If the donor decides to pay cj , then go to step 3, otherwise step 2c.
2c. If the donor declines to pay cj , and t < T , then move to step 1. Otherwise
terminate the match process.
Step 3 (1st Stage Payoff ):
11Of course, as noted above, the cost may be dependent on both the donor’s type, and the relief
organization’s type, wherein the cost would be cij ∈ C, where C is a |N |×|M | Cost matrix. However,
we initially consider the case in which the cost is unique to the relief organization, and homogeneous
across the set of donors, such that cij = cj , ∀i.
12The particular timing of cj is not important (i.e. whether payment occurs at the beginning,
middle, or end of the 1st stage). What is important is that it is paid before stage 2 commences. In
reality cj will be an on going cost throughout the 1st stage, but is considered a one time payment
for ease of analysis.
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3a. The donor receives the 1st stage benefit, sij , and total payoff sij−cj . Go to step
1.
Step 4 (Information Reveal):
4a. The donor receives s̃ij , an updated view of the organization match sij , which is
closer to the true value of xij . 13 Go to step 5.
Step 5 (2nd Stage Decision):
5a. Allowing that s̃ij allows for an update in beliefs about the true match, xij , donor
i decides to either accept the benefit E[xij |s̃ij ] and match with j forever, or
rebuff organization j, and seek a new match.14.
5b. If the donor accepts, a match is solidified, and he leaves the system. If t < T
then go to step 1, otherwise terminate the match process.
5c. If the donor rejects j and t < T then go to step 1, otherwise terminate the
match process.
Figure (12) provides a schematic diagram of the above algorithm. Below, more
technical elements of the model progression and decision process are discussed, with
special attention paid to consideration of the exposure distribution and cost construc-
tion.
3.3.3 Discussion
Both the exposure level and the cost have been defined as proxies for a given or-
ganization, and in this sense it is important to understand how they can define an
underlying organization, and how they function in this model. Specifically, it is im-
portant to understand how they may be manipulated, how they differ, and how each
adds value to the presented model.
13For ease of computation, let s̃ij = xij , initially.
14Again, if the true value is revealed in step 4, then E[xij |s̃ij ] can be replaced by xij
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Figure 12: Donor Search Model
There are, in effect, two ways to use these levers in modeling. The levers can
either exogenously or endogenously evolve with the model. Exogenous evolution is
such that these levers are controlled outside of the model, and can be defined a priori
to coincide with strict testing scenarios. In the instance that organizations are allowed
to interact with and adjust the levers during the course of the model progression then
they are considered to be endogenous to the model. The initial cost and distribution
constructions, along with the interaction rules, can also be used to define testing
scenarios, but in a different sense than the exogenous setting. Throughout we will
assume an exogenous setting, with endogenous evolution of the cost and exposure
variables left as an extension for future work.
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3.3.3.1 Cost Construction
As outlined in the introduction, the primary goal of this model is to understand how
the consideration of search costs, monitoring costs, and exposure in providing human-
itarian aid can be used in explaining the behavior of relief organizations. Control and
manipulation of the cost parameter, in addition to the exposure distribution, allows
for the creation of scenarios from which to analyze the cost effect. The cost parameter,
cj, for a given organization can be viewed as being comprised of two components. The
first component can be considered to consist of standard structural costs associated
with making an investment in a charitable organization, and will be fairly standard
across all organizations.15 The second component of the cost is organization specific
and can be considered the cost, to the donor, to stay informed about organization
activities and mission completion. In this sense, the donor has to pay the cost in
order to find out how well the organization matches with his interests, beyond the
initial warm-glow experience.
Given the explanation of what the cost represents, it is also important to consider
what the manipulation of the cost means (i.e. why might the cost for one organization
be smaller than for another?). Making the assumption that all organizations start
out with the same cost, an organization could reduce its cost through increased trans-
parency or increased media attention. Increased transparency can be accomplished
through organization provided updates to donors about mission success, effectively
reducing the cost to donors of finding this information on their own. Increased media
attention can be accomplished through strategic placement in high publicity areas
and causes, or through organization promotional events showcasing their work. As
will be discussed in Section 3.3.3.2, organizations are also rewarded in the model via
15This might be considered the cost of the actual transaction.
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increased exposure probabilities for working in high attention areas, and so it is pos-
sible, via strategic placement, for an organization to both increase transparency and
exposure. Consequently, the exposure effect is double counted to a point.16 17
3.3.3.2 Exposure Distribution
In pursuing the primary goal of the modeling exercise, it must be that this model
provides a test bed for the assumptions that have been put forth about the behav-
ior of donors and relief organizations. Accordingly, the model should allow for the
existence of several levers, which can be pulled to varying degrees, to test these as-
sumptions. The aforementioned cost construction is one of these levers. However, in
addition to this lever, the exposure lever is available. The exposure distribution is
defined via the exposure (or introduction) matrix in the model. How the distribution
is constructed is directly related to where an organization positions itself as it regards
the various humanitarian causes that persist at any given time.18 This matrix defines
the probability that a given donor comes into contact with a particular organization
during each period of the model. Taking the view that higher publicity areas yield
higher probabilities of introduction, this distribution can be used, in addition to the
cost variables, as a proxy for an organization’s positioning on the publicity spectrum
16While this may seem to be a problem, in that to much weight may be given to the exposure effect,
the situation mirrors reality to an extent. Furthermore, considering the duel role of the exposure
factor allows for isolation of the effects that doing work in high publicity areas has on donor behavior.
For instance, does working in these areas payoff because of ease of monitoring, increased exposure
opportunities, or both? This question can be answered through carefully designed testing scenarios.
17As an aside, the cost representation here places this model in a unique space, in the sense that
the benefit the donor experiences is to some extent controlled by his or her effort. If one considers
Andreoni’s model of impure altruism there are both private and public effects from giving to an
organization, with the private effects being experienced through the act of giving itself. The public
effects, and particularly for humanitarian causes, exist, but unless a donor is informed about the
organization work after his gift, are not experienced by this donor. The model does not allow for
the choice between paying cj or not. However, a model in which the choice could be presented can
be imagined. In such a model those who paid cj would experience both public and private effects of
their gift, and those who did not would experience only private, or warm-glow, effects.
18It is important to emphasis the distinction between the exposure probabilities, which guide the
chances of a given donor encountering a specific organization, and the match distribution. The match
distribution says that for each matched donor and organization pair, the quality of the match, xij , is
normally distributed, whereas exposure defines the probability of that initial introduction occurring.
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Table 1: Example Cause Universe





Table 2: Exposure Translation













of relief causes.19 Table 1 provides an example of how the space of humanitarian
causes, and their associated publicity levels, can be translated into exposure proba-
bilities. Assume a world with M organizations and 4 causes as defined in Table 1.
Each cause has an associated publicity level (High, Medium, Low), and the number
of organizations working on that cause can be defined as Mk, such that the num-
ber of organizations working on cause 1 is M1. If the assumption is made that each
organization within a specific cause has the same probability of exposure, but that
exposure across causes is proportional to the publicity level, one can construct ex-
posure probabilities as in table 2, where α1 + α2 + α3 + α4 = 1. By weighting the
exposure probabilities across causes a characterization of the type of work a given
organization is engaged in can be made.
While exposure for a given organization is tied to the publicity level that their
chosen cause receives, a connection between the relevancy of the cause to the orga-
nization’s mission and its exposure probabilities is not offered. For instance, the fact
19Informally defined, the publicity spectrum simply acknowledges that among the universe of
humanitarian causes, some are more prominently considered within the public sphere than others.
For instance, in recent years beast cancer charities have received prominent exposure will kidney
disease charities have received much less in comparison.
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that cause 3 has high mission relevance to this organization does not in any way make
it more desirable from an exposure standpoint than causes 1 or 2.20 The mission rel-
evance ranking can be useful in scenario construction and analysis, and can act as a
guide in choosing initial exposure levels for a given organization. As an example, if
the assumption is made that an organization eschews publicity for mission relevance
their initial exposure level, p0ij, can be defined in accordance with the cause that they
value the most. Subsequently, if organizations are allowed to alter their behavior and
placement of resources, such that at the end of a scenario run p0ij 6= pTij, then the
distance defined by ||p0ij − pTij|| can be used as a measure of how far an organization
strayed from its core mission goals in the pursuit of funding. Even if the model is
static, and exposure levels are exogenously defined, this particular scenario can still
provide quite a bit of insight when compared with others.21
3.3.3.3 Accept or Reject
In this section the donor’s decision process is considered more throughly. Of particular
consideration is how the donor in the modified Jovanovic model makes a decision
about whether to initially donate to a particular organization, and furthermore how
the decision about whether or not to sustain the match is formulated. The “accept or
reject” proposition of the donor is considered in a three stage format, starting from
the last stage of the decision process.
Starting at stage 3, the worker now knows x = xij for its current match. Let
J(x) be the expected present value of the benefit afforded a donor at stage 3 who
has a known match x in hand, and who behaves optimally. Accordingly, the value of
a match x is given by x + βJ(x), where β is considered to be a discount factor on
20A scale of mission relevance to represent how a particular cause relates to a specific organization’s
stated mission is used. A relevance level of 1 denotes high relevance, and a level of 2 denotes a slightly
lower level of relevance, and so forth.
21Throughout this chapter exposure levels are exogenously defined. Endogenous exposure levels
can be considered as an extension.
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future benefits. A donor who rejects the match gets his reservation benefit, xi0, in
the current period, which is defined by r = xi0 going forward. Additionally, a donor
who rejects this match gets to draw a new match next period, with expected present
value Q, so that the current period payoff of rejection is r + βQ. Thus, the Bellman
equation for stage 3:
J(x) = max{x+ βJ(x), r + βQ} (60)




x+ βJ(x) = x
1−β for x ≥ x̄
r + βQ for x ≤ x̄
(61)
The policy guides the donor to reject the match if x ≤ x̄, and accept if x ≥ x̄,
where x̄
1−β = r + βQ.
Moving back a stage, to stage 2 of the decision process, the donor is confronted
with a current warm-glow benefit s = sij, a cost of exploration c = cj, and the
mathematical expectation of xij in the next period, given sij in this period.
Letm(s, c) = s−c, wherem’s dependence on s and cmay be suppressed by writing
m. Let V (m) be the expected present value of matching benefits at the second stage
to a donor who has warm-glow of s and cost c currently in hand, and who behaves
optimally. A donor who rejects the match receives r+βQ. In this sense one can write
the Bellman equation as below, where the distribution of x is conditioned upon the
observation s.22
22Baye’s rule, and Kalman filtering can be used to derive the distribution of x given s. See the
appendix for more discussion of filtering in this example.
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V (m) = max{m+ β
∫
J(x)dF (x|s), r + βQ} (62)
= max{s− c+ β
∫
J(x)dF (x|s), r + βQ} (63)






J(x)dF (x|s) for m ≥ m̄
r + βQ for m ≤ m̄
(64)
The first stage can now be established, which is the pre-exposure expected present
value of a match to a donor who did not have a match last period, and is about to





V (s− c)f(c)dG(s|µx + µε, σ2x + σ2ε ) (65)
Where G(s|·) is the normal distribution with altered parameters to reflect the
distribution of s, and f(c) is the p.d.f of the cost distribution.
Satisfaction of equations defined by J(x), V (m), and Q will yield the donor’s
optimal policy when seeking matches. Guided by Bellman [14], an iterated solution
method is considered in the appendix.
Proposition 1: Given J(x), V (m), and the identity x̄
1−β = r + βQ, it is always
the case that x̄ > m̄ (i.e. the true match cutoff x̄, will exceed m̄, the cutoff for the
warm-glow cost combination).
Proof. Equation (66) defines an implicit equation for the reservation m̄ via the func-
tional representation of V (m), such that,
V (m̄) = m̄+ β
∫
J(x)dF (x|s) = r + βQ (66)
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J(x)dF (x|s) + β
∫ ∞
x̄











































(x− x̄)dF (x|s) ⇒ x̄− m̄ > 0 (70)
Given the defined value functions, it still remains to be shown that there exists a
unique optimal policy for when to accept and reject in each situation (i.e. does there
exist unique solutions for x̄ and m̄). These issues are addressed in the appendix.
3.4 Simulation and Results
This section seeks to answer questions about how the marketplace evolves given var-
ious structures, and how individual donors and organizations are effected. Primarily
through the manipulation of the cost and exposure variables, along with variance in
the number of organizations, do we consider some of the following scenarios,
1. For a given exposure distribution, what does the donor distribution look like if
monitoring costs are uniform across organizations?
2. For a given exposure distribution, how does output change as monitoring costs
are segmented into more categories?
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3. How does segmented exposure impact organization and system outcomes?
The search model is implemented with Monte Carlo methods, with the aid of the
Matlab programming language. In particular, the implementation process consists
of two simulation phases that are discussed and analyzed below. The first stage of
the process calculates the appropriate cutoff values for the two-stage accept or reject
decision process found in the model. This section begins by considering the behavior
of the cutoff values, and sensitivity of the results when parameters are adjusted. The
second part of this section focuses on the full simulation of the donor search model
proposed in Section 3.3. This second phase simulation takes as input, along with
additional parameters, the cutoff values generated in the first phase of the process.
In this section the preceding scenarios are constructed and analyzed alongside the
presented output.
3.4.1 Behavior of the Cutoff Values
The behavior of the cutoff values, specifically x̄ and m̄ = s − c, that result from a
given scenario analysis are considered. Sensitivity results are established relative to
a baseline scenario, as defined below. The focus is not on absolute values, but on
trends relative to some baseline. All parameter vectors will be defined by the input
vector
ψ = (r, β, {µx, σx}, {µε, σε}, {cSet}, {cDist}), (71)
where r is the reservation payoff, β is the discount parameter, and {µx, σ2x} and
{µε, σ2ε} are the mean and variance of x and ε, respectively. cSet is the set of cost
levels, and cDist defines the distribution over the set. The baseline parameter set is
defined by the vector,
ψbase = (0, 0.5, {5, 10}, {0, 1}, {(0, 5)}, {(0.5, 0.5)}). (72)
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This vector produces the cutoff pair (x̄, m̄) = (1.9232, 1.6272). It is from this pair
that initial sensitivity results associated with the β parameter are described.
To understand what these values mean, it helps to relate them back to the initially
presented search story. m̄ is the first stage cutoff value, and is best understood as
the combination of warm-glow, s, and the cost of monitoring (or transparency), c.
Consequently, any combination of s− c, for a particular donor-organization pair that
exceeds m̄ will induce the donor to make an initial (first stage) contribution to the
organization. Figure (13) provides a graphical representation of m̄ and its connection
to s and c values. The example defines a cutoff value of m̄ = 2, and defines all of the
combinations of s and c which exceed the cutoff level. Accepted combinations are
those for which s − c lies on or above the line defined by mcutoff in the figure, such
that the combination s = 6 less c = 3 lies in the acceptance region, but s = 2 less
c = 1 does not. A similar region can be constructed for the baseline cutoff value of
m̄ = 1.6272.
While m̄ is defined via two dimensions, x̄ is defined only on one, the true value
of the donor-organization match. x̄ is the second stage cutoff, and if the donor’s
true match exceeds this level, the donor will then enter into an perpetual giving
relationship with the organization that generates the match utility. In the baseline
example, if a donor i experiences a match, x, greater than 1.9232 then he will accept,
otherwise he will continue searching.
3.4.1.1 β Analysis
The β ∈ (0, 1) value is presented as a discount parameter and measures a donor’s
tolerance for delay in receiving his payoff. A value of β close to 1 signals a high
tolerance level, in the sense that the donor values next period payoffs almost as
much as current period payoffs. If β = 1 then there is no difference, from the donor
standpoint, of receiving a payoff in the current period or in the next period. In the
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Figure 13: First Stage Cutoff Example
presented model, β could be more concretely viewed as the donor’s willingness to
wait on feedback from an organization, with higher values of β indicative of donors
who are more patient. In figure (14) it can be seen that, holding all other parameters
constant, increases in the β value leads to increases in both x̄ and m̄ values. This is
not a surprising result, in that a donor with a higher tolerance for delay would also be
willing to be more patient in his search, and consequently they can be more selective
in their search process, which in this instance is akin to higher cutoff values.
3.4.1.2 Cost Analysis
Of particular importance to the proposed model is the effect of monitoring costs
(transparency) on the search and acceptance behavior of donors. As previously dis-
cussed, the first stage cutoff value m̄ is defined via the expression s− c, where c is the
monitoring cost. In this analysis c is isolated in an attempt to distinguish its effects
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Figure 14: Effect of β on Cutoff Values
from the effect of the s distribution on the cutoff values. Furthermore, an attempt
is made to distinguish between the effect of the magnitude of the c values and the
dispersion of the c values. To distinguish between these effects two types of scenarios
were run. In the first scenario, the baseline parameter set was altered such that there
existed only one universal transparency level for all organizations. By making the
cost equal across all organizations one is able to vary the magnitude of the universal
c value to distinguish these effects from dispersion in some respect. Figure (15a)
shows the effect of the cost across several scenarios, with the initial scenario being
the baseline put forward above. The baseline scenario is then modified by increasing
the reservation utility (r) from 0 to 5 in one instance, decreasing the expected match
value (µx) from 5 to 0 in another instance, and by doing both in the scenario repre-
sented by Figure (15b). The following observations can be made across analysis of
the various scenarios:
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• In all presented cases an increase in the magnitude of monitoring costs is asso-
ciated with a decrease in both the x̄ and m̄ values.
• Relative to the baseline case, an increase in r from 0 to 5 causes an across the
board upward shift of the cutoff values, but maintains the decreasing trend as-
sociated with the baseline case. Additionally, an increase in the r value appears
to have a tempering effect on the rate of decrease, as shown by Figure (15c).
The decrease in the cutoff values occurs at a smaller rate for the higher level of
r.
• Contrary to the effect of the change in the r value, shifts of the µx value do
not appear to change the rate of decrease in a significant way. In fact, Figure
(15d) seems to suggest that beyond a certain cost level the cutoff values may
converge for the two cases.
• The third scenario, as outlined in Figure (15b), seems to indicate that the r value
has a significant effect on the ability of changes in the µx value to translate to
significant changes in the cutoff values. In particular, it is easily gleaned from
Figure (15b) that the trace of the cutoff values from varying costs when r = 5,
for µx = 5 and µx = 0 are very similar. Much more so than in the analog
case of r = 0, as shown in Figure (15d). In isolation, a change in r from 0 to
5 appears to shift the cutoff values by at least a magnitude of 2. However, a
change in the µx values by the same magnitude shifts the cutoff values by at
most a magnitude of 2, with the difference decreasing as c increases. In total,
this points to the notion that reservation values have a more significant effect
on cutoff values than the mean values of x of similar magnitude.
Resulting from this analysis, one of the primary questions to consider is why,
from an intuitive standpoint, does an increase in cost cause a decrease in the cutoff




Figure 15: Cutoff Value Behavior in Response to Increases in Monitoring Costs
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represents some type of monitoring cost, or transparency level associated with a
particular organization, then it does not immediately make sense that a donor will
decrease his first stage cutoff criteria in the face of increasing costs (i.e. why would a
donor set the bar lower to sample an organization if the cost to do so is greater?). An
important distinction to be made is that the cost in this context is not an explicit per
period search cost (this cost is effectively none), but instead it is the cost to sample a
given organization, and is only paid if the donor chooses to do so within a period. The
model could be amended such that a per period search cost is included in addition to
the the sample cost, however the analysis still stands with or without the inclusion. If,
on average, it costs more to sample each organization that one encounters throughout
the process, it in turn becomes more costly everytime one donates and later finds out
that the organization was not a good match for him. Thus, on a surface level, it
would seem as though one may want a larger spread between s and c (i.e. higher
cutoff value) to induce them to donate, with the thought that the true value of the
match may be more to their liking once revealed in the second period. To understand
why the first stage cutoff value, m̄, decreases in the face of increasing monitoring
costs it helps to first consider a more basic search model.23
If one considers the canonical job search model in which a worker searches each
period, at a cost c, for a job offer with associated wage w, then the donor’s response
to increases in expected cost can be better understood. The simple job search ex-
ample strips away several components of the donor search model, but is useful for
expository purposes. The optimal search policy in the job search model is known,
like the presented model, to have a reservation wage policy as the optimal policy, and
more importantly the policy can be solved for myopically. In this sense the optimal
reservation wage is the wage that makes the marginal cost of obtaining exactly one
more job offer = expected marginal return of one more offer, which can represented






(x′ − wres)dF (x′) (73)
The left-hand side represents the cost of gaining one additional offer, and the
right-hand side represents the expected gain from the next offer. wres is the wage
offer that makes these two sides equal. In other words, a worker currently holding offer
wres in hand would be indifferent between accepting the current offer, and searching
one more time for another offer. Wage offers less than wres would induce the worker
to continue searching, and wage offers greater than wres would prompt the worker to
halt his search. F (x′) is the cumulative distribution of wage offers, and so E[x′] =∫ ∞
−∞ x
′dF (x′). Consequently, it can be shown that if the distribution of the wage offers
stays the same, but c increases, then wres will decrease. This can be understood by
considering that as the cost of search increases, then the expected marginal return of
one more offer must increase, via wres to satisfy (73). Given that the distribution is
constant, the way to increase the expected return is to decrease wres. The presented
donor search model can be analogously applied to understand why an increase in the
monitoring cost causes a decrease in the first stage cutoff value, m̄.
In the donor search model there is no explicitly defined search cost, such that the
donor must pay some cost simply to proceed from period to period, so in this instance
csearch = 0. However, there is β which takes on a similar role of csearch by making
it costly for the donor to continue to search via the discounting of future payoffs.
Although there are several significant deviations from the job search example, it still
holds that an optimal first stage cutoff policy can be described via a cutoff policy,
defined such that the cost of one additional organization introduction is equivalent
to the expected payoff from one additional organization discovered. Through some
abuse of notation and abstraction from the more structured donor search model,
equation (74) represents the myopic condition around which a donor will base his
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cutoff decision, m̄.
0 = βEmax{r − m̄,
∫ ∞
m̄
(m′ − m̄)dF (m′)} (74)
Again, the left-hand side represents the cost of finding one additional organization,
while the right-hand side represents the expected marginal payoff from continuing to
search one more period. m̄ is the cutoff value that satisfies (74). The influence of
the reservation payoff, r, will be ignored for now and the assumption is made that∫ ∞
m̄
(m′ − m̄)dF (m′) will dominate the expression. Remembering that m is derived
from the values of s and c for a particular organization the expression is expanded to






((s′ − c′)− (s̄− c̄))dF (s′)dF (c′)
]
(75)
On the right-hand side the first half of the expression represents the marginal
expected payoff, via s, for one more search period. The second half of the expression
represents the expected marginal monitoring cost, c. The combination of the two ex-
pressions are equivalent to
∫ ∞
m̄
(m′ − m̄)dF (m′), but allows one to better understand
the effects of each component on m̄. From here it can be seen that if all other factors
are held constant, while E[c′] increases, and assuming that s̄ is fixed, then it becomes
clear that c̄ must increase in order to compensate for the increase, such that (75)
remains in balance. However,this increase in c̄ leads to a decrease in m̄, which is the
observed effect from the parameter analysis. While it is not clear exactly how s̄ and c̄
will adjust internally, if one returns back to the aggregate level then it becomes clear
that as E[c′] increases, then the E[m′] decreases, which will require a further decrease
in m̄ if (74) is to hold where csearch = 0. Simulation results presented in the next
section will enlighten the understanding of how s and c behave in this context.
Equation (74) can also be used to understand the effect of r on cutoff values. r was
observed earlier to have the effect of increasing cutoff values, and it can be understood
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Table 3: Dispersion in Monitoring Costs
Scenario Cost Distributions Set of Cost Values m̄ x̄
1 {.5, .5} {0, 20} 1.577 1.890
2 {.333, .333, .333} {0, 10, 20} 0.936 1.242
3 {.25, .25, .25, .25} {0, 6.667, 13.333, 20} 0.613 0.907
4 {.20, .20, .20, .20, .20} {0, 5, 10, 15, 20} 0.356 0.694
that this is a result of a donor simply having more competitive investments for his
money, and thus he would need to be assured of achieving a higher payoff from
donation as r increases.
The second component of the cost analysis deals with the the effect of the cost
distribution, or dispersion, on the cutoff values. The preceding analysis assumed a
trivial distribution by making the assumption that there existed a universal monitor-
ing cost for all organizations. This analysis looks at the effect of presenting the donor
with a non-trivial distribution of cost values. The analysis considers several scenarios,
as outlined in Table 3, beginning with a bi-level cost structure of Prob{c = 0} = 0.5
and Prob{c = 20} = 0.5, and progressively subdivides the scenarios from that point.
Table 3 shows that as the cost structure becomes more segmented (within a defined
interval) the cutoff values decrease. This can be interpreted as more variety within
the market induces increased first stage sampling.
3.4.1.3 Mean Analysis
The mean analysis focuses on the effect of variations of the value µx on the observed
cutoff values. Figure (16) shows that the requisite cutoff values increase with µx.
This comes directly from the fact that as µx increases the standard by which all
organizations are judged must increase. To compensate for the system shift, an
individual donor must alter the criteria by which it judges an organization.
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Figure 16: Change in Cutoff Values in Response to Changes in µx
3.4.1.4 Variance Analysis
The variance analysis focuses on the effect of variations of the value σx on the observed
cutoff values, and shows via figure (17) that the cutoff values increase with σx.
3.4.2 Donor Search Results
The second stage of the simulation process approaches the question of how the market
functions within certain constructs, and provides predictive results, given assumptions
about donor behavior. Several scenarios are constructed, around which analysis as it
relates to anticipated donor behavior can be made. This is begun with the baseline
case (ψbase) outlined in the preceding section. For the vector defined by ψbase the
first stage was repeated over several iterations, and an average of the cutoff values
(x̄ = 1.8921, m̄ = 1.6056) was used as input into the second stage simulation. There
are several metrics of the market structure and donor behavior that can be captured
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Figure 17: Change in Cutoff Values in Response to Changes in σx
via simulation, and which are considered within the course of discussion.
As in the preceding section, the simulation takes a standard input vector of op-
erational parameters. In addition to the previously described parameters the second
stage must also use the input vector,
γ = (N,M, T, distExp, orgCost), (76)
where N , M , and T are as previously described. distExp establishes the exposure
distribution over each organization (Prob{Organization j is selected by a donor i}),
and orgCost assigns a cost value to each organization in accordance with cDist and
cSet defined previously. The input vectors ψ and γ link the first and second stages
of the simulation, and together define an entire scenario. For the baseline scenario,
γbase is defined by,
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Table 4: Baseline Organization Parameters





γbase = (10, 4, 100, {10, 20, 30, 40}, {0, 5, 0, 5}). (77)
In this particular scenario there are 4 charitable organizations, with the structure
defined in table (4).
Defined in this way Organization 4 has a higher probability of discovery than
Organization 3, but also has a higher monitoring cost. Running the simulation and
analyzing the outputs allows for a better understanding of the tradeoff between the
two parameters.
Each iteration of the simulation generates the number of donors that made contri-
butions to each organization. For a given scenario, in order to provide an appropriate
approximation of the average number of donations each organization receives, a req-
uisite number of replications must conducted. As can be seen in figure (18), for
Organization 2, as the number of scenario iterations increases the expected number
of donations provided to the organization stabilizes around 57.1 in accordance with
strong law of large numbers (SLLN). In particular, the convergence seems to happen
rather quickly around the 50 iteration mark.
As an initial analysis two simulation replications scenarios were run. One scenario
with 50 replications of the baseline case, and another with 500 replications. The
output from the scenarios can be found in tables (5) and (6). The output provided
via both scenarios shows that on average Organization 3 will receive more donations
than 4. Thus, while Organization 4 has a higher likelihood of being viewed by a
prospective donor, the fact that it is less transparent (i.e. harder to monitor) than
100
Figure 18: The Average Number of Donations to Organization 2 over Increasing
Replications
Organization 3 leads to less donations. While seemingly suggestive that exposure
levels may be more influential than transparency levels in determining market share,
at least in the defined proportions, an analysis of the Organization 1 and 2 pair seems
to suggest the opposite. More testing is needed to better characterize the relationship
between transparency and exposure. However, before preceding with the analysis it
will be necessary to more explicitly define what is meant by the terms “market size”
and “market share,” within the context of this simulation analysis.
The way the analysis is currently structured, it is such that each simulation is
initiated with N donors and M organizations in the market. The number of donors
in the market at any one time is static (i.e. always N), and is such that for each period
all donors who form a 2nd stage match with an organization are removed from the
system and replaced with new donors. In this sense, N in each period is equivalent
to
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Table 5: Baseline Output (50 Replications)
Org1 Org2 Org3 Org4
Sample Mean 40.1 58.6 118.94 113.9
Sample Variance 54.6225 59.1020 98.9555 84.949
Skewness 0.3984 0.4299 -0.6817 -0.3544
α 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
C.I. ±2.0994 ±2.183784 ±2.8257 ±2.6181
Table 6: Baseline Output (500 Replications)
Org1 Org2 Org3 Org4
Sample Mean 40.2 57.596 119.79 115.218
Sample Variance 33.9848 50.2813 92.8476 86.7119
Skewness 0.0639 0.1213 -0.0443 0.0337
α 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
C.I. ±0.5122 ±0.623 ±0.8466 ±0.8181
N t = N t−1Matched Donors +N
t
New Donors. (78)
While the number of donors within the market in any period t is constant, the
number of donors that enter and leave the market over a defined period will vary in
accordance with donor behavior. In this respect if donor search time, on average,
is low then there be a larger turnover in donors during the T interval. The number
of donors that leave the system over a defined interval is considered to be a proxy
of the market size in this context. The market share of a particular organization is
subsequently defined as the number of donors that chose to give to its organization
during the defined period. The market metrics, defined as such, allow one to better
understand the effects of parameter manipulation within the marketplace.
3.4.2.1 Monitoring Costs Effects on Search Behavior
We begin with an analysis of how the monitoring cost effects the charitable giving
market, particularly as it regards the number of donors who enter the market, average
donor search time, and the average warm-glow values observed.
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(a) (b)
Figure 19: Monitoring Cost Effect on Average m and s Values of Matched Donors
In 3.4.1.2 it was noted that the cutoff values for both the 1st and 2nd stage were
decreasing in the cost when it was kept uniform across all considered organizations. It
was conjectured that although cutoff values were decreasing, the actual level of warm-
glow, s, captured by a donor might be increasing. Figure (19a) shows that, in fact, as
the cost increases the average s value over the set of matched donors increases linearly.
As a response to this, Figure (19b) shows that the average m = s− c decreases in the
uniform cost, which shows that the magnitude of the cost increase is greater than the
change it induces in the average requisite warm-glow value for a match.
An extension of this analysis is the observation that uniform increases in the
monitoring cost severely inhibit donor participation in the market. Figure (20) offers
insight into this statement as it can be seen that as cost increases there is a rather
dramatic increase in the time it takes the initial set of donors to find a matching
organization.24 As a complementary metric, it can be seen that the average donor
search time is also increasing rather significantly over cost increases.
In a similar way, the segmentation of the monitoring cost structure, and its effect
on the cutoff values was also considered. Increased segmentation in the cost structure
24Search time is defined as the number of periods that a donor stays in the market until it is
matched, and leaves.
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Figure 20: The Effect of Monitoring Costs on Donor Search Time
caused the 1st and 2nd stage cutoff values to decrease. The underlying simulation
statistics in response to increases in segmentation help to provide a better picture of
its effect on search behavior and market outcomes. Figure (21) provides an analysis
of the average s and m values as segmentation increases. Considering the defined
scenarios in Table 3 it is easily seen that an increase in segmentation leads to an
increase in average s values realized by matched donors, and a decrease in the average
m values. Given that E[c] = 10 in each scenario, the changes in market structure can
be attributable to the number of transparency segments available within the market.
However, while the cutoff levels change, Table 7 suggests that the underlying market
structure is not effected significantly.25 In fact, the market size remains virtually
constant across the segmentation levels. This is in contrast to the market size that
25The Average Views per Match is defined as the number of organizations that a donor saw before
he matched with a particular organization.
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results from increasing E[c], which also leads to decreasing cutoff values.
Figure 21: The Effect of the Segmented Monitoring Costs on the Average 1st Stage
Acceptance Level (m = s-c) and Warm Glow (s)
Table 7: Cost Segmentation Effects on Donor Search Behavior
Scenario Avg. Views per Match Avg. Time to Match Time til 1st N Match
1 2.936 4.006 5.06
2 3.046 4.108 5.28
3 3.016 4.073 5.05
4 2.949 4.002 5.05
3.4.2.2 Cost Effects on Market Structure
While the donor search behavior is important in itself, its relation to the charitable
marketplace, and how it changes in response to organization behavior is of primary
importance in considering organization behavior. This section considers the effect of
changes in the cost for one organization, or sector, relative to others, so that trade-
offs can be better understood. Section 3.3.3 lays out an argument that monitoring
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costs, and by extension transparency, are important via the role they play in the
donor decision process. Consequently, the notion is put forth that organizations will
undertake activities to decrease their costs (increase transparency) relative to others,
even perhaps if the activities are not wholly aligned with their organizational goals.
The extent to which this is likely to be true will be correlated with the expected ben-
efits from such behavior. Specific effects of unilateral cost changes by an individual
organization are examined here.
To examine this issue, the effect of both unilateral cost increases, and cost de-
creases were considered. The effects of cost increases and decreases by individual
organizations on the size of the market are outlined in Figure (22), and effects on the
market share captured by an individual organization are shown in Figure (23).
Figure 22: Effects on Market Size of Monitoring Cost Deviations
Figure (22) was derived by considering five baseline cost scenarios, of 5, 10, 15,
20, and 40. After each scenario was run for the baseline case, in which exposure
106
Figure 23: Effects on Organization Market Share of Monitoring Cost Deviations
levels and costs were uniform across a set of 4 organizations, the monitoring costs for
Organization 1 was decreased by half, and the scenario was rerun. The same was done
for a 50% increase in the monitoring costs associated with Organization 1. Figure
(22) outlines the market size generated in each scenario over a defined period of T =
100. It can be seen that the effect of increases and decreases in cost (decreases and
increases in transparency) is highly dependent on the initial state of the market. In
particular, if the overall transparency level of the organizations within a given market
are already very good, then the deviation by one organization one way or the other
does not have a significant effect on the overall market structure.
Similarly, it can also be seen that the individual market share is also dependent
on the overall state of transparency within a market. Figure(23) shows the market
share that Organization 1 is able to capture in all three scenarios for a given baseline
cost structure. In the case of a baseline level of 5, a 50% increase or decrease in
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transparency relative to the rest of the market has a neglible effect on the share of
donors the organization is able to capture. However, in the case of a baseline level
cost of 40 (i.e. a relatively non-transparent market), investment in transparency
improvements of 50% lead to an almost 60% increase in market share. How these
results align with the effects of increases in exposure levels are considered next.
3.4.2.3 Exposure Sensitivity
The effect of exposure on an organization is investigated here by holding constant
the effects of transparency on market outcomes. In this instance, a baseline scenario
is once again created, wherein 4 organizations within a given market are assumed.
Initially, each organization has an equal chance of being discovered by a perspective
donor (namely a 25% chance). From this point, keeping all other exposure levels
uniform, the first organization’s exposure probability is increased such that it a has
higher chance of discovery by perspective donors. Figure (24) shows that the market
share captured by the first organization linearly increases in exposure level. However,
while cost effects were able to increase or decrease market share, exposure, because it
is assumed to be rivalrous, only redistributes donors, and does not expand or reduce
the market.
Considered within the context of the leading example, it is clear that there are
significant implications both from an organization and market standpoint as it regards
changes in behavior by organizations. Section (3.5) considers these issues within the
context of charitable organization behavior.
3.5 Implications on Organization Behavior and Markets
This chapter began with an introductory assumption that charitable organizations
will act strategically to obtain funds from donors, even if it means drifting from their
core mission at some level. The extent to which this hypothesis can be supported or
rejected is a function of both organization priorities, and donor behavior. Assuming
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Figure 24
that donor decision making is in part shaped by how well a donor is able to ascertain
the value of their contribution to an organization, and how easily they are able to
find a given organization, the presented search model allows one to characterize donor
behavior in response to posited market scenarios. From this perspective a given
organization is able to ascertain what the payoff would be, in terms of market share,
of unilateral deviation along one of these metrics. Whether or not these payoffs
are enough to alter organization behavior is dependent upon a given organization’s
objective function, and how closely aligned are the payoff inducing behaviors with its
mission.
Table 8 considers potential activities or strategies that an organization can un-
dertake to increase either transparency, exposure, or both. Each of these activities
is costly to the organization in some sense as it may divert physical and monetary
resources from core objectives. The extent to which each activity is worth it from
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Table 8: Transparency and Exposure Increasing Activities
Transparency Activites Exposure Activities
Newsletters Ad Campaigns
Videos and Pictures Awareness Raising Events
Donor Site Visits Participation in “Hot Spots”
Social Media Celebrity Endorsements
Work in easily Viewable Areas
Independent Audits
the perspective of the organization has to be considered within the context of the
current state of that organization’s market or sector, as the payoff has been shown
to be largely dependent on the the relative transparency levels of other market par-
ticipants. However, the payoff from unilateral exposure increasing activities, while
perhaps harder to execute on a sustained basis, appear to yield gains that are less
dependent on the market. Depending on how closely aligned these activities are to an
organization’s core mission, in particular as it regards participating in certain “hot
spots,” or areas of the humanitarian market which receive large amounts of attention,
an organization’s pursuit of these activities can result in waste and inefficiency as it
regards the use of resources. As an example consider the relief environments of the
previous chapter.
Within the context of humanitarian relief organizations the preceding chapter
posited, based on anecdotal evidence, that high publicity relief areas tend to initially
attract an excess of resources and organizations, as organizations use the event as an
opportunity to signal their quality to potential donors. Implicit within the quality
signal is an increase in organization transparency, real or otherwise, that allows a
donor to more readily view the work of that organization, as it occurs within a media
saturated environment. Furthermore, as a result of the high visibility level of the
opportunity, organizations become more exposed from the standpoint of discovery by
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potential donors. In this context the simultaneous increase in exposure and trans-
parency, even if only for a brief period, presumably allows an organization to increase
its donor attraction.26 The signaling model from the previous chapter provides some
guidance as to how a donor might make a tradeoff decision in this context.
Furthermore, aside from individual organization behavior, the results of the search
model bolster an argument for increased transparency and regulation of non-profit
related organizations across the board. The model argues that markets with high
monitoring costs effectively shut out potential donors. This is exceedingly important,
as an increase in the donor base can lead to increased provision of necessary services.
Along these lines it should be considered that the model is also applicable to sectors
within the philanthropic marketplace. Much of the discussion has centered around
the consideration of individual organization behavior. However, these transparency
and exposure levels can be endemic to a particular sector, and can be used to explain
why one charitable cause may command a larger segment of the market than another.
3.6 Conclusions
At its core, this chapter builds on Jovanovic’s model of job search to construct a
model of how donor’s search for charitable organizations to contribute funds toward.
The model is constructed around the notion that a donor’s decision process, in addi-
tion to his innate preferences, is guided by organization transparency and exposure
levels. Furthermore, the model is developed, in part, to offer an explanation for why
organizations may engage in publicity seeking behavior as it regards which causes
and activities they choose to participate in. To this extent, the model incorporates
measures of transparency, via monitoring costs, and exposure into a functional two-
stage donor search framework, and allows for one to predict behavior in response to
26It should be noted that the argument, at least in this instance, is not that organizations create
the increased exposure and transparency, but that they take advantage of an opportunity for which
these dimensions are increased via participation because of the characteristics of the event.
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various market constructions. Furthermore, if it can be verified that the presented
model is indeed a reliable predictor of behavior it can be used to define markets or
organizations to yield desired results as it regards donor participation.
Perhaps the most informative result of the model is in regards to the effect of
transparency on the overall market structure and on the individual organization.
While increases or decreases in exposure levels by individual organizations altered
their market share, it did nothing to effectively alter the level of donor participation
within the market overall. Conversely, increases and decreases in monitoring costs
altered the overall market structure. It was shown that the more transparent the
market as a whole, the larger the donor pool became, and the harder it became for
an organization to distinguish itself along this metric. In particular, section 3.4.2.2
showed that the returns to increases in transparency for a given organization were
almost negligible if the market was already fairly transparent. However, for markets
with high monitoring costs initially, the increase in transparency of the same magni-
tude as in high transparency markets yielded a much larger share of the donor pool,
while also increasing the overall market size. Section 3.5 discussed the implications
for this as it regards organization decision making in resource placement. In addi-
tion to helping answer questions proposed at the outset, the model also raises several
questions, along with opening the door for extensions in future work.
Questions of the empirical variety consider how one might measure the trans-
parency of a particular organization, or sector, within the humanitarian marketplace,
in practice. Subsequently, it is then worth considering how transparency varies across
organizations and sectors, and whether or not there is any difference in funding levels
which would lead one to conclude that transparency is indeed a sufficient predictor
of how donors will allocate their funds.
There are several extensions to the model which were not considered within this
chapter, but would be useful to consider in future work. As of now the organization
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behavior is exogenously defined via the cost and exposure distribution constructs.
An extension of the model to an environment in which organizations can engage in
real-time adjustment of these parameters would add increased depth to the model,
and provide further insight into organization behavior.
In the same vein as endogenous modeling, the model could be extended to consider
questions of “mission drift” within the humanitarian marketplace. In particular, if
the model is extended to observe dynamic organization behavior over a sustained
interval, then the model could be used to classify or predict mission drift [37], and
how it might occur as a result of a defined market structure.27
Another considered extension is that of a two-sided search model. As currently
defined the model is a one-sided matching model in which the donor picks an or-
ganization to match with, and the organization always accepts the match (i.e. the
organization never refuses funding). However, if one considers a market construction
in which donors are allowed to earmark their funds to certain organizations, for spe-
cific causes, then the donor may be refused by organizations that are not interested in
accepting earmarked funds. The extent to which this alters the model is a worthwhile
consideration given the recent trend in allowing for earmarked donations within the
charitable giving arena.
In chapter 4, the organization under consideration offers the donor a money back
guarantee on his investment if he is not satisfied with the outcomes. Such a guarantee
would presumably alter donor behavior, perhaps increasing their initial warm-glow
value, effectively decreasing his first stage cutoff value. However, inclusion, and se-
rious modeling of this money back guarantee in the donor’s value function when he
encounters specific organizations would be a credible extension to the model, and
would offer a direct comparison to the cases in which one was not offered.
27“Mission drift” is a term used consider how far an organization’s portfolio of activities has
strayed, or drifted, away from its core mission.
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While the extensions will help to advance the understanding of how charitable
marketplaces work, the extent to which the model is useful, is based in large part on
the validity of the assumptions made at the beginning. In particular, the assumptions
as it regards the effect of transparency and exposure on donor decision making. Chap-
ter 4 uses donor data from an online charitable marketplace to consider, empirically,
to what extent these attributes matter, as it regards donor decision making. The
model implies that beyond a certain market transparency level increases or decreases
by individual organizations within the marketplace have a negligible effect on decision
making, Chapter 4 provides insight into whether or not this can indeed be the case.
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3.7 Appendix A: Existence and Solution
To begin with, the problem space is collapsed such that J(x), V (m), and Q can be
incorporated into a single value function. Remembering that, V (m) = max{m +
β
∫
J(x)dF (x|s), r + βQ}, allows for the substitution of J(x) and Q.





















V (m′)f(c′)dG(s′|µx + µε, σ2x + σ2ε )} (80)
Where, m′ = s′ − c′.
A metric space (C[0,mB], d∞) is defined, along with an operator T on the right
hand side of (80), which maps continuous functions V into functions TV , such that
(80) can be written as V = TV . It is assumed that m has a cumulative distribution
function such that for mt in period t, Prob{mt ≤ m} = F (m) where F (0) = 0
and F (mB) = 1. Below, T is shown to be a contraction through satisfaction of
Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions. If T is a contraction, it follows that there exists a
unique continuous solution to the functional relation TV = V .
Blackwell’s Sufficiency Conditions:
Monotonicity
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w(m′)f(c′)dG(s′|µx + µε, σ2x + σ2ε )} = (Tw)(m)
(81)
Discounting
Let a denote a function that is constant at the real value a for all points in the
domain C[0,mB]. For any positive real a and every C[0,mB], if T is a contraction, it
must be that T (ν + c) ≤ T (ν) + βa for some β satisfying 0 ≤ β < 1.
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(ν(m′) + a)f(c′)dG(s′|µx + µε, σ2x + σ2ε )}+ β2 (86)
Then, considering (84) and (86), it must follow that.
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ν(m′)f(c′)dG(s′|µx + µε, σ2x + σ2ε )}+ βa = (Tν) + βa (87)
Consequently, it is established that T is a contraction mapping with modulus β.
3.8 Appendix B: Value Function Iteration
Given the following equations, and satisfaction of Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions
as outlined in Appendix A, such that a fixed point solution is guaranteed to exist,
one can solve for the value functions by iterating over increasingly better guesses for
the value of Q.
Let the worker’s belief about the distribution of x, given s = x + ε be given by
N(E[x|s], σ21), where E[x|s] = µx +Kx(s− (µx + µε)), and σ21 = E[(x− E[x|s])2|s] =
Kxσ
2






J(x) = max{x+ βJ(x), r + βQ} (88)
V (s− c) = max{s− c+ β
∫





V (s− c)f(c)dG(s|µx + µε, σ2x + σ2ε ) (90)
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To arrive at a solution (e.g. values for each value function) the fixed point property
of the system of functions can be exploited by iterating over (88),(89), and (90), in
the following manner:
a. Guess a value for Q, let the guessed value be Qi with i = 1.
b. Given Qi, compute sequentially the value of J i(x), V i(m).
c. Given solutions to J i(x) and V i(m) , calculate an updated Qi called Q̃i.
d. Let Q(i+1) = Q̃i (some other scheme can be used to update Q(i+1), such as Q(i+1) =
gQi + (1− g)Q̃i, where g ∈ (0, 1).
e. Iterate until convergence.
3.9 Appendix C: Kalman Filtering
The Kalman filter is a recursive algorithm for computing the expectation of an un-
observed vector, conditional upon an observed noisy vector. In the context of this
paper, x is the unobserved vector, and s is the noisy observed vector. Given that s
is defined via x, as s = x+ ε the expectation of x can be updated from E[x] to E[x|s]
upon the observation of s. The Kalman filter can be used to recursively determine
x̂ = E[x|s]. Below, the application of the Kalman filter to a generic linear state space
system is defined, and then translated to the problem presented in this paper. This
is largely adapted from Ljungqvist and Sargent [56].
Given x0, let
xt+1 = Axt + Cwt+1 (91)
yt = Gxt + νt (92)
where xt is an (n x 1) state vector, wt is an i.i.d. sequence Gaussian vector
with Ewtw
′




t = R; and A,C, and G are matrices conformable to the vectors they
multiply. Assume that the initial condition x0 is unobserved , but is known to have a
Gaussian distribution with mean x̂0 and covariance matrix Σ0. At time t, the history
of observations yt ≡ [yt, . . . , y0] is available to estimate the location of xt and the
location of xt+1. The Kalman algorithm is






′ + CC ′ − AΣtG′(GΣtG′ +R)−1GΣtA (95)
Σt = E(xt − x̂t)(xt − x̂t)′, and Kt is called the Kalman gain.
Equivalently, the Kalman filter is sometimes written as the “observer system”
x̂t+1 = Ax̂t +Ktat (96)
yt = Gx̂t + at (97)
where at ≡ yt −Gx̂t ≡ yt − E[yt|yt−1].
Assuming a 2-stage process where t = 0 denotes the the initial stage, and t = 1
denotes the second stage, equation (93) can be defined as
x̂1 = (A−K0G)x̂0 +K0y0 (98)
where x̂1 denotes the mathematical expectation of x in the second stage given the
first stage observation of y0, and unconditional first stage expectation x̂0 = E[x0].
Similarly, Σ1 is the second stage covariance, as defined via first stage parameters.
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By letting A = 1, C = 0, and G = 1 the presented modified Jovanovic model can
be written as a linear state space analog to equations (91) and (92) as defined by (99)
and (100).
xt+1 = xt (99)
st = xt + εt (100)
Consequently st is a noisy signal defined by xt and εt, and xt+1 = xt. xt and εt
are distributed by N(µx, σ
2
x) and N(µε, σ
2
ε ) respectively. Considering that the model
is 2-staged, the Kalman algorithm for the two-stage donor search model, becomes:
x̂1 = (1−K0)x̂0 +K0s0 (101)
In addition to A, C, and G, let Σ0 = σ
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Combining (101) and (103) produces the mathematical expectation of x, given an
observation s
E[x|s] = (1−K0)x̂0 +K0s0
= x̂0 +K0(s0 − x̂0)
= µx +K0(s0 − µx) (104)
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Or, alternatively the filter can be represented in the form
E[x|s] = x̂t +K0at
= E[x] +K0(s0 − E[s0]) (105)
with the updated belief about the variance defined by Σ1. Consequently, the
updated belief about the distribution of x, given s, is represented by N(E[x|s],Σ1).
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CHAPTER IV
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CHARITABLE GIVING
BEHAVIOR IN AN ONLINE MARKETPLACE
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides further analysis of charitable giving behavior, and roots the
work of the previous two in an empirical foundation. It makes more tangible the no-
tion of a charitable giving marketplace through the use of observational data provided
from an online giving community for grassroots charitable causes. A relationship be-
tween the behavior of the donor, and that of the charitable organization is sought
along two dimensions, in particular how organization behavior effects the amount
that a donor gives, along with how organization behavior effects the likelihood of
a donor making a subsequent future contribution. Behavior of the organization is
defined with respect to transparency, and an attempt to explicitly parallel the donor
search model of chapter 3 is made.
Beyond testing the assumptions and results of this search model, understanding
the connection between the donor and a recipient organization continues to be im-
portant as it regards the questions of whether current humanitarian market funds
are being used efficiently and effectively, and how might the market continue to grow
and attract more donors. This chapter, much like the previous one, puts forth the
contention that project or organization information, as it regards transparency, is at
the root of understanding for both of these questions. Both of these perspectives are
important as it relates to the effect that humanitarian giving can have on the lives of
recipients.
The previous two chapters build on the foundational economic work of altruism
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and philanthropy, and put forth donor and organization behavioral models rooted in
this work. Chapter 3, in particular, proposes a model rooted in two driving factors,
exposure and transparency, of how donors respond to variations in organization be-
havior. At its core, the model and subsequent analysis is about understanding the
role of information as a driver of the humanitarian marketplace.
A data set provided by GlobalGiving (GG), an online charitable giving market,
is used along with several empirical methods to try to understand the effect of trans-
parency related information on donor behavior. The GlobalGiving market structure,
to a large extent, represents a self-contained version of the aforementioned donor
search model, and consequently it provides a fairly reasonable test of the assump-
tions and results put forth previously. GlobalGiving requires that in addition to the
initial due diligence process that all projects posted on its site post project updates,
at a minimum, once every three months. These project updates, and the frequency
at which they occur, are used as proxies for the transparency related variables in
the donor search model. It is assumed that project updates are taken by donors,
regardless of content, as signals of transparency and effectively lowers the monitoring
cost associated with a particular project. The use of project updates as transparency
proxies is a key innovation of this chapter, and offers a unique way in which to mea-
sure organization transparency levels. The extent to which these proxies effect giving
behavior is explored.
The chapter begins with a brief review of relevant literature that guides not only
use of the econometric methods, but also forms the foundation for behavioral assump-
tions. Section 4.3 provides an overview of GlobalGiving along with summary results
of the provided dataset. Section 4.4 reviews the relevant donor search model, provides
a framework for the empirical analysis, and proposes two hypotheses which drive the
empirical analysis found within. The subsequent analysis focuses on the effect of
transparency related information in two distinct ways. Part I focuses on information
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and its effect on the amount that a donor gives, and Part II focuses on information
and its effect on a donor’s likelihood of giving at all. Section 4.5 outlines econometric
methods for how these questions will be probed, and using the fixed effects panel re-
gression model and logistic regression models proposed in 4.5, section 4.6 presents the
results of the subsequent analysis. In contrast to the assumptions the analysis does
not show transparency related information, on average, to have a significant effect
on the behavior of the population under analysis, with some noted exceptions. As a
result section 4.7 considers validity issues associated with the analysis, and section
4.8 offers interpretations of the analysis along with directions for future work.
4.2 Background and Literature
First, it should be said that the research related to charitable giving, and understand-
ing why and how people give is interdisciplinary by nature, and has been treated as
such within the literature. To this extent Sargeant and Woodliffe [87] offer a compre-
hensive overview of the existing literature, and attempt to create a unified framework
of factors in modeling and understanding donor behavior. In this respect, charity
reputation has been shown to be a key component in effecting donor giving behavior.
In fact, Meijer [61] uses data from the ‘Giving in the Netherlands Project’ to show
exactly that. Meijer uses several proxies for charity reputation, and is able to confirm
that the reputation of charity effects its ability to attract donors, but cannot confirm
that the reputation is influential in effecting the level of the donation. Hsu et al. [47]
conduct a similar study in which a survey is used to measure willingness to support
Taiwanese charities, and also cite reputation as a factor in donor decision making.
Venable et al. [99], Sargeant et al.[86] and Hibbert and Horne [44], and Radley and
Kennedy [72] all propose donor frameworks for giving, and consider the role of char-
ity branding and reputation in this process. While there is a relationship between an
organization’s reputation and an organization’s level of transparency the two notions
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are not synonymous. To the extent that one can, this paper considers the role of
transparency in establishing reputation, and by extension how it ultimately effects
donation volume, and donation amount for a given organization. In particular, while
there are several ways to proxy transparency this chapter considers a unique way to
measure transparency as represented through project updates on the GlobalGiving
website.
Beyond an extension of the notion of reputation in giving, this work builds off
several disciplines, and offers to make a contribution in several areas as well. Because
the framework for this empirical analysis essentially emanates from the confluence of
consumer search models and donor behavioral models, the work can be placed along
two dimensions. In particular it has a relationship with the literature that considers
the empirical evaluation of search models, but also has a relationship with empirical
work on charitable giving motivations and behavior. The preceding chapters offered
up a review of some literature in both respects. A few relevant papers are highlighted
here for each section, with potential contributions of the current analysis considered
intermittently.
Looking outside of the realm of charitable giving behavior there have been several
novel attempts at the empirical verification of search models, outside the that of
traditional consumer search. In particular, building off of the Jovanovic [49] search
model from which chapter 2’s donor search model is derived Marinescu [58] attempts
to describe the effect of shocks in the labor market on marriage duration. Garman
et al. [36] use a model of donor search to describe participant behavior in a Person-
to-Person lending market, and use data from Prosper.com to empirically verify their
assumptions. Hitsch et al. [45] use a data set provided by an online dating service
to empirically investigate search preferences in pursuing online mates. Their model
makes several empirical contributions to the search literature and makes use of a
similar discrete choice modeling methods used in this analysis. In this context the
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work in this chapter can be considered a contribution to the literature on empirical
verification of search models, in particular through the use of a rather novel data set.
Within the framework of research into motives for charitable giving this chapter
can also be considered distinct. There has been a plethora of research both theoretical
and empirical on describing donor motivations for giving, and the effect of various
types of information in altering donor behavior. List [55] provides an overview of
how field experiments have come to be used with respect to the economics of charity.
Works within this area of the literature include Croson and Shang [28] who investigate
the impact of social information on giving through a field experiment with a public
radio station. Alpizar et al. [2] considers whether context matters in how donors
respond in willingness-to-pay scenarios when compared with actual contributions.
Karlan and List [50] conducted a large-scale field experiment to ascertain the effects
of price on charitable giving, and find that gift matching helps increase both response
rate and the amount of the gift at the 1:1 level, but there is relatively little difference
for increasing match rates. Rondeau and List [78] conduct a similar field experiment
and conclude that challenge gifts positively influence contributions, but matching
gifts do not. While the work of this chapter is not of the experimental variety it
can be argued that it paves the way for such experiments by considering the role
of transparency in giving, which has not been considered directly, to the author’s
knowledge, before now. There are tradeoffs in using observational data over explicitly
defined experiments, but both are types of analysis are necessary in building toward
a unified understanding of donor behavior, and how organizations can best respond.
This work is not the first to use empirical methods to evaluate charitable giving
behavior, but does complement previous empirical studies. Kottasz [51] considers
difference in the donor behavior of young affluent males and females in the UK.
Woods [20] tests the notion of whether donors care about overhead costs through the
analysis of giving behavior of federal employees in Chicago. Ribar and Wilhem [75]
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use panel data to empirical examine the effects of the joy-of-giving motive in driving
donor contributions. Andreoni and Scholz [6] use econometric analysis to understand
the effects of social reference spaces in influencing the charitable giving behavior of
individuals. Lankford and Wyckoff [52] use Federal Tax File data, in conjunction
with a Box-Cox standard tobit model to examine charitable giving behavior in the
US population. Lastly, Sargeant et al. [85] provide an empirical based marketing
model, using a survey of 1300 respondents, to understand how givers perceptions of
organizations effect their giving behavior.
This analysis makes its primary contribution via its direct consideration of the
effects of transparency on donor behavior through the use of observational dataset.
The analysis further differentiates itself among other studies as it attempts to analyze
a set of projects within a confined market, for which there were uniform barriers to
entry. More explicitly, because projects are subjected to an upfront due diligence
process they all meet some threshold level of credibility. Beyond that level is where
the analysis takes place, and to some extent the model is as much a measure of
the effect of institutions to provide legitimacy to groups of organizations, as it is a
measure of individual organization behavior.
4.3 An Online Marketplace for Charitable Giving
4.3.1 GlobalGiving
Founded in February of 2002, GlobalGiving (www.GlobalGiving.com) is an online
marketplace that brings donors together with grassroots charity projects from around
the world. The stated mission of the organization is to, “Build an efficient, open,
thriving marketplace that connects people who have community and world-changing
ideas with people who can support them”. The organization places a significant em-
phasis on providing a transparent and impactful experience for the donor via several
mechanisms, as described below. In this vein, GlobalGiving is premised on the idea
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that people want to give, and will give to projects for which they can have a direct
impact, can trust, and are verifiable in some respects. In addition to providing a reli-
able and impactful giving experience for the donor, GlobalGiving is also of the belief
that healthy competition in the non-profit sector can encourage non-profit innovation
and accountability.
Since 2002 GlobalGiving has been a conduit for over $19.2 million in donations
from over 49,000 unique donors. GlobalGiving takes a nominal 10% fee from each
donation for its work, and passes along the remaining contribtuions to the over 1,340
projects it has helped to provide with funding.
4.3.2 How it Works
To understand how the GlobalGiving site functions is to also understand why it
works, in that the process by which donors and project leaders engage with the site is
fundamental to understanding why GlobalGiving continues to grow, with increasing
levels of donors and projects. How the process works is outlined below.1
• Project Leaders post their causes and details about what they need on Glob-
alGiving.com - giving donors an inside look at the project’s unique needs and
work being done.
• Donors browse the website, research causes by topic or location, and pick the
one that matches their interests and passions.
• Donors make a tax-deductible donation and their gift is combined with other
generous donors doing the same thing.
• GlobalGiving ensures that 85-90% of the donation is on-the-ground within 60
days and has an immediate impact.
• Donors get regular updates telling them what a difference their gift is making
and the results that have been achieved.
1Adapted from http://www.globalgiving.com/howitworks.html (accessed May 2009)
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Embedded within the story of how the process works is a good deal about why the
process works. In particular the success of GlobalGiving can perhaps be understood
along three dimensions; variety, credibility, and amenities.
4.3.2.1 Variety
With approximately 500 projects listed on the website GlobalGiving provides a large
variety of options for potential donors, allowing them to capture donors of a wide
range of preferences. More specifically projects from close to 100 countries are repre-
sented on the site, and can be classified within one of six global regions.2 In addition
to geographical variation the projects also vary by topic. GlobalGiving provides the
donor with projects from 17 topic groupings that, much like the geographical varia-
tion, allows the site to retain donors over a wide range of giving interests.3
4.3.2.2 Credibility
While the project variety allows GlobalGiving to attract a wide range of donors, it is
a high level of credibility that GlobalGiving uses as a differentiator from traditional
charitable giving channels. GlobalGiving attempts to provide credibility both at the
organization level, and at the project level. By providing credibility at the organiza-
tion level GlobalGiving provides an implicit level of credibility to any project listed
on the website, but beyond that level GlobalGiving encourages individual projects to
maintain a high level of transparency and feedback to donors so that the projects can
stand on their own as credible entities.
By providing a certain level of credibility and transparency it is assumed that
donors will be more comfortable giving to projects listed on the site, and should in
fact be willing to give more, and give more often. As outlined in “How it Works”
2Africa, Asia and Oceania, Europe and Russia, Middle East, North America, and South/Central
America and the Caribbean
3Project topics include: Animals, Children, Climate Change (GG Green), Democracy and Gov-
ernance, Disaster Recovery, Economic Development, Education, Environment, HIV-AIDS, Health,
Human Rights, Malaria, Microfinance, Peace and Security, Sport, Technology, Women and Girls
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GlobalGiving fosters credibility and transparency through several mechanisms.
One of the primary mechanisms in providing credibility to projects listed on the
site is the due diligence process that GlobalGiving adheres to when vetting projects
to appear on the website. The due diligence process is characterized, in addition to
other factors, by projects meeting the following criteria:4
• Their work has significant social impact.
• They have a track record for delivering on promises.
• They are not listed in any terrorist databases.
• Their projects are eligible for international philanthropic donations so donors
in the US receive full tax benefits.
This process provides the donor with upfront knowledge that each of the listed
projects meets these qualifications at a bare minimum.
In addition to the due diligence process GlobalGiving also encourages projects
to provide frequent updates on progress, allowing donors to stay engaged with the
project and monitor the impact of their donation from afar. GlobalGiving rewards
projects with frequent and informative updates through higher rankings, as discussed
below. Beyond providing another means by which projects can distinguish themselves
from others, project updates help to provide an additional layer of credibility. While
the due diligence process helps to establish GlobalGiving as a credible organization,
the project updates allow individual projects to further assert themselves as reliable
investments. Figure (25) highlights the distribution of project updates amongst the
projects found within the provided dataset. While the amount of updates for a given
project varies over time, Figure (25) uses the total number of updates for a given
project during its last occurrence within the set.
4Adapted from http://www.globalgiving.com/aboutus/dd.html (accessed May 2009)
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Figure 25: Distribution of project updates for the last project occurrence within the
data set.
A third mechanism by which GlobalGiving helps to reassure the donor of the qual-
ity of the site’s projects is “GlobalGiving Guaranteed.”5 The is GlobalGiving’s com-
mitment to offering a moneyback guarantee, in the form of a voucher, for any donor
who is not satisfied with their giving experience. Much like in the for-profit sector,
this guarantee helps to underscore a level of confidence in the quality of the product
that GlobalGiving is offering, which in this case are the charitable projects([67]).
As a collective these mechanisms help to provide both GlobalGiving and subsidiary
projects with a strong brand as it concerns credible and quality projects. GlobalGiv-
ing’s focus on these issues as an organization is of benefit to the empirical analysis in
this paper, as the primary focus is on characterizing the importance of these factors
as it relates to the donor giving experience, and the propensity for giving.
5http://www.globalgiving.com/guaranteed/ (accessed May 2009)
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4.3.2.3 Amenities
In addition to variety and credibility the GlobalGiving market has several other fea-
tures which help to enhance its usefulness to donors, and distinguish it from other
online giving communities. These features are classified under amenities in this pa-
per, as they represent features that are not critical to the market success, but help
enhance the viability of the marketplace as a first option of charitable givers.
Crucial to the success of the market in attracting and retaining potential donors
is the time it takes a potential donor to find a project to which he wants to make a
donation. In this respect, how efficiently a donor can search the site, and on what
dimensions, is an important market characteristic. To address this issue GlobalGiving
offers the potential donor several search options. In addition to the donation wizard,
which makes project suggestions after the donor responds to a few questions, the site
allows the donor to search for projects along the following dimensions:
• Project Theme
• Country/Region
• Closest to Goal
• Newest Projects
• Recently Updated
Furthermore, within each of these search categories projects are given a ranking
as a function of several factors, such as the projects most recent update, the amount
of funding received relative to other projects, the amount of donors the project has
attracted, and how close it is to its fundraising goal. This ranking allows projects to
be presented in the order of those that GlobalGiving believes to be the “best” in the
sense that they have received a higher GlobalGiving ranking.
In addition to facilitated search and project ranking, other market amenities in-
clude the option for donors to setup wedding registries, sponsor fundraisers, or pur-
chase gift cards.
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Understanding how GlobalGiving works is essential to understanding the meaning
of the analysis contained herein, and in particular it helps in contextualizing the data
set used in this analysis.
4.3.3 Data and Donor Characteristics
For this empirical study of donor giving behavior in response to project related infor-
mation, GlobalGiving provided an anonymized data set of donations spanning an 11
month period from February 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008.6. The remainder of this
section will describe the contents of the data set along with the presentation of some
preliminary summary statistics.
The provided GlobalGiving dataset contains close to 20,000 observations, where
each observation is a donor gift to a specific project. Each observation contains
information about the donor and information about the project that received the
gift. Some summary statistics of project and donor characteristics are given below.
Distribution of gifts by date Figure (26) shows the distribution of the dona-
tions provided via GlobalGiving by the day the gift was made. As can be readily seen
there are two periods in which the volume of giving seems to dramatically deviate
from the average level. Specifically, the months of May and December appear to
be aberrations, and in fact they account for 28% and 23% of the donations within
the provided set. The increase in giving associated with December can be perhaps
be explained by an end of the year giving surge for individuals wanting to receive
charitable tax deductions on their current year income tax returns. In this sense, De-
cember would always exhibit deviant behavior with respect to the rest of the year’s
average level of giving. May, however, experienced an aberration in giving because of
two high profile natural disasters that occurred in succession of one another. On May
2nd, 2008 Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar causing over 146,000 fatalities and thousands
6The month of January was excluded because of a special promotion that was running on the
site at that time, which highly skewed the amount and type of donations made from normal activity
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of injuries. Shortly thereafter on May 12th an earthquake hit Sichuan Province of
China resulting in over 68,000 fatalities. The occurrence of both of these significant
disasters within days of each other caused May to be the highest giving month of
2008 on the GlobalGiving website. The average number of donations per day over
the entire data set is 59.07 donations per day. May and December each averaged
169.9 and 149 donations per day respectively.
Figure 26: Distribution of Donations via GlobalGiving by Date
Donations by project theme There are 706 projects in the set that vary by
theme as described above. 14 of the 17 project themes are represented in the provided
set with the total amount of donations accrued to each theme over the data set as
outlined in Figure (27). Children, disaster, education, and health themed projects
accounted for 15%, 26%, 13%, and 21% of the unique gifts within the data set. Do-
nations from the month of May inevitably accounted for the large volume of disaster
themed project donations, with 75% of these donations occuring within the month.
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Figure 27: Total Funding by Project Theme
Donations by country As one would expect given the aforementioned distribu-
tions, China and Myanmar received the 1st and 3rd largest amount of total donations
by country, accruing 28% and 6.2% of approximately $708,000. India was second
largest with 7.4% of the total donations made over the data set. Figure (28) outlines
this figure for the top 6 countries as ranked by the percentage of total donations
captured over the data set.
4.3.3.1 Derived Variables and Truncated Data
Because of the nature of the GlobalGiving data set, the discussion, to ensue later, of
what regressors to include in associated empirical models must implicitly include a
discussion of which observations to include in the final evaluation set. In particular,
because of the nature of the set certain variables can only be derived for projects
that started after the data set begins, February 1, 2008. Consequently, it becomes an
important consideration in determining which variables to include in the regression
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Figure 28: Percentage of Funding by Country
analysis. Because not all projects in the data set begin after February 1st, it would
become necessary to exclude projects initiated earlier from the analysis if one of the
associated regressors were to be included. In real terms this would require removing
about 36% of the observations from the data set, leaving just over 12,500 for eval-
uation. An even further paring of the data occurs, as outlined in the next section,
when one wishes to consider the question of wehther or not a donor gives again. In
this instance the set is effectively reducded to around 7,000 observations.7
7It should also be noted that analysis is confined to those donations between $10 and $100 as
the donor search model is primarily concerned with those who gave in small amounts. Additionally,
this range accounts for approximately 90% of the donations found in the set.
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4.3.3.2 Coding Multiple Donations
An important feature of the data set with respect to the empirical analysis to follow
is the ability to ascertain whether, after an initial donation, a donor makes a sub-
sequent contribution.8 Furthermore, it can be determined whether that subsequent
contribution was made to the same project as the initial contribution, or whether it
was made to a different project. In this sense, it becomes necessary to code each
observation with whether or not there is a subsequent donation, and if so, of what
type.
Given a donor and his initial donation to a project either one of three things can
occur subsequent to this donation:9
1. A donor can donate to this project again at some point in the future.
2. They can donate again in the future to a different project.
3. They can choose not to donate again.
Given these three possible outcomes there are several ways of coding the data to
represent the scenarios, each with some advantages and drawbacks. A simple and
straightforward way to consider coding these scenarios is something along the lines
of the following:
Each observation in the data set is coded with 0, 1, or 2 denoting one of the three
scenarios. If an observation is coded with a 0 then the donor made a subsequent
donation, but not to the project listed in the current observation. An observation
8Each donation by a donor is treated as an initial donation. As such it is possible to ascertain
for every observation within the set whether or not their was a subsequent donation made by that
donor.
9In this analysis if a donor makes multiple initial donations to a suite of projects on the same
day, then each of these donations is treated as a unique instance and analyzed as such. In this way,
if donor 3 contributes to projects A and B on the 1st of February, and then contributes only to
project A later in the data set then the first observation of the contribution to A is coded with a 1,
and the observation in which the donor contributes to project B is coded with 0.
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coded with 1 denotes a donor who made a subsequent contribution to the same
project. An observation coded with 2 denotes a donor who does not appear in the
data set again after the current observation.
While seemingly straightforward, this initial coding is complicated by censoring
issues that arise from the data. Because the data set ends on December 31, 2008 it is
entirely possible that a donor who gives on December 15, 2008 does give again, but
because it is not until January it is coded in the data set as 2. In fact, given that a
rather large number of donations occur within the last month of the year, it is quite
possible that this censoring problem skews the coding of the data in a significant way.
There are, in fact, a few ways to better code the data such that this problem can be
mitigated to some extent.
One way to do this is to assume that the set of observations ends at some time
before December 31, 2008, and only code observations to that point. Whereas now
there is no post-December 31st information available for any of the observations, one
can generate a data set for which there is post-termination information. For instance,
if the set is cut such that only observations before December 1st are considered then
donor’s who make a contribution toward the end of the that set have at least a 31
day window in which one is able to see whether or not that donor contributes again
in that time period. While this method does help eliminate some of the bias, it also
requires that 23% of the observations are lost. However, even beyond the issue of lost
observations the question of what is the appropiate cutoff point persists. Leaving 31
days to observe end of period donors might not be benenficial at all if the the average
time for a repeat donor is longer than 31 days. In fact, if one does an inital coding in
the manner proposed above the average time, in days, for a donor who does give again
to make a subsequent contribution is 34.15 days. Additionally, the median number
of days for donors who do give again is 20, while 75% of those who give again do so
in 33 days or less. These numbers suggest that 31 days might be a feasiable cutoff
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point, in that it could provide a workable time window in which to observe whether
or not a donor gives again or not. In general, with data of this sort this censoring
problem will always be an issue when trying to determine behavior over an extended
period of time for individuals. Regardless of the time period which is avaiable within
the data set, it can always be said to be the case that there are donors who are going
to give again but have not done so yet.
The previous paragraph hints at a problem of another potential solution, which
is to collect data for individual donors beyond the December 31st cutoff, until the
present. In this way, for each donor in the original data set whether or not they enter
the set after the cutoff point is ascertained. While this is ideal in some respects, such
data is not available, and if it were it still fails to avoid the censoring problem.
Another alternative solution to help mitigate the censoring problem is to stan-
dardize the interval over which all observations are considered. Both of the prior
solutions offer alternatives which are meant to deal with the issues regarding obser-
vations found near the end of the data set. However, there is still an issue in that
because of the serial nature in which observations occur, those at the beginning of
the data set will always have a longer period over which to be observed than those
at the end of the set. A potential antidote to this is to consider all observations over
a standardized period, such that if a donor does not give again over the course of a
pre-defined interval, then it should be considered not to have given again at all. In
this sense, if one were to define the interval at 100 days, then the coding could look
something like the following:
An observation is coded with a 0 if the donor makes a subsequent donation within
100 days of his current donation, but not to the project listed in the current obser-
vation. An observation is coded with a 1 if a donor makes a subsequent contribution
to the same project within 100 days of the current donations. An observation is
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coded with a 2 when a donor does not appear in the data set again after the cur-
rent observation, or when the donor makes a subsequent donation after the 100 day
interval.
Considering the donations within the standardized framework helps to provide
consistency over the analysis and eliminate some of the problems related to bias.
While a seeming improvement over the previous coding proposals, there are still some
issues that arise when one considers which variables are available as regressors in the
model, and how many observations are lost via selection of the evaluation interval.
Issues related to potential regressors are discussed later on within the context of the
discussion as to which variables should be included in the model. Much like the
previous solution of advancing the cutoff point of the data set, analysis by interval
runs into the same problem of lost observations, and what is the appropriate interval
over which to evaluate.
The problem of lost observations occurs because observations who enter the data
set in a period in which they do not have enough time to be evaluated over the selected
interval cannot be included in the analysis. Thus, if 100 days is the selected interval
then all observations within the last 100 days of the year are dropped, which in
this context amounts to 47% of the observations. This is a fairly significant number
of observations, and so consideration must be given to the question of what the
appropiate interval should be in the context of both the number of observations lost,
and the number of days in which it is feasiable to expect a repeat donor.
An initial coding of the observations occurs in which a variable, giveagain, is coded
to take on the values is defined by the initial coding without intervals. Approximately
9% of the donations are coded such that they indicate that a subsequent donation
followed (i.e. giveagain = 0 or 1). This provides a foundational point to consider
how the dataset changes as the decisions about potential intervals are considered.
As mentioned above, of those who give again, 50% of the donations come within 20
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days, and 75% come within 22 days. Additionally, 99% of the repeat donations occur
within 102 days of the intial donation. Looking at the effect of several intervals on
the distribution of the giveagain coding within the data set, we initially proceed with
a 100 day interval over which to evaluate donor behavior.10
Lastly, it is worth considering that none of these solutions are not without criti-
cism, but are perhaps among a set of best alternatives given the empirical constraints
of the data set. One question for consideration is the question of what it means for
a donor to give again after 100 days, or after a defined interval period in general. As
of now, those donors who give again after 100 days are considered to not have given
at all, and are coded as a 2, which may be appropriate in some sense, particularly if
there is not a significant difference in the characteristics of the two groups. However,
consideration that those who give again after 100 days might be significantly distinct
from those who don’t give again is a worthwhile exercise. For now however, because
of the relatively small number of observations which fall into the category of provid-
ing repeat gifts after 100 days, the data will be coded in the aforementioned 0,1, 2
framework. Further discussion of this derived variable will arise in the context of its
use as a regressor.
4.4 A Modeling Framework for Analyzing Donor Behavior
Chapter 2 presents a two-stage donor search model from which the empirical analysis
is in part derived. The model considers charitable projects to be public goods, and is
based on the idea that individuals with heterogeneous preferences over these projects
want to contribute monetary gifts toward them and are motivated by both private
and public aspects of the gift and good. The model is a selection model which
considers a market with donors who want to buy public goods, and charities which
provide them. This two stage model consists of an introductory stage in which donors
10100 days is considered to be exclusive of the day the initial gift was made, so the interval of
observation is 100 days after the intial day
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are introduced to a particular project or organization via a weighted introduction
mechanism. The donors, once introduced, must make a decision about whether to
contribute toward the project or take a pass and continue looking for a worthy project
(i.e. accept or defer). The donor’s first stage decision of whether to pass or not is
driven by two factors; the expected benefit from making the contribution, of which
there are both public and private components, and his view of the cost to monitor the
organization (or transparency cost). If the expected benefits outweighs the perceived
costs by enough then the donor will choose to make a first stage contribution. If the
donor contributes during the first stage then a second stage decision presents itself.
This decision differs from the first stage decision because the donor now has more
information about the quality of the project or organization, and his satisfaction with
the internalized benefits. The second stage decision is presumed to be one in which
the donor decides either to return to the pool of potential projects, or matches with
the current project.11 This model is analyzed with an eye toward understanding the
effects of monitoring costs (transparency) and exposure in driving donor behavior and
market dynamics. Several implications arise from the model:
1. A reduction in monitoring costs within the market, by individual organizations,
expands the size of the overall market.
2. Unilateral transparency increases, by individual organizations, have effects that
are relative to the transparency level of the market as a whole. If transparency
across the market is high, a 10% increase in transparency by an orgnaization
A will yeild less gains from donors when compared to a 10% increase in a low
transparency market.
3. An organization’s exposure level is a primary driver in attracting donor’s, and
11In this context match is used to denote a donor and organization pairing which is stable, in the
sense that the donor does not desire to break the pairing.
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to some extent can overcome any decrease in donations due to transparency
related issues, at the margins.
More pointedly, there are two aspects of this work which are of interest vis −
à− vis empirical analysis of the GlobalGiving data set. This model rests on several
assumptions about what both donors and organizations care about, and through these
assumptions and analysis of the model several testable hypotheses emerge with regard
to donor and organization interaction within the charitable giving market. Through
the lens of the data set this section defines two specific hypotheses which guide the
subsequent analysis.
The GlobalGiving provided data set is absent some key variables which would
allow for a more through testing of assumptions and results implied by the donor
search model.12 However, the data set does offer the opportunity to test the effects
of various types of information on donor behavior and organization fundraising, with
some tests emanating directly from the aforementioned theoretical models, and oth-
ers which are related but not explicitly modeled from a theoretical standpoint. In
particular the donor search model does not tackle the question of the amount of the
gift, but only the disbursement of the gift as altered through organization exposure
and transparency levels.
While this work advances the theoretical basis of discrete choice selection as it
concerns organizations in a charitable marketplace, it does so by advancing the no-
tion that certain types of information matters in giving. From this perspective, the
GlobalGiving data set allows one to test notions of behavior alteration in the face of
various scenarios. The set is particularly suited to a model construction which might
allow one to infer the role of information on the level of giving, which was deferred
in the theoretical treatment.
12(i.e. the opportunity pipeline, page layout information, etc.)
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What follows is a two part treatment of the analysis of information effects on
giving. Part I focuses on its effect on the amount of the donor’s gift, and part II will
focus on the donor’s allocation decision.
4.4.1 Part I: Information and its Effect on the Level of Gifts
This treatment results from a confluence of the information available within the Glob-
alGiving dataset and the theoretical development of the role of information in donor
giving. The donor search model develops formal claims about the effect of informa-
tion on donor giving behavior. In particular the hypothesis is formulated such that
increases in exposure levels for a given organization, along with investment in the
reduction of donor monitoring costs (a monitoring cost reduction can equivalently be
thought of as an increase in transparency) will lead to a higher likelihood of selection
by a given donor, with all other attributes being controlled for. H1 extends that no-
tion to the amount of the gift, and hypothesizes that reductions in monitoring costs
will lead to higher donation levels for a given organization.
H1: Controlling for all other attributes of both the donor and the organization,
an increase in the transparency level of an organization will lead to an increase in the
amount donated by an individual donor.
More formal meaning will be brought to some of the language used in H1, par-
ticularly in regards to how one might measure the transparency level of a project or
organization . H1 says that for a donor who is already pre-disposed to give to an
organization A, he will increase has donation level in relation to an increase in the
transparency level associated with that organization. To test this hypothesis a panel
regression with fixed effects is used, with an ordered logit model considered as an
extension.
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4.4.2 Part II: Information and its Effect on the Allocation of Gifts
While section 4.4.1 can be considered an extended test of the donor search model re-
sults, this section shifts the focus to testing the specific results derived from the donor
search model as it regards likelihood of selection from the organization standpoint.
The main result from the model was the effect of exposure and transparency on the
likelihood of organization selection, as distinct from the gift amount hypothesis put
forth in the previous section. H2 defines the hypothesis under consideration here.
H2: Controlling for all other attributes of both the donor and the organization,
an increase in the transparency level of an organization will lead to an increase in the
likelihood that the organization is selected to receive a donor’s gift.
H2 deals with the the probability of an organization being selected relative to
all other similar organizations, while H1 dealt with how much a selected organization
would receive, given that a donor has already settled on this organization. H1 and H2
both make claims about the usefulness of certain information in aiding donor decision
making, but take a different perspective on its use. Neither are mutually exclusive,
and in fact it is not beyond reason that for a given donor, information will enter his
decision process in both respects. H2 lends itself to verification via a conditional logit
model.
4.4.2.1 Dataset limitations with respect to the H2 Hypothesis
Before preceding to the model specification it is important to consider what the
dataset allows one to test via the H2 hypothesis and the associated search model. As
alluded to previously, there are pieces of information missing from the dataset which
preclude a full testing of the donor search model. Consider a s simplified version of the
previously described search model in Figure (29) that excludes the introduction stage.
It becomes apparent that the contents of the GlobalGiving data set do not permit
analysis of information’s effect on a donor’s first stage decision (i.e. the donor’s defer
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Figure 29: A Simplified Two-Stage Donor Search Model
or accept decision for a given project). Said another way, the GlobalGiving dataset
begins at the point where the donor has already agreed to “Pay Cost and Donate”
for a given project. Consequently, given the construction of the dataset, one does
not have access to information about the number and type of alternatives that a
donor considered before making the observed project contribution, making it difficult
to make conjectures about the factors that influence this initial selection. However,
what one can hope to establish is, given stage 1, a set of factors that can predict
match sustainment at stage 2.13 As section 4.3.3.2 outlines, what can be drawn
from the dataset in support of this is information about how many contributions
specific donors made, as identified via a unique identifier, to various projects, and
whether or not donors made those contributions to the same projects, or different
13Stage 2 analysis suffers from some of the same missing data problems as the stage 1 analysis
does, but because the question being asked is fundamentally different its effect is limited.
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projects, in successive periods. The availability of this information, coupled with
project attributes and donor characteristics, allows one to construct an econometric
model that can make claims as to the likelihood of a given donor to give again to the
same project, give again to a different project, or not give again at all.
4.5 Econometric Specification
4.5.1 Panel Regression Model with Fixed Effects
Section 4.6.1 considers more thoroughly how the following model is justified, for
now the model is presented generally, and then specified for the specific context
outlined above. If Yijt is the amount donated by donor i to project j in period t,
then the population regression function (106) defines the relationship between project
attributes, donor characteristics, and Y .




itβ2 + αj + εijt (106)
x′jt and x
′
it are vectors of observable project attributes and donor characteristics,
respectively. Additionally, αj represents unobservable project specific fixed effects,
and εijt are all remaining uncorrelated unobservables. Using project update related
attributes as proxies for transparency, equation (106) is extended such that it has
relevance to the considered data set and the available attributes and characteristics
one can define the following:
Yijt = β0 + β1numprojupdtsjt + β2daysfrmlastupdtjt + β3numprevdonorsjt
+ β4amtofprojfunded+ β5projage+ β6subscribeit + β7guestcheckoutit
+ β8mayit + αj + λt + εijt (107)
The number of project updates posted at the time the donation was made (numpro-
jupdts) along with the days since the last project update (daysfrmlastupdt) are used
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as proxies for transparency, and are the primary regressors of interest. However,
in addition to the variables of interest it is also necessary to control for other rele-
vant factors which might contribute toward the decision of how much to donate to
a particular project. The choice of which factors to control for is in part informed
by some of the aforementioned research in section 4.2 on how donors make giving
decisions. In particular, the number of previous donors to a project at the time of
donation (numprevdonors) along with the amount of funding the project has received
to date as a percentage of its funding goal (amtofprojfunded) are considered to be
influential in shaping a donor’s donation level decision. To control for these variables
with respect to how long the project has been available for funding the project’s age
(projage), in days, is also included.
In addition to project attributes several observable donor characteristics are also
considered. While most donor characteristics remain unobservable, the existence
of characteristics such as whether or not the donor subscribes to the GlobalGiving
newsletter (subscribe) or whether or not their donation was made via a guest account
(guestcheckout) allows one to segment the donor population at a very coarse level. In
this way, one can ascertain whether one type of donor is more pre-disposed to higher
giving, or repeat giving, than another.
4.5.1.1 Fixed Effects
Project characteristics vary across several dimensions, most notably the theme of the
project and the country in which it takes place. It is assumed that individual donors,
exclusive of the aforementioned regressors, have preferences over the type of projects
they like to fund. For instance, an investment banker with an altruistic streak may
be more inclined to donate to mircrofinance related projects as opposed to education
related projects. Consequently, this donor may be willing to settle for a lower level
of transparency in exchange for a stronger project match along the lines of thematic
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preference. While the project theme is observable, one can easily imagine other
project attributes that may bias a donor’s decision process that are not observable
within the set. One such unobservable might be the public opinion as it concerns the
perceived value of the project. A project, by its nature, may be considered to be of
high value and so its higher donation levels are not a result of more or less relative
transparency, but simply a function of its perceived value.
Alternatively, from the project perspective, because it is considered a high value
project, it may be of the belief that greater transparency will cause increased donation
amounts. This would then cause a project to provide more updates than it would
relative to other projects, as driven by its value attribute. It soon becomes clear
that an unobservable project related value attribute can be correlated with both the
dependent variable, along with an independent regressor. To control for these project
specific unobservables a fixed effects regression model is used, whereby αj is added
to the model for each project j, and are considered to be entity fixed effects which
control for the unobservable variables related to each project.
4.5.1.2 Time Effects
While the model has been specified as one in which fixed effects are accounted for,
there is also some concern that unobservable time effects may play a role in shaping
behavior as it regards a donor’s gift amount. As discussed in section 4.3.3 there were
two months in particular in which the volume of the donations were high relative to
other months, May and December. These abnormalities suggests that there may be
some time effects which are necessary to control for. Consequently, an attempt is
made to control for time effects on the level of giving by adding dummy variables (λt)
for each of the T-1 (T = 11) periods for which the data set spans.
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Figure 30: Distribution of the Donation Amount
4.5.2 Ordered Logit Model
As mentioned previously, for the level of giving analysis, the data has been truncated
such that only donations between $10 and $100 appear in the dataset, as interest
is confined to the behavior of donors who give in relatively small amounts. Figure
(30) shows how the donations are distributed based on the amount given. Easily
seen from the figure is that donations appear to occur primarily at 4 distinct levels
$10, $25, $50, and $100. This grouping of data is largely a by-product of the way
donation options are presented on the GlobalGiving website. While individual donors
are free to give at any level they choose, each project comes with a menu of options
with suggested donation amounts, and what each amount can buy with respect to
that project. Not surprisingly these values usually begin at the $10 and $25 levels,
with one step above these levels are the $50 and $100 levels. As a consequence donor
level decisions are somewhat bias toward these groups. Consequently, it is worth
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considering how project information effects the probability of a donor selecting into
a specific donation grouping. Because the groupings are ordered and represent a
discrete choice decision an ordered logit model is used for analysis.
The dependent variable (dongroup) is coded to represent four donation levels at
which a donor can give. Using the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles as cutoff points
dongroup is coded as follows:
dongroup =

1 if Amount Donated ≤ $15
2 if Amount Donated > $15 and ≤ $25
3 if Amount Donated > $25 and ≤ $50
4 if Amount Donated > $50 and ≤ $100
Given an ordered choice set as the dependent variable an ordered logit model is
derived from a generic latent regression model ([39]), whereby
y∗ = x′β + ε (108)
y∗ is unobserved, but what is observed is the censored group value as derived
through (109).
y = 0 if y∗ ≤ 0,
= 1 if 0 < y∗ ≤ µ1,
= 2 if µ1 < y
∗ ≤ µ2,
...
= J if µJ−1 ≤ y∗. (109)
The µ values (cutoff points), assuming the error terms (ε) are i.i.d. with type I
extreme value distribution, F (ε) = exp(−eε) are then estimated via the following,
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Prob(y = 1|x) = F (µ1 − x′β)− F(−x′β),
P rob(y = 2|x) = F (µ2 − x′β)− F(µ1 − x′β),
...
Prob(y = J |x) = 1− F (µJ−1 − x′β), (110)
where 0 < µ1 < µ2 < · · · < µJ−1.
Defining (110) for dongroupijt yields the following,
Prob(dongroupijt = 1|x) = F (µ1 − x′β)− F(−x′β),
P rob(dongroupijt = 2|x) = F (µ2 − x′β)− F(µ1 − x′β),
P rob(dongroupijt = 3|x) = F (µ3 − x′β)− F(µ2 − x′β),
P rob(dongroupijt = 4|x) = 1− F (µ3 − x′β), (111)
where the regression vector x is defined as in equation (107).14
4.5.3 Multinomial Logit Model
Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 developed models to test transparency effects on the level of
giving. Here a multinomial logit model is developed along with associated binomial
conditional logit models to test the H2 hypothesis with respect to the donor search
model. Similar in concept to an ordered logit model, the multinomial logit model
allows one to estimate the odds of a donor selecting into one of several unordered
groups, dependent on project attributes and donor characteristics. While potentially
beneficial it is not clear that the multinomial logit model offers greater insight into
the effects of transparency on matching than any of the conditional logit structures
14Discuss incidental parameter problem, and the need to drop projects with frequencies less than
30.
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defined below. Each of the logit models is derived with respect to the dependent
giveagain variable. The ability to structure this variable such that it represents
either a binomial or multinomial choice set rests at the center of the subsequently
outlined models. Assuming the error terms (εij) are i.i.d. with type I extreme value
distribution, a generic logit model over a size J choice set can be represented as









Given the coding outlined in section 4.3.3.2 logit modeling is used to consider the
likelihood of selection among the choice set
k ∈ {0 = give again to the same project,
1 = give again to a different project,
2 = don’t give again} (113)
The set of regressors defined here is much the same as in the previous two sections,
however because of the temporal nature of the giveagain variable, between period
variables are also included within the model. Recalling that giveagain is defined over
a 100 day interval, one is able to record project attributes over this interval, for
each project. In particular one can derive the number of donors that contributed
to the project during the interval (totaldonors100 ), the number of project updates
posted (numprojupdts100 ), and the amount of money raised as a percentage of the
desired funding goal (amtprojfunded100 ) during the interval. These regressors are
added to the model, as they would presumably have an effect on a donor’s likelihood
of contributing toward the same project in the future.15 Additionally, how many
15It should be noted that if a donor donates again to either his initial project or a different project
then these marginal variables may not be exactly aligned with the interval between the initial gift
and the subsequent gift. In fact, this will be the case anytime the time between gifts is not 100
days. In this respect a variable such as numprojupdts100 may include updates that were not present
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donations a particular donor has made (numdonofdonor), inclusive of the current
donation, is also included as a regressor. For x containing the previously described
regressors, a logit model over the donor choice set (113) can be described via (114).









4.5.3.1 Conditional Logit Model
It can reasonably be argued that the choice set of the multinomial framework is
overextended, and that one need only consider a binomial choice set for a relevant
analysis. A binomial conditional logit model is used, and allows for better control
over the fixed effects as discussed in section (4.5.1.1). There are potentially three
ways in which one can consider the 2nd stage interpretation of the donor search
model. Given the 3-choice set (113) one can construct relevant binary choice sets to
answer more specific questions. The following discusses why these choice sets might
be constructed, and how the coding of giveagain must be adjusted.
One may reasonably infer that if a donor decides to the make a subsequent con-
tribution via GlobalGiving, regardless of whether it is to a new project or the same
project, then this should be taken as evidence of satisfaction with his previous do-
nation. Consequently, no distinction need be made between the choice of give again
to the same project, or give again to a different project. This reasoning effectively
collapses choice set (113) into set (115).
k1 ∈ {0 = do not give again at all,
1 = give again to a GlobalGiving project (115)
during the period in which the donor was formulating his decision to give again or not. In this sense
these variables can be considered, to some extent, as propensity scores, and so while numprojupdts100
represents the actual number of updates posted during a 100 day time span, it can also be considered
as a proxy for a project’s likelihood to post updates.
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Alternatively it may also be argued that a donor who does not donate to the same
project again, alternative actions aside, was not satisfied with his previous experience
enough to match with that project, and that this should be the set of analysis. Doing
so yields the set defined by (116).
k2 ∈ {0 = do not give again to same project,
1 = give again to the same project (116)
Lastly, one may argue that the choice model should be nested, in that a donor
first makes a decision about whether or not to give again, and then makes a decision
about whether to give to the same project or a different project. Consequently,
conditioning on those donors who decided to give again the relevant within market
analysis is whether they give to the same project or another project. Choice set (117)
captures this view.
k3 ∈ {0 = give again to different project,
1 = give again to same project (117)
Regardless of the view taken, assuming identical regressors as in the multinomial
example, one can model each of the aforementioned binary choice sets via (118).




4.6 Empirical Evidence: Main Results
4.6.1 Part I: Results and Analysis
4.6.1.1 Fixed Effects Panel Regression Results
The results from the fixed effects panel regression shown in table (9), imply that
neither of the transparency variables “Days Since Last Update”(daysfrmlastupdt)
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and “Total Project Updates”(numprojupdts) have a statistically significant impact
on the amount of a donor’s gift. In fact, considering specification (10) which includes
a full compliment of regressors, including controls for time effects, it can be seen that
only two project related attributes, the amount of funds raised by a project as a
percentage of the fundraising goal and the project’s age, were shown to be significant
in adjusting a donor’s gift level. While statistically significant it is not clear that
either regressor is economically significant in the sense that they make any tangible
difference in the level of gifts. The estimated coefficient of the “Project Funding”
(amtofprojfunded) regressor −0.118 can be interpreted as, controlling for all other
factors, a 1% increase in the amount of the project funded will cause an $0.118 decline
in the donation amount to a given project. This interpretation creates an implicit
range on the economic effect of (-$11.80,$0]. This range is a result of amtofprojfunded
being bounded between 0% and 100%. Potential reasons for why the coefficient can
reasonably be argued to be < 0 are discussed in 4.6.1.3.
Also having a statistically significant effect on a donor’s contribution level to a
project, the project’s age has an associated estimated coefficient of 0.127, which would
imply that as a project’s age increases by 1 day, then the amount of the expected
donation would increase by approximately 13 cents. Considering project’s range in
age from 1 day to 327 days this would imply a range of [$0.13, $42.51], which would
certainly be economically significant within the context of a donation range of $10
to $100. While at the lower end of the spectrum, the range is not very significant,
as a project hits the 39 day mark, it begins to mean an increase of approximately
$5 in the expected donation amount. It seems rather curious that given all of the
available project information that the project’s age would have such a significant
economic effect on the donation amount when controlling for fixed effects. However,
there are several factors which could explain this result. In particular there may be a
process of attrition taking place, in which only high quality projects survive beyond
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a certain point, and lower quality projects are dropped from the available listing
such that those left in the set are those projects that receive higher funds because of
their quality, but the effect is seen via the project age regressor. Furthermore, if one
considers that variables such as the number of previous donors, the amount the of
funds raised relative to other projects, and how close the project is to its goal effect
a project’s ranking and subsequent probability of exposure, it would be reasonable
to infer that older projects would receive higher donation amounts. Because of the
absence of ranking data, and the GlobalGiving portfolio in each period, it is difficult
to explicitly control for these factors.
When controls for time effects are relaxed in specifications( 7) and (8), the project’s
age becomes statistically insignificant. While (10) controls for each month, (7) and
(8) attempt to control for the period in which the Myanmar and China disasters
occurred. Because the disasters both occurred in May, (8) includes a dummy for do-
nations given within the month of May. Specification (7) attempts to bring an even
finer level of granularity to the analysis by replacing the month of May dummy, with
a dummy that represents gifts given in a period of 18 days around the disaster from
May 6th, 2008 - May 23rd, 2008. Outside the context of other period controls these
dummies are significant, but become insignificant in specifications (9) and (10) when
all months are controlled for.
In specifications (3) through (10) controls are added for two donor characteristics,
subscribe and guestcheckout. Both of these regressors remain significant throughout,
but not in the way one would expect. Donors who opt to subscribe, controlling
for all other factors, contribute $1.54 less on average, than those who opt out of a
subscription to the GlobalGiving newsletter. In the same vein, Those donors who
create a GlobalGiving profile (i.e. do not use the guest checkout option) contribute
$4.08 less on average, than those who use the guest check out option. A possible
explanation for this is that donors who subscribe to the newsletter, and/or create
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profiles, are more likely to contribute on a sustained basis at regular lower amounts,
while those who do not create a profile and/or subscribe to the newsletter are drawn
to the site for a specific one time gift, which may on average be higher. Whether
or not this is true to any significant extent will become more apparent in section
(4.6.2)16.
While these initial results provide some insights into what variables may or may
not be significant in terms of the amount of a donor’s gift, it not entirely clear how
economically significant they are, given the distribution of GlobalGiving donations
as presented in Figure (30). The results for the ordered logit model are considered
below, and provided to give more context to the results for the fixed effects regression.
4.6.1.2 Ordered Logit Regression
While the ordered logit output is interpreted in a different way than the fixed effects
regression output, the logit results imply much the same thing about the factors
that influence the level of a donors gift. Table (10) outlines the results from several
ordered logit specifications. The output is expressed in the terms of the odds ratio
associated with each variable, which is an expression of the probability of being in
the one grouping in comparison to all groupings above it in ordering. For instance, if
specification (6) is considered, an increase of 1% in the amount of a project’s funding
goal completed would dictate that the odds of giving above $50 is 0.990 times less
likely than giving any amount $50 or less (i.e. the odds of being in the highest
grouping compared with all combined lower groupings is 0.990 times less likely). The
same thing can be said for a transition between any groupings such that it is also
0.990 times less likely to give more than $15 when compare with giving less than $15.
Considering specification (6), which controls for both time and fixed effects, it can
16An argument can be made that the subscribe regressor is not relevant in this context and only
serves to complicate the analysis by subsuming the effects of other relevant variables. Regressions
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































be seen that the days since the last project update, the amount of project funding
received relative to its goal, whether or not a donor subscribed to the newsletter,
and whether or not they chose to use the guest checkout option can all be considered
statistically significant in determining a donor’s likelihood of increasing or decreasing
his donation amount. The ordered logit results differ from the preceding fixed effects
regression in that the days since the last project update is now significant, while a
project’s age is not.
The days since the last project update imply a counter-intuitive result, in that
a 1 day increase in the days since the last update cause it to be more likely, by a
magnitude of 1.004 times, that a donor will increase his donation to a higher grouping.
The magnitude however is small enough is to not be very significant in practice, and
so it is not clear that recency of the last update is effective in moving donor’s donation
levels.
If one recalls Figure (30) it can be seen that the donation groupings are fairly
uniformly distributed across donors. As a consequence the variance in the set is
extremely small, making the ability to pick up reasons for variation via the regressors
difficult, particular in the presence of other explainers. Taking this into consideration,
table (18) in the appendix considers each transparency regressor in isolation, and show
significant effects in the total project updates measure, along with the days from the
last update, which would suggest that the transparency related variables may indeed
have some effect on donor choice, as it regards what level to give at. However, while
the results are statistically significant within the context of the model, the propotional
odds ratios of 1.003 and 1.031 corresponding to the days since the last update, and
total project updates, respectively, are not practically significant as they are both
very close to 1.17
17Further regressions on the ordered logit model were also run using various cutoff points, and
further sub-intervals among the gift amount groupings. This was done in order to test the robustness


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.6.1.3 Impact Philanthropy v. Threshold Giving
As discussed in 4.6.1 the existence of a negative coefficient on the amtofprojfunded is
slightly curious. Below we consider how this might justified, and why it is appropri-
ate to consider amtofprojfunded as a percentage. The evidence is motivated by the
economic literature on public goods and philanthropy.
Public goods theory introduces the notion of threshold public goods, which are
public goods that will, or can, only be provided once a certain funding threshold is
met. For instance, a city planning commission may only begin construction of a public
train system once they have received enough money such that they can complete the
entire construction. Alternatively they could begin construction in phases, whereby
once they receive enough money to build one route they begin construction, only
going to each phase once there is enough money. Regardless of the approach taken
the good should be considered a threshold good in the sense that only once a certain
threshold of funds are procured can a useful public train system be provided to the
community. In the first scenario the threshold is the entire cost of the project. In
the second scenario the minimum threshold is lower because the thresholds are phase
specific, but a threshold funding level must be reached nonetheless.
Because the projects on GlobalGiving each have an associated funding goal it
might be assumed that donors view these projects as threshold goods, in that a project
does not make an impact on the targeted area until the funding goal is reached. If
this is the case then it is not a stretch to imagine that the closer a project gets to its
goal the more each donor will contribute on average. For instance, if a donor goes
to GlobalGiving intending to give $10 but encounters a project that he would like to
give to that is only $50 away from being completely funded he may decide to give
that $50 so that the public good can be provided. Even if he does not provide the full
which the initial model was constructed. All of the other variations yielded either similar results, or
less significant results.
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$50 he may be encouraged to give $20 instead of $10 so as to make the prospect of the
good being provided more likely. Observance of this type of behavior would suggest
that donor’s act in accordance with the threshold theory, and view the public goods
found on the GlobalGiving site in this manner. Alternatively, in the sense that it
would elicit the opposite behavior from the donor, is the view that donors are impact
philanthropists.
Impact philanthropists, as defined by Duncan [32], are donors who seek to maxi-
mize the impact of the last dollar of their gift. In contrast to the perspective of one
who views the goods as threshold goods, an impact philanthropist views the contri-
bution of each additional dollar as having less impact than the previous dollar. This
view is a function of the belief that the good is of a continuous nature, in that unlike a
threshold good it can be provided once the first $1 is received, with more of the good
being provided as funding allows. In this sense, a donor who goes to GlobalGiving
ready to make a $20 donation may give only $10 to a project that he intrinsically
likes, but already has a high level of funding relative to its goal.18 There can indeed
be a mix of both types of donors, as their probably are. The question that seeks to
be answered here, is what type of donor is observed, on average, in the GlobalGiving
set.
Not knowing what type of donor exists a priori, the coefficient on the amtofpro-
jfunded regressor can offer some insight into this question. A coefficient < 0 would
suggest that donors, on average are impact giver’s, and view the projects provided
on GlobalGiving as continuous public goods. A coefficient > 0 would suggest that
donors view the goods as threshold, with increases in amtofprojfunded leading to in-
creased levels of giving as the project nears its funding goal. Because both types are
18One way to think of this is to assume that the donor still gives $20 but distributes it in $10
donations to two closely related projects so that the impact of the $20 is maximized. Alternatively,
it may also be the case that this type of donor will choose to give his complete $20 to a substitute
good that has less overall funding. However, this deals with a first level choice, and the data set
does not contain enough information to make the appropriate inferences.
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sensitive to the percentage change in the amount of the project that is funded, it is
appropriate that amtofprojfunded is expressed as such.
As a consequence the significant coefficient of -0.118 on the amtofprojfunded re-
gressor suggests that on average, donor’s in the data set view their gift in terms of
impact, and are likely to give more, if they perceive their gift as having more impact
relative to the gifts of others.
4.6.2 Part II: Results and Analysis
The multinomial logit model is initially considered for discrete choice analysis to
estimate the effect of project related information and donor characteristics on the
choice set (113). Table (11) presents the relative risk ratios from a multinomial logit
estimation, inclusive of controls for time effects, and project specific effects. The risk
ratios, which are the exponentiated coefficients of the logit model, are defined relative
to the base choice of not to give again (i.e. giveagain = 2). The results do not show
any significant effect for project related information, other than the project’s age,
on donor choice in this instance. Whether or not the donor has given previously is
shown to be the primary driver in determining the likelihood of a donor returning to
GlobalGiving to make a subsequent donation after an initial contribution.
For each additional donation, a donor becomes 4.198 times more likely to give to
a different GlobalGiving project in the future than they are to not give again at all,
and 3.090 times more likely to give to the same project in the future, than they are
to not give again at all. It is not particularly surprising that for each additional gift
a donor is more likely to return in the future, as one repeat gift is indicative of some
level of satisfaction with the process on the previous iteration, and so each additional
gift is evidence of either maintained or increased satisfaction.
The project’s age is shown to be significant in the comparison between the choice
of giving to a different project and not giving at all, but is not so in considering
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whether the donor gives again to the same project. In the instance of giving to
a different project it is shown that with each additional day that the project has
existed the less likely the donor will opt to give again in the future to a GlobalGiving
project. Specifically, an increase of 1 day in a project’s age will cause the the donor
to be 0.964 times more likely to be in the group of individuals which do contribute
again via GlobalGiving, which is to say the expectation that they will not give again
is increased.
As alluded to earlier, it could be argued that multinomial form is not appropriate
for this particular choice modeling, and that the decision should be considered a
binary one. Results follow for the binary variants of this multinomial model.
Table (12) presents the discrete choice analysis output for the set defined by (115),
such that the results characterize the factors which may influence a donor’s decision
to give again to the same project that he gave to initially or place his contribution
elsewhere (either within or outside GlobalGiving). In this coding of the data the full
regressor specification (10), inclusive of controls for the donation period, the project’s
age is the only significant project attribute. In addition to this attribute, the donor
associated characteristic, the donor’s number of donations (inclusive) was shown to
be significant.
Given a 1 day increase in the age of a project, specification (10) implies a de-
crease, by a factor of .972, in the odds of a donor choosing to give subsequently to
a GlobalGiving affiliated project. That is a project’s age at the time of an initial
donation is a significant factor in determining whether or not one will donate via
GlobalGiving within the subsequent 100 days. The effect of a project’s age on the
likelihood of repeat giving is counter-balanced, to some extent, by the significance
of the variable which measure’s how many donations a donor has made previously,
inclusive of the current gift. In fact, each subsequent gift by a donor increases the
odds of them returning to GlobalGiving within the next 100 days by a magnitude of
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Table 11: Relative Risk Ratios for the Multinomial Logit Model to Estimate Selection
into Repeat Giving (Don’t Return to GlobalGiving (GG) is Reference Group)
Choice Equations




Days Since Last Update 1.008 1.000
(0.00648) (0.00681)
Total Project Updates 1.175 0.753
(0.350) (0.250)
Total Previous Donors 0.990 0.997
(0.0127) (0.0190)
Project Funding (%) 1.138 1.503
(0.116) (0.544)
New Donors Since 0.989 0.996
(0.0127) (0.0189)
New Updates Since 1.118 1.000
(0.321) (0.316)
Increase in Funding (%) 1.167 1.487
(0.117) (0.535)
Subscribe? (0/1) 1.318* 0.835
(0.198) (0.142)
Guest Checkout? (0/1) 1.189 0.786
(0.810) (0.606)
Project Age (Days) 0.964*** 0.978
(0.0127) (0.0139)
Donor’s Donation 4.198*** 3.090***
(0.358) (0.278)
Observations 7292 7292
Log likelihood -1673 -1673
Chi2 1459 1459
DF 260 260
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
*Dummies for projects and periods are suppressed.
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3.56. These two regressors are also shown to be the only one’s of significance when
coding the choice set as in (116).
Choice set (116) takes the implicit view that if a donor does not give again to
the same project, then it is equivalent to not giving to another GlobalGiving project
at all. The project’s age now has the opposite effect, in that a one day increase in
the project’s age increases the odds by a magnitude of 1.014 that the donor will give
again to the same project within the following 100 days. The number of donation’s
a donor has made remains significant in the positive direction, but the magnitude of
the odds increase is reduced to 1.50.
It is not until the choice set (117), where those donors who did not give again to
a GlobalGiving affiliated charity are excluded, does any semblance of significance to
project related metrics arise. In this analysis, when not controlling for all periods, two
of the project related transparency regressors become significant. Namely, the total
project updates, and the number of viewed updates since the initial donation. The
total project proportional odds associated with the total project updates is less than 1
in both instances in which it is significant, while the odds increase associated with the
post donation updates is greater than 1 in specification (4). The latter observation is
in line with expectations and intuition. The meaning of the former is not clear in this
context, and perhaps points to some endogeneity issues within the dataset. Table (21)
in the appendix considers each transparency related regressor independently, controls
for time effects, and finds that none of the transparency regressors remain significant.
What does remain significant is the number of donations that a donor has made, and
in this case each increasing donation decreases the odds by a factor of approximately
0.7 that a donor will give again to the same project. While this is the opposite effect
of the previous two cases there is no overriding justification to argue that it should
be one way or the other. When considered in the context of the higher level decision















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tables (14) and (15) offer some summary statistics of the populations, as repre-
sented by their groupings. Table (14) offers an overview of the type of projects, by
theme, that receive the donors initial gift for each of the distinct groupings that began
this section. The table does not reveal any overt difference between the groups with
respect to the types of project they initially give to, other than of those who gave
again to the same project a larger percentage of their initial overall contribution went
to gender than the other two groups. Table (15) provides more instructive statistics
for the two groups of donors who do make repeat contributions. In particular there
are significant differences in the means of each population across three categories.
The days between gifts, and the amount of the initial donation were both lower for
those who gave again to the same project. Most relevant to the preceding analysis the
donor who gave again to the same project was able to view, on average, 2.88 updates
from their initial project, whereas those who gave to a different project viewed 2.23
updates from the time of their initial gift to the time of their subsequent gift. This
occurs even in spite of the fact that donors who give to different projects take longer
to do so, which would in effect allow them more time to receive potential updates.
Because of a focus on the subset of donors who do give again one is not longer
restricted to dropping donors from the last 100 days of the data set. Table (22) in the
appendix considers how the inclusion of the previously dropped observations alters
the conditional logit analysis if at all. Almost doubling the number of observations,
some slight changes are noted in the significance of the regressors. In particular,
the project’s initial level of funding, and subsequent post donation level of funding
are shown to be significant at 90% in the first three specification, while in the fifth
specification whether or not a project was updated in the interval since the donation
is shown to be significant at 95%, with the odds of giving to the same project again
increasing by a magnitude of 2.347. This is quite a significant result, and hints towards
the value of just one update among the set of donors who have already decided to
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give again.
Table 14: The Initial Donation Project Theme of Donors by whether they “Give
Again”







Children 12 0 14 26
Climate 4 3 8 15
Disaster 135 100 4,483 4,718
Econ. Dev 13 11 157 181
Education 22 70 256 348
Environment 3 1 82 86
Finance 1 0 1 2
Gender 23 51 580 654
Health 81 21 1,086 1,188
Hum. Rights 13 3 30 46
Sports 5 1 15 21
Tech 0 0 7 7
Total 312 261 6,719 7,292
It was speculated in section 4.6.1.1 that one might be able to explain the lower
level of giving associated with donor’s who subscribe to the newsletter by showing
that they were more likely to give on a sustained basis, and consequently, give more
over the long run. However, the results here do not support this hypothesis as the
subscribe variable is not shown to be significant in the three cases.
It is also worth considering the effect of disaster related giving on the observed
results. As mentioned before, disaster related giving stemming from the Myanmar
Cyclone and Chinese Earthquake account for approximately 28% of observed dona-
tions. There is an arugment to be made that these projects should not be included
in the analyzed data set, as giving to them is driven by outside influences to a much
larger extent than other projects on the site.19 Furthermore, giving to disaster related
19The argument can be made that because these events recieved a high level of media exposure in
the general population, that the giving to these events are influenced by many more unobservables
than projects which are of a more sustained variety on the GlobalGiving site.
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Table 15: Summary of statistics for donors who give again to GlobalGiving, either to
a new project or to same project.
Give Again? Days Btw.Gifts Initial Donation($) Age(Days) Updates
New Project
29.84*** 84.07** 31.63 2.23**
-26.49 -153.73 -39.51 -3.37
[26.89;32.79] [66.95;101.20] [27.23;36.03] [1.85;2.60]
Same Project
15.16*** 57.11** 33.75 2.88**
-14.12 -110.63 -39.59 -4.42
[13.44;16.88] [43.63;70.60] [28.93;38.58] [2.34;3.42]
Total
23.15 71.79 32.6 2.53
-22.93 -136.36 -39.52 -3.89
[21.57;24.73] [62.41;81.18] [29.88;35.32] [2.26;2.79]
Standard deviations in parentheses
95% Confidence intervals in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
projects are traditionally viewed as one-off occurences, in which donors give at the
time of the event, but do not neccesarily sustain a relationship with the recipient
organization or disaster. As such, it is possible the coding of whether or not an in-
dividual gives again to the same project or not is skewed by the presence of disaster
related data. Consequently, disaster related projects were removed from the set, and
the conditonal logit regressions of Tables (19), (20), and (21) were reproducded for
the altered set, and are also found in the appendix. The results for both the 2nd
and 3rd models, tables (24) and (25) respectively, do not drastically differ from the
results with inclusion, as none of the regressors of interest are shown to be significant
at a 95% level. However, the 1st model (Table (23)), in which the donor’s choice be-
tween not giving again at all, or giving again to a GlobalGiving project is considered,
shows both statisical, and practical significance for the post donation project update
boolean, with an odds ratio of 2.851 at a 99% significance level. With the interpre-
tation that the odds of giving again increase by a factor of 2.851 if a donor recieves
an update after his inital donation. In this context, this results suggest that trans-
parency matters to the donor. However, again, we do not see that it is statistically





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As with most observational data, problems arise when one attempts to establish
causal relationships from the provided data set. In contrast to data collected through
experiment, observational data requires that the researcher attempt to control for the
effect of outside influences on the relationship of interest at the time of analysis, as
opposed to at the time of collection [81]. The GlobalGiving data set is not without
exception, and some of the issues with the data, particularly as it relates to both
internal and external validity are explored below.
There is an initial question of external validity as it concerns the dataset, and the
derived results. Ideally, the data set would allow one to make conjectures about the
effect of transparency related variables on the giving behavior of the overall popula-
tion. However, it is not clear that the composition of the data set would allow one
to make such a conclusion. The donors who have opted to give donations via Glob-
alGiving have self selected into the grouping, and as consequence the set consists of
donors, who at least to some extent, care about the ideas of transparency and impact
in charitable giving. It is highly unlikely that the population contained in the data
set is representative of the population at large, and this particular data set does not
offer a way in which to test that notion. In general this is not an issue as it concerns
the analysis, but it does constrain the conclusions one can make from the analysis.
As a result the conclusions are sub-population specific, and not generalizable to the
population at large.
While self-selection limits the conclusions that can be made via the set, there
are other issues which threaten the internal validity of the analysis, not the least of
which are omitted variables which are not found in the data set. With regard to
GlobalGiving, and the empirical focus on the question of transparency, project rank-
ings, information placement, and giving amount anchors are all important variables
that are not included in the given set. However, the inclusion of the aforementioned
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variables is not necessarily a panacea for threats to validity.
A project’s ranking, as discussed in the introductory section, is determined by
GlobalGiving, and comprised of four primary components. The ranking is important,
as it drives project exposure which, as the donor search model shows, drives the
number of donors that a project will receive. As a consequence, without having the
the project’s ranking readily accessible it is difficult to distinguish exposure effects
on the gift amount and likelihood of return, from the effects of transparency, as the
transparency variables are in part drivers of the ranking. The absence of the ranking
variable is more pronounced in its effect on the level of the gift than on the donor’s
likelihood of giving to a project again. Analysis of a donor’s likelihood of giving again
is largely unaffected as the project is already known to the donor when the analysis
begins. Within the constraints of that framework the explicit ranking of a project,
and how it changes on a day to day basis is less important to the donor, as it can
be understood through the lens of other closely associated input factors. However,
for the giving level it is important to control for how donors view the ranking, or a
project’s placement in the search cue, as a signal of quality. If the ranking is high,
a donor may be inclined to give more to that project. While it would be beneficial
to have the explicit day to day ranking, the inclusion of several of the inputs in the
dataset help to mitigate this problem
It should also be noted that even if the ranking measure were present within the
set, validity issues would still persist, particularly as it relates to reverse causality. If
one assumes, as the donor search model does, that exposure for a project increases
the amount of donations seen by that project then it is not clear that one could make
a clean inference as it regards the effect of ranking on the number of donors and
vice versa. If ranking increases exposure then the number of donors and amount of
donations would be expected to increase. However, because ranking is driven by these
components, it can just as easily be stated that increases in the number of donors and
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amount of donations will cause the ranking to increase. As a consequence the effect
of one variable on the other would be hard to distinguish without the appropriate
instrument. Because the number and timing of project updates is not explicitly
driven by the ranking it does not fall into the aforementioned cycle. However, there
are concerns about endogeneity of the update related variables, and whether or not
expectations about the return on updates causes underperforming projects to provide
more updates, thus biasing the effect on behavior results of updates.20
Of even more concern than a project’s ranking is the placement of project infor-
mation within the project page. While all of the project related variables used for
analysis were readily available to the donors it is not clear how much of the informa-
tion the donor viewed. Each piece of information is placed on the page with some
pieces receiving more prominent placement than others. For instance, when one visits
a project page it is easy to see the amount of money raised, and the number of donors
who have contributed thus far, with the amount of funding requested following shortly
thereafter. While the days since the most recent update is available, along with all
previous updates, this information is not as readily available. As a consequence it is
not entirely clear which pieces of information are being viewed. Seen in the analysis
thus far, with the exception of table (22), transparency related variables were shown
not to have a significant effect on either the level of the gift nor on the decision to
return and give again. This may well have to do with placement of this information,
as it occurs fairly far down on a project’s page. While one may argue that if a donor
is truly concerned about these transparency proxies then they will search for them
on the page regardless, it would serve the analysis better to have had randomization
over page placement, for relevant information.
Another issue posed by how GlobalGiving controls its site is the provision for
coherent arbitrariness, or anchoring of the gift amount. It is has been well documented
20Chapter 2 speaks to this adverse signaling behavior as a possibility.
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that in contributing to public goods donors are often times unaware of their value for
the good, while maintaining coherent preferences over goods [8]. As such, a donor
can be coaxed to give a certain amount to a project by setting the baseline at that
amount. GlobalGiving does this explicitly (perhaps as a side effect) as it offers each
potential project donor a menu of options as to what they can contribute toward,
and how much a particular impact level will cost. However, these menus vary across
projects, and so it is perhaps not fair to compare giving levels across projects without
controlling for these menu options. This problem is remedied, to some extent, through
the use of fixed effects regression and logit models.
One of the primary concerns in the discrete choice analysis portion is the absence of
data on the GlobalGiving project portfolio. The data set does not contain information
on all available projects on the GlobalGiving website for a particular day, which would
allow for a more thorough analysis of how donors choose between projects. The
absence of this data causes a limitation in the type of analysis that can be done, and
as discussed earlier it does not allow for one to consider the decision at the fist stage
of the donor search model. in particular it does not allow one to fully characterize
the discrete choice set. As a consequence the logit models were derived with a focus
placed on the attributes of the initial project, and how those attributes contribute
toward defining whether or not a donor returned to his a her project. To more fully
address the choice issue, more information needs to be known about the attributes
of the various alternatives during a given period. As discussed within the context of
the framework this required a focus on the second stage giving transaction, and while
transparency proxies were not shown to be very significant in this stage, it may be
the case that they are most important in the first stage.
While the observational data set presents some limitations on the analysis there
are still some conclusions that can be made from the prior analysis, which can serve
to help define what is understood about donor behavior.
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4.8 Conclusions and Future Work
Given some of the issues raised in section 4.7 a question remains as to what the results
mean, and how they should be interpreted with respect to the initial hypotheses, H1
and H2. It was assumed that the defined transparency proxies, the days from the
last update and the total number of project updates, would have a positive effect on
both the the level of the gift, and the likelihood of repeat giving. A cursory reading
of the results would lead one to reject both H1 and H2, as these regressors were
shown either to be not statistically significant, or were statistically significant but
not practically meaningful, with the exception of a few cases. Of notable exception
was the impact of the post donation project update variable for the scenarios outlined
in tables (22) and (23). However, these results alone, while encouraging evidence of
transparency effects, are not robust enough to not reject H1 and H2 when considered
in the context of the holistic analysis conducted throughout. These results, however,
must be contextualized within the framework of the population of study.
As discussed previously the results suffer from external validity threats, in that
the population under consideration is a specific subset of the population that has
self-selected into using the GlobalGiving website, presumably because of its promise
of transparency, and mechanisms to monitor impact. One might argue, that as a
consequence, if transparency was truly important in giving it would manifest itself
in this group more than any other, as donors in the this group have self identified as
being transparency conscious. The larger point, however, may be that transparency
matters, but only to the point that it allows one to freely give along the dimensions of
project preference. In this sense, the donor’s view of GlobalGiving as a trustworthy
brand provides a baseline beyond which transparency related output does not effect
donor behavior in a significant way.
Both GlobalGiving and the donor search model begin with the premise that there
is a significant subset of the population that wants to give charitably, for a multitude
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of reasons, and will do so in greater volume and amounts if transparency is increased.
While this analysis lacks the power to make that conclusion definitively, the con-
tinued existence, growth and popularity of GlobalGiving, and comparable charitable
marketplaces can be offered as evidence in support of that notion.21 As such, this
analysis should not be taken as transparency does not matter in giving, but that it
matters to the point that it allows one to feel comfortable about the impact of their
contribution. The contrarian viewpoint, that donor’s don’t care about transparency
in the sense that it increases their internalization of the public portion of the gift, but
in fact only care about the appearance of transparency in so far as it allows them to
enhance their associated warm-glow cannot be ruled out. This could in fact be offered
as one explanation as to why it does not appear that GlobalGiving donors consider
transparency related variables as drivers in their decision making beyond selection
into the site. In either case the promise of transparency and tangible impact does
seem to play a role in attracting donors to GlobalGiving’s site, which might lead one
to conclude there is an opportunity for growth in the coming years for competitors
and GlobalGiving alike, perhaps with an eye toward specialization among project
themes or project countries.
Of particular interest to GlobalGiving and other similarly positioned organiza-
tions, is how to continually engage a set of donors who have self-identified as altruists
who are willing to give, particularly if the answer does not lie in increased trans-
parency beyond a threshold level. While other social information was shown to have
some effect on the level of giving, it is perhaps the diversity of interests contained
within one individual that might be best leveraged to engage donors in a more proac-
tive way. Recommendations of similar projects to an individual at the time of the
initial gift, or at some point thereafter might serve to re-engage those who no longer
21From 2004 to 2008 GlobalGiving had a 13.58% increase in contributions from $508,653 to
$7,418,503.
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have concerns about project validity and impact, but are concerned with simply sat-
isfying their thematic preferences.
Future work in this area should focus on testing a more diverse set of the giving
population through large scale field experiments. The emergence and popularity of
online markets for charitable giving in recent years allow the researcher to have greater
reach and flexibility in testing issues of transparency. There were several factors here
which prohibit one from making stronger conclusions about transparency’s role in
giving that could be mitigated in a more controlled environment. In the effort to
both maximize the pool of humanitarian funds, and to better utilize those funds,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
Conclusions and extensions as it regards the specific models and empirical analysis are
discussed at the end of each respective chapter. However, if one were to offer an over-
all conclusion on the thematic work of the dissertation, it would be that information,
as it regards organization quality, is significant in determining how donors and or-
ganizations conduct themselves within the philanthropic, or charitable, marketplace.
While a seemingly obvious result on the surface, the way in which information man-
ifests itself is quite unique with respect to other economic markets. Not only do the
dual objectives of the nonprofit alter how information is used, but as was mentioned
at the outset the market for charitable goods is quite unique in that donors often
times can’t experience firsthand the charitable output toward which they contribute.
In this respect, information and signals about organization quality and behavior take
on heightened importance within the domain of the charitable marketplace.
Chapters 2 and 3, in particular, offer frameworks for how one can begin to think
about the effect of information as it regards organization quality and relevance. Chap-
ter 4 offers an empirical analysis that was able to provide some insight into real world
donor behavior in a charitable marketplace. This work represents a small piece of a
much larger subset of literature and research that has been conducted on why people
give, and why organizations comport themselves as they do. In this respect, this
dissertation makes a contribution to advancing notions of how information functions
within this sector, and provides alternative ways to think about its role. Furthermore,
these models have laid the groundwork for future research, particularly as it regards
191
testing and verification of the models both as a whole, and as it regards specific pa-
rameters. As was mentioned before, the GlobalGiving observational data set allowed
us to take an important first step as it regards verification, but the limits of such
a set open the door for experimental techniques. In particular, controlled lab and
field experiments, which have been the tools of the experimental economist in the
philanthropic sector over the past decade are very amenable to further testing and
verification of these models.
Looking toward the future, as social entrepreneurship contains to develop and take
center stage within the philanthropic discussion, the way in which people think about
giving will continue to expand. Understanding how information can be manipulated
and interpreted to maximize impact in organization and institution design will be
critical. It is the author’s desire that this work will provide more consciousness both
from the donor and organization perspective into how behaviors are shaped, with
the hope that more efficient use of donor funds that are currently available can be
facilitated, and also that the pool of funds from which to draw on can be expanded,
so that effective solutions can continue to be implemented through the laudable work
of many of these organizations.
192
REFERENCES
[1] Akerlof, G., “The market for lemons: Qualitative uncertainty and the market
mechanism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 84, no. 3, pp. 488 – 500,
1970.
[2] Alpizar, F., Carlsson, F., and Johansson-Stenman, O., “Does context
matter more for hypothetical than for actual contributions? evidence from a
natural field experiment,” Experimental Economics, vol. 11, pp. 299–314, 2008.
[3] Andreoni, J., “Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory
of warm-glow giving,” The Economic Journal, vol. 100, no. 401, pp. 467–477,
1990.
[4] Andreoni, J., Handbook of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, ch. Philan-
thropy, pp. 1201–1269. 2006.
[5] Andreoni, J., “Leadership giving and charitable fund-raising,” Journal of
Public Economic Theory, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1 – 22, 2006.
[6] Andreoni, J. and Scholz, J. K., “An econometric analysis of charitable
giving with interdependent preferences,” Economic Inquiry, vol. 36, no. 3, 1998.
[7] Anheier, H., “Global civil society,” tech. rep., The Centre for the Study of
Global Governance, 2001.
[8] Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., and Prelec, D., “coherent arbitrariness:
Stable demand curves without stable preferences,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, pp. 73–105, February 2003.
[9] Atakan, A. E., “Assortative matching with explicit search costs,” Economet-
rica, vol. 74, no. 3, pp. 667–680, 2006.
[10] Barman, E., “With strings attached: Nonprofits and the adoption of donor
choice,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 39–56,
2008.
[11] Barnett, M., “Can humanitarianism save itself?,” tech. rep., Hubert
Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota.
[12] Becker, G. S., “A theory of marriage: Part i,” The Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 81, no. 4, pp. 813–846, 1973.
[13] Bekkers, R. and Wiepking, P., “Generosity and philanthropy - a literature
review,” 2007.
193
[14] Bellman, R., Dynamic Programming. Princeton University Press, 1957.
[15] Bennett, J., Bertrand, W., Harkin, C., Samarasinghe, S., and Wick-
ramatillake, H., “Coordination of international humanitarian assistance in
tsunami-affected countries,” tech. rep., Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, July
2006.
[16] Bennett, R. and Kottasz, R., “Emergency fund-raising for disaster relief,”
Disaster and Prevention Management, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 352 – 359, 2000.
[17] Bilodeau, M. and Slivinski, A., “Rival charities,” The Journal of Public
Economics, vol. 66, pp. 449–467, 1997.
[18] Blackwood, A., Wing, K. T., and Pollak, T. H., “The nonprofit sector
in brief: Facts and figures from the nonprofit almanac 2008,” tech. rep., The
Urban Institute, 2008.
[19] Borton, J., “Recent trends in the international relief system,” Disasters,
vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 187–201, 1993.
[20] Bowman, W., “Should donors care about overhead costs? do they care?,”
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, vol. 35, pp. 288–310, 2006.
[21] Brown, P. and Minty, J., “Media coverage & charitable giving after the 2004
tsunami,” Working Paper 855, William Davidson Institute at The University
of Michigan, 2006.
[22] Casataneda, M. A., Garen, J., and Thornton, J., “Competition, con-
tractibility, and the market for donors to nonprofits,” Journal of Law, Eco-
nomics, & Organization, vol. 24, no. 1, 2007.
[23] Clinton, B., Giving: How Each of Us Can Change the World. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.
[24] Cooley, A. and Ron, J., “Perverse aid: The new market for foreign assis-
tance.”
[25] Cooley, A. and Ron, J., “The ngo scramble: Organizational insecurity and
the political economy of transnational action,” International Security, vol. 27,
no. 1, pp. 5–39, 2002.
[26] Cornes, R. and Sandler, T., The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods,
and Club Goods. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
[27] Crawford, V. and Sobel, J., “Strategic information transmission,” Econo-
metrica, vol. 50, no. 6, pp. 1431 – 1451, 1982.
[28] Croson, R. and Shang, J., “The impact of downward social information on
contribution decisions,” Experimental Economics, vol. 11, pp. 221–233, 2008.
194
[29] Crumpler, H. and Grossman, P., “An experimental test of warm glow
giving,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92, no. 5-6, pp. 1011 – 1021, 2008.
[30] Darby, M. R. and Karni, E., “Free competition and the optimal amount of
fraud,” The Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 16, pp. 67–88, 1973.
[31] Donini, A. and Niland, N., “Lessons learned: A report on the coordination
of humanitarian activities in rwanda,” tech. rep., United Nations Department
of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), 1-51 1994.
[32] Duncan, B., “A theory of impact philanthropy,” Journal of Public Economics,
vol. 88, pp. 2159–2180, 2004.
[33] Feigenbaum, S., “Competition and performance in the nonprofit sector: The
case of us medical research charities,” The Journal of Industrial Economics,
vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 241–253, 1987.
[34] Frumkin, P. and Kim, M. T., “Strategic positioning and the financing of non-
profit organizations: Is efficiency rewarded in the contributions marketplace?,”
Public Administration Review, vol. 61, no. 3, p. 266, 2001.
[35] Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J., Game Theory. The MIT Press, 1991.
[36] Garman, S., Hampshire, R., and Krishnan, R., “A search theoretic model
of person-to-person lending.” May 2008.
[37] Ghosh, S. and Van Tassel, E., “A model of mission drift in microfinance
institutions.” 2008.
[38] Glazer, A. and Konrad, K., “A signaling explanation for private charity,”
American Economic Review, vol. 86, no. 4, pp. 1019 – 1028, 1996.
[39] Greene, W. H., Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall, 5th ed., 2003.
[40] Hall, J., “Too many ways to divide donations?,” The Christian Science Mon-
itor.
[41] Handy, F., “How we beg: The analysis of direct mail appeals,” Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 439–454, 2000.
[42] Hansmann, H., “The role of nonprofit enterprise,” The Yale Law Journal,
vol. 89, no. 5, 1980.
[43] Harbaugh, W., “What do donations buy? a model of philanthropy based on
prestige and warm glow,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 67, pp. 269 – 284,
1998.
[44] Hibbert, S. and Horne, S., “Giving to charity: questioning the donor deci-
sion process,” Journal of Consumer Marketing, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 4–13, 1996.
195
[45] Hitsch, G., Hortacsu, A., and Ariely, D., “What makes you click? mate
preferences and matching outcomes in online dating.” April 2006.
[46] Holtmann, A. G., “A theory of non-profit firms,” Economica, vol. 50, no. 200,
pp. 439–449, 1983.
[47] Hsu, J. L., Liang, G.-Y., and Tien, C.-P., “Social concerns and willingness
to support charities,” Social Behavior and Personality, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 189–
200, 2005.
[48] James, E., “How nonprofits grow: A model,” Journal of Policy Analysis and.
[49] Jovanovic, B., “Job matching and the theory of turnover,” The Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 87, no. 5, pp. 972–990, 1979.
[50] Karlan, D. and List, J. A., “Does price matter in charitable giving? ev-
idence from a large-scale natural field experiment,” The American Economic
Review, vol. 7, December 2007.
[51] Kottasz, R., “Differences in the donor behavior characteristics of young af-
fluent males and females: Empirical evidence from britain,” Voluntas: Interna-
tional Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, vol. 15, no. 2, 2004.
[52] Lankford, R. H. and Wyckoff, J. H., “Modeling charitable giving using a
box-cox standard tobit model,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 73,
no. 3, 1991.
[53] Lippman, S. and McCall, J., eds., Studies in the Economics of Search,
vol. 123 of Contributions to Economic Analysis. North-Holland Publishing
Company, 1979.
[54] Lipson, M., “Interorganizational networks in peacekeeping and humanitarian
relief: An institutional theory perspective,” in Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, (Philadelphia, PA), p. 29, 2003.
[55] List, J. A., “Introduction to field experiments in economics with applications
to the economics of charity,” Experimental Economics, vol. 11, pp. 203–212,
2008.
[56] Ljungqvist, L. and Sargent, T. J., Recursive Macroeconomic Theory. Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000.
[57] Macrae, J. and Harmer, A., “Humanitarian action and the ‘global war on
terror’: a review of trends and issues,” Tech. Rep. 14, Overseas Development
Institute: Humanitarian Policy Group, July 2003 2003.
[58] Marinescu, I., “Labor market shocks and marriage duration.” October 2008.
[59] Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., and Green, J. R., Microeconomic
Theory. Oxford University Press, Inc., 1995.
196
[60] McCall, J., “Economics of information and job search,” The Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, vol. 84, no. 1, pp. 113–126, 1970.
[61] Meijer, M.-M., “The effects of charity reputation on charitable giving,” Cor-
porate Reputation Review, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 33–42, 2009.
[62] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J., “Price and advertising signals of product
quality,” The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, no. 4, pp. 796 – 821, 1986.
[63] Minear, L., The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries.
Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc., 2002.
[64] Minear, L., Chelliah, U., Crips, J., Mackinlay, J., and Weiss, T. G.,
“Un coordination of the international humanitarian response to the gulf crisis
1990 - 1992,” Tech. Rep. 13, Thomas J. Watson Institute for International
Studies, 1992.
[65] Mirrlees, J., “An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation,”
The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 175 – 208, 1971.
[66] Moore, S., Eng, E., and Daniel, M., “International ngos and the role of
network centrality in humanitarian aid operations: A case study of coordination
during the 2000 mozambique floods,” Disasters, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 305–318,
2003.
[67] Moorthy, S. and Srinivasan, K., “Signaling quality with a money-back
guarantee: The role of transaction costs,” Marketing Science, vol. 14, no. 4,
1995.
[68] Natsios, A. S., “Ngos and the un system in complex humanitarian emergen-
cies: conflict or cooperation?,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 405–
419, 1995.
[69] Nelson, P., “Information and consumer behavior,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 311–329, 1970.
[70] Nelson, P., “Information and consumer behavior,” The Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 311 – 329, 1970.
[71] Pepall, L., Richards, D., Straub, J., and DeBartolo, M., “Crowding
out and competition in the religious marketplace.” 2007.
[72] Radley, A. and Kennedy, M., “Charitable giving by individuals: A study
of attitudes and practice,” Human Relations, vol. 48, no. 6, 1995.
[73] Reindorp, N. and Wiles, P., “Humanitarian coordination: Lessons from
recent field experience,” tech. rep., Overseas Development Institute, June 2001
2001.
197
[74] Reinhardt, G., “Matching donors and nonprofits: The importance of signal-
ing in funding awards.” Working Paper, 2007.
[75] Ribar, D. C. and Wilhelm, M. O., “Altruistic and joy-of-giving motivations
in charitable behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 110, no. 2, 2002.
[76] Riley, J., “Silver signals: Twenty-five years of screening and signaling,” Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 432–478, 2001.
[77] Romano, R. and Yildirim, H., “Why charities announce donations: A pos-
itive perspective,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 81, no. 3, pp. 423 – 447,
2001.
[78] Rondeau, D. and List, J. A., “Matching and challenge gifts to charity: evi-
dence from laboratory and natural field experiments,” Experimental Economics,
vol. 11, pp. 253–267, 2008.
[79] Rose-Ackerman, S., “Charitable giving and “excessive” fundraising,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 97, no. 2, pp. 193–212, 1982.
[80] Rose-Ackerman, S., “Altruism, nonprofits, and economic theory,” Journal
of Economic Literature, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 701 – 728, 1996.
[81] Rosenbaum, P. R., “Observational Study,” in Encyclopedia of Statistics in
Behavioral Science (Everitt, B. S. and Howell, D. C., eds.), pp. 1451–
1462, John Wiley & Sons, 2005.
[82] Roth, A. E. and Sotomayor, M. A. O., Two-Sided Matching: A study in
game-theoretic modeling and analysis. Cambridge University Press, 1992.
[83] Rothschild, M., “Models of market organization with imperfect information:
A survey,” Public Administration Review, vol. 81, no. 6, pp. 1283–1308, 1973.
[84] Sargeant, A., “Charitable giving: Towards a model of donor behaviour,”
Journal of Marketing Management, vol. 15, pp. 215–238, 1999.
[85] Sargeant, A., Ford, J. B., and West, D. C., “Perceptual determinants of
nonprofit giving behavior,” Journal of Business Research, vol. 59, pp. 155–165,
2006.
[86] Sargeant, A., West, D. C., and Ford, J., “The role of perceptions in
predicting donor value,” Journal of Marketing Management, vol. 17, no. 3-4,
pp. 407–428, 2001.
[87] Sargeant, A. and Woodliffe, L., “Gift giving: An interdisciplinary re-
view,” International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing,
vol. 12, no. 4, 2007.
[88] Shimer, R. and Smith, L., “Assortative matching and search,” Econometrica,
vol. 68, no. 2, pp. 343–369, 2000.
198
[89] Simon, A., “Television news and international earthquake relief,” Journal of
Communication, vol. 47, no. 3, 1997.
[90] Smillie, I., “Relief and development: The struggle for synergy,” 1998.
[91] Spence, M., “Job market signaling,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 87, no. 3, pp. 355 – 374, 1973.
[92] Steinberg, R., “The revealed objective functions of nonprofit firms,” The
RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 508–526, 1986.
[93] Stephenson, Max, J., “Making humanitarian relief networks more effective:
Exploring the relationships among coordination, trust and sense making,” Dis-
asters, vol. 29, no. 4, 2005.
[94] Stephenson, Max, J. and Schnitzer, M., “Interorganizational trust,
boundary spanning and humanitarian relief coordination,” Nonprofit Manage-
ment & Leadership, vol. 17, no. 2, 2006.
[95] Stigler, G., “The economics of information,” The Journal of Political Econ-
omy, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 213–225, 1961.
[96] Stockton, N., “Strategic coordination in afghanistan,” tech. rep., August
2002 2002.
[97] Tisdell, C. and Wilson, C., “Information, wildlife valuation, conservation:
Experiments and policy,” Contemporary Economic Policy, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 144
– 159, 2006.
[98] Tuckman, H. P., “Competition, commercialization, and the evolution of non-
profit organizational structures,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,
vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 175–194, 1998.
[99] Venable, B. T., Rose, G. M., Bush, V. D., and Gilbert, F., “The role of
brand personality in charitable giving: An assessment and validation,” Journal
of the Academy of Marketing Science, vol. 33, no. 3, 2005.
[100] Vesterlund, L., “The informational value of sequential fundraising,” Journal
of Public Economics, vol. 87, pp. 627 – 657, 2003.
[101] Vickrey, W., “Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders,”
Journal of Finance, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 41 – 50, 1961.
[102] Weisbrod, B. A., ed., The Voluntary Nonprofit Sector. Lexington Books,
1977.
[103] Wilde, L. L., Studies in the Economics of Search, ch. An Information-
Theoretic Approach to Job Quits. Yale University Press, 1987.
199
[104] Williamson, O. E., “Transaction-cost economics: The governance of con-
tractual relations,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 233–261,
1979.
[105] Willitts-King, B. and Harvey, P., “Managing the risks of corruption in
humanitarian relief operations,” tech. rep., Overseas Development Institute -
Humanitarian Policy Group, 2005/3/31 2005.
[106] Wolpert, J. and Reiner, T., “A philanthropy marketplace,” Economic Ge-
ography, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 197–209, 1984.
[107] Wood, J., “Improving ngo coordination: lessons from the bam earthquake,”
tech. rep., Humanitarian Practice Network, 2004/15/07 2004.
[108] Yashiv, E., “Labor search and matching in macroeconomics,” European Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 51, pp. 1859–195, 2007.
200
VITA
Clarence L. Wardell III was born in Detroit, Michigan on October 13th, 1982. He
attended the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor, where he obtained a Bachelor of
Science and Engineering Degree in Computer Engineering in 2004. Upon graduation
he joined the PhD program in Industrial and Systems Engineering at the Georgia
Institute of Technology.
201
